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Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings
LENN! B. BENSON•

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Plenary Power Meets Plenary Power
To become a United States citizen, a lawful pennanent resident
alien 1 must successfully demonstrate a knowledge of United States history and government. 2 A standard examination question is: "How many

• Associate Professor at New York Law School. In preparing this Article, I especially
appreciate the assistance of Martin Bloor and Lisa Schatz, students at New York Law School
and the financial support of the school. I am grate.fa/ for the comments of Gerald Neuman,
Margaret Taylor and Peter Schuck I also benefitted from discussions with many people including Stephen Legomsky, Denise Morgan, Hiroshi Motomura, Nancy Morawetz, Stephen YaleLoehr, Lucas Guttentag, Linda Bosniak, Jeff Heller, Pamela Goldberg, Michael Botein, Charles
Weisse/berg and Stanley Mailman.
1. A lawful pennanent resident alien is a person who may Jive and reside on a permanent
basis within the United States subject to removal due to specific violations of the immigration
laws. See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 101(a)(20). Lawful admission for permanent residence is ordinarily a prerequisite to qualifying for naturalization as a United States
citizen. Although the Constitution does not use the term "alien," it is used in statutory language. Under the INA, an "alien" is any person not a citizen or national of the United States.
See INA § 101(a)(3). At times in this Article, I will use the term "alien" to achieve precision
in quotations of statutory and other legal material or legal clarity. I have .adopted "noncitizen"
as a less prejudicial tenn.
The term "alien" unfortunately raises many negative images. Many writers are beginning
to question the use of the tenn "alien." For example, Gerald Neuman points out that using
the tenn alien "calls attention to [the person's] 'otherness' and even associates them with nonhuman invaders from outer space." Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Prorection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425,
1428 (1995).
2. INA § 312(a)(2) states that no person shall be naturalized as a citizen of the United
States who cannot demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of history,
and of the principles and form of government, of the United States. For a general discussion
on the United States history and government knowledge requirements, see 4 CHARLES GORDON
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 95.03(4](c] (1997).
"Fll'St published in: 29 Conn. L. Rev.1411 (1997)."
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branches are there in the federal government of the United States?"3
The correct answer of course is three branches. However, where immigration enforcement is concerned, the more accurate answer might
appear to be two branches-Legislative and Executive. Why no judicial branch? The evisceration of judicial power is due to important
recent legislation that purports to eliminate, or at least radically curtail,
judicial review of immigration proceedings.
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA")4 eliminated judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders for noncitizens convicted of "aggravated felonies." This legislation
also eliminated a traditional, frequently granted, waiver of deportability
for long term lawful residents. Judicial review was further restricted in
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRAIRA").5 IIRAIRA repealed a longstanding provision that
authorized judicial review in the circuit court of appeals and guaranteed
habeas corpus review upon detention. Although IIRAIRA created a
streamlined form of review in the circuit court of appeals for some
classes of noncitizens, it purports to bar disfavored groups and
disfavored claims from review in any Article III court. In addition,
IIRAIRA contains a multitude of individual statutory provisions that
Congress independently designed to expedite, curtail, or eliminate whatever remains of judicial review. A more detailed description of the
legislation is set forth in Part IV.
Two forms of congressional plenary power-power over the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and power over immigration-shaped this
legislation. The doctrine of plenary power in immigration law, a well

3. AUSTIN FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 14-68, 14-69 (1997).
4. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter "AEDPA"]. AEDPA also created a new form of deportation
proceeding for noncitizens accused of terrorist activity which involved Article III court adjudication but severely curtailed the due process rights of the noncitizen respondent. This article will
not address those provisions which are aimed at removals of noncitizens accused of terrorism.
See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone? Due Process and Secret Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996) (describing the new terrorism deportation procedures).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (a modified version of the conference report on H.R. 2202 was included as Division C of the conference
report filed in the House on H.R. 3601 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act (1997))
(H.R. REP. No. 104-863), and by a recorded vote of 370-37 (with 1 abstaining), the House
agreed to that conference report. On September 28, 1996, the Senate, by voice vote, agreed to
the conference report on H.R. 3610, and the measure was signed by the President, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), amended by, 104 Pub. L. No. 302 (Oct. 4, 1996)) [hereinafter
"llRAIRA"]. The October 4 changes were part of a technical amendment bill.
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known and frequently criticized legal construct, 6 holds that Congress
has plenary power to regulate the admission of aliens to the United
States with few constitutional limits. 7 The power to determine the
substantive grounds for deportation (now called removal) have also
been referred to as within the scope of this power. 8 Yet, even as the
courts recite the mantra of plenary power, they have preserved due
process rights for noncitizens and have carefully evaluated the statutory
authority for the challenged governmental action. 9 Perhaps because of

6. The plenary power of Congress and the Executive in immigration matters may more
accurately be described as a doctrine that describes the extremely deferential standard that
courts will apply in considering the constitutionality of government conduct in this area. Some
influential articles on the scope of the plenary power include: Louis H. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, I00
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987), Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. er. REV. 255; and Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation
of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I (1984). In recent decades, the majority scholarly
view has been that the plenary power doctrine in immigration law would erocfe and would
eventually be abandoned as courts allowed noncitizens to assert substantive constitutional rights.
The development of the plenary power doctrine and its place in U.S. constitutional law is discussed and analyzed in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY-LAW AND
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177-222 (1987). Ser! afsa GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND' FUNDAMENTAL LAW ch. 7 (1996).
Recently Professor Legomsky has been less optimistic about the speed at which the plenary
power doctrine will erode. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 l.J.ASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995).
7. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (federal government has inherent power to exclusively regulate the
admission of noncitizens). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding statutory
discrimination against the ability of illegitimate U.S. citizen children to sponsor their fathers for
immigration as within the plenary power of Congress to control immigration admissions). It, is
not as clear that the same judicial cfeference should be given to review of actions taken by the
executive to enforce the immigration statutes as the deference afforded to review of congressional legislation. See the discussion of executive as distinguished from congressional plenary
power in Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Alien Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the
Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1146 n.301
(1995).
8. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding the deportation of
three long term permanent residents based on their membership in the Communist party although the ground of deportation would be applied retroactively). See also Fong Yu Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding congressional power to deport not just exclude
under the Chinese Exclusion Acts).
9. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (returning lawful permanent resident
is entitled to due process in exclusion procedures); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (deportation procedures must comport with procedural due
process). Hiroshi Motomura has thoroughly documented the use of statutory construction and
procedural due process as substitutes for traditional constitutional analysis.
See Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) [hereinafter "Motomura, Procedural Sur-
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these judicial protections, Congress has again resorted to statutory limits
on judicial review in an attempt to shield immigration actions from
judicial interference. 10
The power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has also
been described as plenary. 11 Scholars concerned with the constitutional
limits on this plenary power over jurisdiction have frequently written
about ways in which congressional power might be limited or restrained. 12 Some have argued that the structure of our tripartite government and the doctrine of the separation of powers mandates federal
court jurisdiction at least for federal and constitutional questions. 13
Others have argued that the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law requires the right to challenge governmental conduct via some
judicial process. 14 A few have even found limitations on congressional
rogates"]; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter
"Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms"].
10. See the discussion of the motivations of Congress in creating the limits on judicial review in Part llI. In the past, Congress has also granted detailed procedural rights to
noncitizens facing removal, perhaps in recognition of the important interests at stake in deporta·
tion. Other Congressional protections may have been motivated by reports of frequent agency
errors. See, e.g., former INA § 242 (detailing the notice required in deportation hearings).
11. Section 1 of Article III of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." This section also
contains the "Exceptions Clause" providing that the "supreme [sic] Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." The assertion that congressional power over jurisdiction is plenary is in
large part based on this power to create "exceptions" to jurisdiction. See PAUL BATOR ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 362-473 (3d ed.
1988) [hereinafter "HART & WECHSLER"]. See also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506
(1869) (holding that Congress had the power to create exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to hear habeas corpus petitions); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803) (holding that the first judic:ary act improperly gave original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to hear writs of mandamus).
12. A large number of articles have been written on the scope of congres5ional power to
control federal court jurisdiction. For example, articles representing a wide array of views are
gathered in two symposium issues. See Colloquy, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Symposium, Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 21 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982). Other
articles are cited infra.
13. See, e.g., Leonard· G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 21 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) (relying on the essential
function of the federal courts to ensure conflict resolution between state and federal governments, uniform application of law and to protect individual from unconstitutional conduct by
the elected branches); Lawrence Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
14. See Paul Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 21
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power in the language of the Constitution itself. 15 Still, others have
made arguments based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to limit the power of the elected branches. 16 These debates helped to
defeat various bills that would have eliminated the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in areas of particular controversy such as abortion, busing, prayer in public schools and other areas concerning civil rights. 17
Unfortunately, scholarly attention to the intersection of the congressional power over immigration and the congressional power to eliminate
federal court jurisdiction has not been as intense. 18

VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1034-35 (1982) (limits such as due process and equal protection which
are external to Article 111 can restrain congressional plenary power over jurisdiction). Most of
these scholars have written in a context in which they assume that state courts are available as
an alternative to the federal courts. Immigration cases have been reserved to the federal courts
by exclusive jurisdiction statutes. See, e.g., former INA §§ 106, 279. State regulation of
immigration has been limited by federal preemption and judicial doctrines concerning exclusive
federal power to regulate immigration and foreign affairs. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915) (finding federal immigration law preempted state regulation of employment by
noncitizens); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (exclusive federal authority
to regulate admission of noncitizens); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 560 (1884) (upholding
federal taxation of noncitizen entrants to the U.S.); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875)
(invalidating a California statute authorizing state officials to exclude disabled or debauched
noncitizens as unconstitutional interference with the conduct of foreign affairs). As will be
discussed in Part IV, a subsection of the new immigration statute provides for Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts and then goes on to state that "[except as provided in this section
and] notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien . . ." INA §- 242(g).
15. This position was first articulated by Justice Story, in dicta, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (l Wheat) 304, 328-31 (1816). Justice Story read the language of Article III to
require some forms of mandatory vesting of jurisdiction. See Akhil R Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205
(1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some types of jurisdiction in the federal courts such as
federal question, suits affecting ambassadors, and cases concerning admiralty). Professor Amar's
arguments were further developed in Akhil R Amar, Article Ill and the Judiciary Act of 1789,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990), critiqued in Martin H. Redish, Text Structure and Common
Sense in the Interpretation of Article ///, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990), further elaborated
in Akhil R Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1651 (1990).
16. See Robert Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest
for Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984) (finding evidence in
historical sources outside the text of the Constitution that the framers intended some forms of
mandatory federal jurisdiction to protect federal supremacy).
17. Some of these bills are discussed in Max Baucus & Kenneth R Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, The Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988
(1982). A fuller, historical perspective is presented in Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (1984). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note II, at 362-79. The legislative .
history of restrictive immigration bills is discussed infra Part II and Part V.
18. Ironically, many scholars were inspired to enter into the study of federal court jurisdic-

258
1416

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1411

The 1996 immigration legislation appeared to move the issue of the
scope of these so called "plenary powers" from the realm of academic
debate to biting reality for many noncitizens. Although the question of
whether Congress can remove all judicial review of immigration matters
is intriguing, I contend that Congress has not yet reached this point.
By removing express grants of federal court jurisdiction, Congress has
revived the default vehicle for judicial review, the writ of habeas corpus. 19 I further contend that in reviving habeas corpus, Congress has
defeated some of its own goals of streamlining judicial review and may
have forced the "constitutionalization" of judicial review in immigration
cases. Because habeas corpus jurisdiction remains, I will not explore
the questions of whether Congress has the power to insulate immigration decisions from any review by an Article III court, or whether due
process mandates Article III judicial review. 20

tion by the questions posed in the famous 1953 law review article written by Henry Hart, The
Power of Congress to limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953). A significant portion of Professor Hart's discussion concerns the
Supreme Court's confusion about judicial review in immigration proceedings. See id. at 13871402. Hart specifically commented in his article that the immigration cases were ·"one of the
most impressive examples of the general point . . . and currently provides a testing crucible of
basic principle." Id. at 1389. A notable exception is Richard Fallon. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, IOI HARV. L. REV. 915,
967-70 (1988) (arguing that, at a minimum, Article III values require appellate judicial review
legislative courts and administrative agencies, including the area of immigration).
I suspect that this lack of attention from the scholarly world will soon end because the
recent immigration legislation presents a fertile field for the exploration and mapping of the
precise scope of congressional power to eliminate federal court jurisdiction. Even more important than the scholarly response and analysis will be the federal judiciary's reactions and analysis. The current and future federal court rulings on the constitutionality of these immigration
provisions will tell us much about the judiciary's self-perceived ability and desire to preserve
judicial review. As of June 1997, several cases discussing the power of Congress to eliminate
the court of appeals' jurisdiction have rejected separation of powers and due process arguments
and reaffirmed the right of Congress to eliminate lower court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Yang v.
INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997) (neither Article III nor due process requires judicial review
of discretionary agency decisions); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (hold·
ing that AEDPA § 440(a)(I 0) not only does not violate Article III, it is illustrative of the
concept of separation of powers envisioned in the Constitution); Williams v. INS, 114 F.3d 82
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the application of AEDPA to preclude judicial review did not
violate separation of powers doctrine or due process clause).
19. I will refer to both the constitutional Great Writ and the embodiment of that right in 28
U.S.C. § 2241. In Part V of this Article, I will attempt to distinguish between the constitutional and statutory writs of habeas corpus.
20. The separation of powers or Article III argument in support of judicial review is based
on the premise that judicial review is an inherent part of the balance of power between the
branches of our government and that this separation is mandated by the structure or functional
limits in the Constitution. See the articles discussed supra note 13. The due process argument
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B. Everything Old is New Again

Before a person can be removed from the United States, the government must have control over the body of the person. In immigration cases, this simple fact has always been the basis for habeas corpus
jurisciiction. As I will discuss further, the right to habeas review leads
me to the conclusion that Congress, in its efforts to "streamline" the
removal of noncitizens from the United States, has not created a more
efficient structure. In fact, it has inadvertently returned to an historical
model of judicial review in immigration proceedings that was inefficient
in its form and often ineffective in expediting the removal of
noncitizens. Congress has taken us back to the future or, to describe
the new legislation more precisely, Congress has taken us forward to
the past.21
This Article will focus on a key question raised by the re-emergence of habeas corpus review. 22 Which types of legal issues can be

asserts that judicial process or at least judicial review of administrative process is required by
the due process clause. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confasions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1993) (evaluating due process as a theoretical basis for preserving judicial review). Although it is possible that the
courts might narrow the scope of habeas corpus review to an empty shell that might not comport with requirements of due process or perhaps violate the separation of powers doctrine, this
article does not explore due process or Article Ill theoretical constraints on congressional power
to limit federal court jurisdiction. In most of the few cases decided to date, the arguments
concerning separation of powers and due process have not been thoroughly explored because of
the theoretical availability of habeas corpus review. See infra Part V (discussing these cases).
In one case, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit found that habeas review was not available for the claims before him and further ruled that elimination of judicial review violated
neither separation of powers restraints nor due process limitations. See Yang, 109 F.3d 1185.
21. "Back to the Future" is the title of a popular film in which an inventor created a time
travel machine designed to take him to the future. Through misadventure and ina~vertence, the
machine travels backwards in time and the traveler must struggle to get back to his own time.
See BACK To TuE FlTl1.IRE (MCA Universal 1985).
22. llRAIRA also sought to curtail or restrict other forms of immigration litigation. Some
of these restraints are discussed in Part IV. This Article focuses on the provisions aimed at
eliminating judicial review of final orders of removal. I do not address all of the provisions
in the legislation which might generally impact on litigation outside of the context of judicial
review of a final order of removal. Additionally, I do not address the transitional provisions
or retroactivity in general. For an analysis of the transitional provisions, see Lucas Guttentag,
The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions'and Constitutional
Rights, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245-60 (Feb. 10, 1997). See also Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV
97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) (applying transitional jurisdictional provisions and refusing to apply AEDPA bar on relief from deportation
retroactively). I also do not address the power of Congress to insulate decisions made outside
the United States by consular officers in immigration related cases. For a discussion of
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heard in habeas corpus petitions? In the litigation concerning the new
legislation, the United States government is arguing that AEDPA and
IIRAIRA have effectively repealed the general statutory authority for
habeas corpus review, limiting noncitizens to constitutional habeas.
Alternatively, the government contends that habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to "substantial" constitutional questions. 23
Many noncitizens will raise constitutional challenges in large part to
bolster their assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under habeas corpus.
Congress has inadvertently encouraged attacks on congressional and
executive plenary power to control immigration. To the degree that
these constitutional challenges succeed, the unanticipated result of habeas corpus review may be to hasten the long awaited mainstreaming of
immigration law into modern constitutional law. 24 By channeling the
battles into habeas corpus territory, Congress has entered a murky
ground and raised the stakes to constitutional proportions.
While judicial recognition of substantive constitutional rights in
immigration law will have many benefits, limiting judicial review to
exclusively constitutional claims creates significant problems.
Constitutionalization will make it even harder for unrepresented people
to challenge immigration decisions and many people will be harmed if
lower courts reject substantive claims based on plenary power precedents. It will distort the usual incremental changes in law produced by
a dialogue among the branches of government. Judicial reliance on
procedural due process surrogates for substantive rights will undoubtedly expand.25 This, in turn, increases the cost of administering the immigration laws and increases congressional reluctance to create any new
substantive immigration rights. Constitutionalization may also increase
nonreviewability of overseas decisions, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 144-51, and STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 348-57 (2d ed. 1997). See also James R.
Na1Ziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. I (1991) (critiquing
the plenlll)' power doctrine as an illogical bar to judicial review of consular decisions).
23. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (!st Cir. 1996) (government argued that statuto·
ry habeas corpus had been repealed by AEDPA, and constitutional habeas is all that is avail·
able); Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (government asserted that statutory habeas was re·
pealed and constitutional habeas limited to substantial constitutional claims); Yesil v. Reno, 985
F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (same). The scope of both constiiutional and statutory habeas
are discussed below in Part V. I will argue that under the new laws, habeas corpus review is
not limited to constitutional "issues.
24. See Schuck, supra note 6 (suggesting that the demise of the plenlll)' power doctrine will
lead to the "mainstreaming" of constitutional immigration law).
25. See Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 9. In this article, Professor Motomura
identified many of the problems created by judicial reliance on due process surrogates. See Id.
at 1699-1704.
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unpredictability in immigration enforcement. I will discuss these implications and other unintended consequences of the Congressional attack
on judicial review in Parts V and VI.
II.

HISTORY REPEATS: PATTERNS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Restric[ions in Immigration Cases
In some ways, the history of judicial review in immigration cases
looks like an example of Newton's Third Law of Motion, that for every action there is an equal, and opposite, reaction. 26 As noncitizens
challenged governmental decisions via writs of habeas corpus in federal
courts and succeeded in overturning exclusi6n or deportation orders,
Congress amended the immigration laws in an attempt to control the
power of judicial review. 27 The following history will begin with a
focus on habeas corpus review of early immigration cases. It will also
illustrate how habeas corpus review, in combination with other types of
judicial review such as mandamus or declaratory judgment actions, led
Congress to believe that judicial review unduly restrained immigration
enforcement. The latter part of this section discusses other developments in judicial review that led up to the 1996 legislation. These
latest changes are part of the continuing efforts of Congress to control
the timing, scope, and nature of judicial review of immigration proceedings.28

26. See SIR ISAAC NEWTON, PRINCIPIA MA11IEMATICA (1987). I do not mean to suggest
that all of the statutory changes are intended by Congress to counter the success of noncitizens
in using judicial review to overturn the agency determinations. Some of the changes are based
on erroneous perceptions of members of Congress. See infra note 158 (discussing the myth
that judicial review created wholesale delay). This continuing interaction between Congress and
the courts has also been aptly characterized as a "dialogue." See Note, Deportaiion and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 761
(1962) (analyzing the 1961 judicial review amendments and discussing some of the historical
developments of judicial review in immigration cases) [hereinafter "Continuing Dialogue"].
27. This pattern is also explored in LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS A:l[I 11IE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). This excellent history
discusses the laws aimed at Chinese immigration from the period of 1882 to 1924. In the
most recent legislative hearings, Senator Simpson described the limits on judicial review as an
effective block to class action litigation. "We also got rid of layers of people who love to
bring class actions and disrupt the normal course of INS work." 142 CONG. REc. Sll,711
(Sept 28, 1996).
28. For a general history of the immigration laws of the United States between 1875 and
1917, see 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, at § 2.02(2]. A curtailed history appears in
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The Chinese Exclusion Acts were among the first federal statutes
expressly to limit the admission of new immigrants.29 In this series of
.restrictive statutes adopted prior to 1892,3° Congress sought to bar the
admission of Chinese laborers. The first Exclusion Acts did not expressly provide for, nor did they expressly limit, judicial review of an
executive official's admission decision. Some Chinese applicants immediately challenged adverse admission decisions by filing writs of habeas
corpus in federal court. 31 In characterizing the habeas corpus petition

LEGOMSKY, supra note 6. See also NEUMAN, supra note 6, at Pt. I; Motomura, Procedural
Su"ogates, supra note 9, at 1625 (detailed historical analysis of the development of procedural
due process as a substitute for substantive judicial review). Some of the history of habeas
corpus and judicial review is presented in Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention
of Aliens: Lessons From the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Jgnatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933,
943-51 (1995).
29. The Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted in 1789, were the first statutes passed of this
kind. After these acts, it was not until 1875 that Congress passed restrictive immigration legislation. Early Immigration Acts, such as the Immigration Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 488, were concerned with the welfare of the immigrants, imposing such regulations as the number of people
who were allowed on ships coming to the United States. However, later immigration legislation, such as the Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214, had sought to protect the states from
the, financial burden of indigent immigrants. In contrast to this goal, the motivating factor
behind the Chinese Exclusion Act was the fear that the Chinese would be too successful and
harm the white United States workforce. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 1-7. For an excellent
discussion of early history of immigration controls, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
Immigration La.w (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993).
30. In the ':hinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Congress suspended the admission of new Chinese laborers for ten years but preserved the right of Chinese previously residing in the United
States to return by presenting a certificate of identity which documented the prior residence.
See Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. Many Chinese people who fulfilled their prior residence
requirement, but had left the United States prior to the passage of the act, lacked these certifi·
cates. In these types of cases, the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the collectors to accept
other evidence of prior residence in lieu of the certificates. The collector at the port' of San
Francisco refused to take other evidence, making it necessary for the courts in San Francisco to
become involved. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 18.
31. Habeas corpus jurisdiction existed as a result of the fact that in order to execute an
exclusion or deportation order, the government must take the noncitizen into its custody. In
this period, the custody prerequisite was strictly construed. Noncitizens could only seek a writ
of habeas corpus when they were actually in the custody of the executive branch of government or in the custody of a transportation company under color of federal law. The petitioners
seeking review relied on the federal statute granting habeas corpus jurisdiction to the federal
district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § ·2241. This statutory grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction has
existed since 1789 and provides for habeas corpus jurisdiction to prisoners "in custody under
colour, or by colour of the authority of the United States." See Section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of September 24, 1789, I Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c}(I)}. In 1867, the statute was amended to include "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat.
385 (1867) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). For a history of the writ of
habeas corpus, see WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 12-
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as a challenge to the "legality" of the executive detention, federal
courts also examined the evidence supporting the exclusion decision. 32
In many cases, the federal court overruled the admission officer's decision and granted the applicant admission. 33 The federal courts also
rejected the executive's statutory interpretations of various provisions of
the Exclusion Acts. These cases expanded the classes of Chinese exempt from a special documentation requirement and broadened the
fonns of evidence that established membership in an exempt class.34
Each time the litigation strategy of the Chinese succeeded, Congress
amended the exclusion acts to plug the holes. 35 In 1888, Congress
expressly tried to insulate the admission decisions from judicial interfer-

63 (1980) and JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HER1Z, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE ch. 2 (1994) (discussing the history and use of habeas corpus). See also Student
Articles, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1238
(1970) [hereinafter "Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus"]. See the discussion of
habeas corpus after the 1996 legislation i'lfra Part V.
32. See, e.g., In re Chin Ah On, 18 F. 506 (9th Cir. 1883) (finding that a customs certificate is not necessary evidence for Chinese laborers who had left the United States before the
1882 Act went into effect); In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605 (9th Cir. 1882) (holding that
Chinese merchants who lived outside of China on the passage of the 1882 Act could establish
membership in the merchant class by parol evidence); In re Tung Yeong, 19 F. 184 (N.D. Cal.
1884) (holding that certain Chinese people could land in the United States without customhouse papers proving that they were merchants).
33. In. San Francisco, petitioners were particularly successful. Lucy Salyer estimates that the
federal district court in San Francisco reversed the collector of customs in 86% of the cases.
See SALYER, supra note 27, at 28. See also Yeong, 19 F. at 185-91 (briefly discussing the
three major types of claims that the courts were hearing at the time).
34. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 28. The court interpreted certain provisions of the Exclusion Act much more broadly than the customs officials.
35. Section 6 of the Exclusion Act required that a person coming to the United States who
was part of the exempt class provide documentation from the Chinese government that they
did, in fact, belong to that class. Many merchants arrived at the border of the United States
without the documentation and, as a result, customs officials sought to exclude them. However, the courts· ruled that other evidence could be taken to prove membership in the exempt
group. According to the courts, "Section 6 documentation," was not essential, provided the
person could establish her membership in the exempted class with other evidence. See Chow,
13 F. 605. In the Restrictions Act of 1884, 23 Stat 115, Congress attempted to redefine certain provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act in a narrower fashion than the manner in which
the courts had been interpre~ing those provisions. The 1884 amendment expressly prohibited
the taking of other evidence and strictly required that the Chinese', national produce the required
documentation. Despite this new explicit statutory restriction on the taking of additional evidence, the courts continued to reject customs officials findings in other areas. For example,
Courts also affirmed the right to jus solis citizenship for Chinese children born in the United
States, even though their parents could not have been allowed to be naturalized due to statutory
racial discrimination. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (1884). This interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship by birth in the territory of the United States was upheld in
United Stales v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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ence by providing that only the Secretary of the Treasury could review
the admission officer's decision 36 and "not otherwise."37 Again, applicants for admission challenged the 1888 amendments. Several courts
found that the finality provisions had never become law because Congress had made the particular provision conditional upon ratification of
a treaty with China. 38 This treaty was never ratified.
The finality provisions were next incorporated into the Immigration
Act of 1891,39 which governed general immigration, not Chinese exclusion alone. One historian has suggested, though it is not clear from the
debates in the legislature at the time, that the purpose of making the
decisions final was to prevent othe~ classes of immigrants from having
the same success as the Chinese.40
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 41 the Supreme Court considered
whether the finality provisions would shield the admission decisions of
the executive branch from judicial review. Nishimura Ekiu filed a writ
of habeas corpus challenging her exclusion. She argued that, despite

36. Congress originally assigned the responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws to a
part of the Treasury Department Admissions decisions were made by "collectors" who determined admissibility and collected the appropriate federal head tax. The 1891 legislation created
the position of Superintendent of Immigration in the Treasury Department. In 1903, Congress
transferred the administration of the immigration laws to the Department of Commerce and
Labor. In 1913, the functions were vested in the Department of Labor. Finally, in 1940,
Congress moved the duties to the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a part of the Department of Justice. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY IOI n.2 (3d ed. 1995).
37. Act of Sept 13, 1888, § 12, 25 Stat 476 (1888). Congress also voided the prior certificates for reentry to the United States and banned the readmission of prior residents. It was
the new, 1ightened procedure which led to the exclusio~ of Chae Chan Ping who had obtained
the certificate of identity before he left for China in 1887. He was refused readmission because Congress had voided the certificates in 1888, while he was in transit to the United
States. The 1888 Act also banned all admission of Chinese. See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the 1888 Act as constitutional and within the power of
Congress).
· 38. See Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (noting that section 12 of the
amendment was not in force); United States v. Gee Lee, SO F, 271 (9th Cir. 1892) (holding
that section 12 of the amendment which made collectors' decisions final was not in force due
to China's failure to ratify a treaty).
39. See Immigration Act of 1891, § 8, 26 Stat 1084 (1891). This section provided that the
decision of the inspection officer was final, except for administrative appeals to the superintendent of immigration, whose actions were in tum subject to review by the Secretary of the
Treasury. Section 13 of this statute contained an express grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts. However, the Supreme Court interpreted section 13 as only conferring jurisdiction over
criminal and civil sanctions under the 1891 Act See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 664 (1892) (this case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-44).
40. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 27.
41. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).

265
1997]

BACK TO THE FUTURE

1423

the finality prov1s1on, a review of evidence was an inherent part of
habeas review. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that
Congress had intended for the factual determinations to rest solely with
the executive officers.42 Further, the Court's opinion appeared ~o restrict habeas corpus review to a consideration of whether the executive
official had proper 'jurisdiction" over her detention. 43 Courts, however,
continued to review legal rulings in exclusion cases, interpreting
Nishimura Ekiu to insulate only factual determinations. 44
Many Chinese sought to avoid the Chinese Exclusion Laws or other
immigration laws by asserting a claim of United States citizenship. In
United States v. Ju Toy, 45 the Supreme Court appeared to accept the
ability of Congress to insulate the decision of the immigration inspector
from review by the judiciary. . Ju Toy claimed to be a United States
citizen. The inspectors denied his entry. The court found that, even
assuming that Ju Toy was a citizen46 and was entitled to constitutional
protections, .due process did not necessarily require a judicial hearing.47

42. See id. at 660.
43. See id. at 663. For a discussion of the concept of jurisdictional review in habeas corpus, see DUKER, supra note 31, at 225-48. See also Weisselberg, supra note 28, at 944 n.40.
44. See SAYLER, supra note 27, at 31. In 1892, Congress renewed the suspension of the
admission of Chinese for the next ten years and for the first time provided for the deportation
of Chinese. The deportation procedure required a judicial hearing and judicial finding of deportability. This was in contrast to the administrative process for admission determinations.
The 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act also invalidated the prior identity certificates and required new
certification of residence in the United States prior. to May 5, 1892. To avoid deportation if
the person lacked a new certificate, the Chinese applicant had to produce at least one "credible
witness other than Chinese" to establish prior residence. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also United States v. Williams, 83 F. 997, 999 (N.D. Cal. 1897)
(noting that a white person must testify). The certificate was obtained from the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The deportation procedure required a judicial hearing before the person
could be removed for lacking the necessary certificate. The Act did not expressly give the
courts jurisdiction to review customs officials admission decisions but courts did review these
decisions in habeas corpus.
45. 198 U.S. 253 (1905). This particular case came as a challenge to the Immigration Act
of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § l, 28 Stat 372 (1894), which made the factual decision of the
immigration inspector conclusive on the federal court hearing a habeas petition.
46. The district court had found that Ju Toy presented evidence of citizenship. See Ju Toy,
198 U.S. at 264 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
47. See id. st 263. But even though the Supreme Court determined that the factual findings
of the inspectcr would not be set aside, the Supreme Court stated that the federal courts continued to have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the final decision and to determine if
the proceedings themselves met the requirements of the Constitution. Justice Holmes stressed
that petitioner "does not allege or show in any other way unlawful action or abuse of discretion or powers by the immigration officers who excluded him." Id. at 265. Note, however,
that the Supreme Court has afforded greater constitutional protection when dealing with cases of
deportation, as opposed to the exclusion situation that arose in Ju Toy. In Ng Fung Ho v.
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In the 190748 and 1917 Immigration Acts, 49 Congress continued the
effort to limit judicial review by specifically providing that the decision
of the admission inspector was a "final decision."50 Nevertheless, while
the courts were grappling with precise meaning of this phrase, they
often allowed the person to attack the deportation or exclusion orders
through habeas corpus. In these habeas petitions, the courts heard
constitutional challenges to the immigration procedures51 and constitutional challenges to the substantive provisions of the laws.52 However,
the courts did not limit themselves to constitutional challenges. They
also heard non-constitutional claims53 such as challenges to the interpretation of the statute,54 or whether "some evidence" supported the find-

ing.ss

White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a person in deportation proceedings
who made claims of United States citizenship was entitled to a full factual determination as to
his citizenship by the federal district court. See id. at 284. The opinion distinguished Ju Toy
as applying solely to admission decisions. See id. at 282. The continuing validity of Ju Toy
was further weakened in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (allowing declaratory judgement
action to assert claim of citizenship made outside of the United States). Rusk, the new legisla·
tion, and citizenship claims made at the port of entry, are discussed infra Part IV.B.3 and note
184.
48. Immigration Act of 1907, 34 Stat 898.
49. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat 874. This act and the 1907 act, see supra note 48,
regulated all immigration, not just the migration of the Chinese.
SO. See Section 25 of the 1907 Act Prior to the 1907 and 1917 Acts, Congress used the
same "finality" language in section 25 of the 1903 Act
SI. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (acknowledging the right to due process in
deportation procedures but ultimately rejecting due process challenge to statutory scheme and
deportation hearing procedures).
52. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
S3. While I characterize these claims as "non-constitutional" claims, in fact these types of
claims might also raise due process issues. As the conception of due process has evolved, the
types of claims which might be raised in habeas corpus has also expanded. See the discussion
infra Part VI concerning possible implications of due process challenges to the new legislation.
S4. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948) (rejecting executive's interpretation of
multiple criminal convictions deportation provision); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388
(1947) (rejecting executive's interpretation of "entry"); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924)
(rejecting executive's interpretation of findings necessary for deportation after conviction under
Espionage Act); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (finding that the government misinterpreted
the statutory ability to deny entry based on the job market in a particular area). See also
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. S90 (1953) (rejecting executive's interpretation of pro·
cedural regulation); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 908 (1950) (rejecting executive's
interpretation of APA procedural requirements).
SS. While exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction, courts reviewed the administrative record to
determine whether the administrative decision was supported by "some evidence." In several
cases, this type of review resulted in a victory for the noncitizen. See Chin Yow v. United
States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (finding that petitioner should be allowed to present evidence of his
United States citizenship); F.x Parle Fierstein, 41 F2d 53 (9th Cir. 1930) (finding "insufficient
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During the attacks on suspected communists, anarchists and other
subversives, and during periods of war, Congress enacted statutes designed to expedite the deportation of dangerous56 and "enemy aliens."57
Although the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the litigants' attacks on
the constitutionality of the substantive provisions, it entertained their
challenges under habeas corpus jurisdiction. Some important cases of
this period illustrate that even during the height of the expansion of
congressional power over the regulation of immigration, habeas corpus
review nevertheless continued. As one article noted, "aliens have often
been left to the mercy of administrative authority in habeas proceedings, not because of limitation on the power of the writ, but because
their substantive rights are limited."58
In Bridges v. Wixon, 59 the Supreme Court vacated a final order of
deportation based on evidence finding that Harry Bridges belonged to
an organization "affiliated with" the Communist Party.60 Bridges' habeas petition challenged the competence of the evidence and asserted the
bad faith of the government throughout his prosecution.61 The Court
evidence" to justify deportation); Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928) (finding no
conclusive evidence to support deportation); cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner
of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (finding there was some evidence to support deportation
order and denying relief); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924) (finding
some evidence to support the deportation order); Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912)
(finding there was evidence to support the inspector's findings). See also Gerald L. Neuman,
The Constitutional Requirement of Some Evidence, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 631 (1988).
56. See March 1903 Act, § 2, 32 Stat 1214 (providing for the exclusion of anarchists).
Many different statutes provided for the deportation of communists. See, e.g., Section 22 of
the Internal Security Act of 1950, 66 Stat 205 (provisions related to communists' deportation),
codified as § 24l(a)(6)(c) of the 1952 INA.
57. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). The petitioner was ordered deported by the Attorney General under a similar act, the Alien Enemy Act because of his affiliation
with the Nazi party. See Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat 577, R.S. § 4607, amended by, 40 Stat
531. While the Court found that the special grant of Executive War Powers authorized the
Act is elimination of judicial review, nevertheless, the Court heard the habeas corpus petition
seeking release from detention and challenging the ability of the Executive to deport without a
hearing. This case does not rely on congressional power over immigration. Since 1798, the
President has, in the interests of the national security, had the discretionary power to deport
nom;itizens of a foreign nation with whom the United States is engaged in a .declared war.
The Enemy Alien Act is currently codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23.
58. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 31, at 1243 (footnote
omitted).
59. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
60. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 429, § 23, 54 Stat 670, 671 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2385), created a ground of deportation for "membership or affiliation with any
organization, association, society, or group, that believe in, advises, advocates, or teaches . . .
the overthrow by force of violence of the Government of the United States."
61. Justice Murphy severely criticizes the government for the tactics and strategies used to
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relied on a narrow statutory reading to find that Bridges was not deportable. Bridges also raised constitutional claims that the statute created an ex post facto punishment, but the Court's habeas jurisdiction
does not rely on these constitutional claims.62
The constitutional issues which remained below the surface in
Bridges, were directly resolved in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. 63
Harisiades al)d two other permanent resident aliens filed habeas corpus
petitions that challenged deportation based on past membership in the
Communist Party. 64 They argued that their deportation denied them

attempt to deport Bridges, a prominent union activist See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 157 (Murphy,
J., concurring}. The government never succeeded in deporting Mr. Bridges. Mr. Bridges ap·
peared at an immigration law conference in 1987 to retell the story of his deportation hearings.
Suddenly from the back of the room, Maurice Roberts, an esteemed immigration scholar and
former BIA chair, rose to explain his role in the case. He stated that at the time of the Supreme Court's decision, he was working as an attorney for the INS and, based on the opinion,
he recommended that the Justice Department give up. Mr. Roberts said, "I recommended that
the government close your file" and the two men shook hands. See Statement of Maurice
Roberts at "Great Moments in Immigration History," 1987 Conference of the American lmmi·
gration Lawyer's Association, San Francisco, California (from author's notes taken at the Con·
ference}.
62. The Court would have had to overturn several precedential decisions to rely on the con·
stitutional grounds directly. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,
591 (1913) (deportation is not punishment but "simply a refusal . . . to harbor persons whom
it does not want"). Hiroshi Motomura has discussed the subconstitutional decision in Bridges
as an example of "phantom constitutional norms" reasoning. He suggests that the Court is
clearly focusing on the consequences of deportation and the constitutional claim that deportation
should be treated in the same manner as criminal punishment See Motomura, Phantom Cons//.
tutional Norms, supra note 9, at 567-68.
63. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
64. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, 64 Stal 989, created a ground of deportation for
membership or past membership in any organization which advocated the use of violence to
overthrow the United States government Congress had specifically amended the Jaw to include
past membership to overturn the Supreme Court decision the prior year in Kessler v. Strecker,
307 U.S. 22 (1939) (habeas corpus petition challenging statutory interpretation). The Court
read the prior deportation ground as allowing only the deportation of current members of the
Communist Party. Once membi:rship ceased, the noncitizen was no longer deportable. Conse·
quently, the Communist Party had expelled all noncitizen members. See the discussion of these
statutes aimed at the deportation of subversives and Communists in ALEJNIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 36, at 513-18.
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fundamental rights,65 infringed First Amendment protections,66 and violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.67 The Supreme Court rejected each of these substantive constitutional challenges.
In Carlson v. Landon,68 a group of lawful p~rmanent resident aliens
also sought to prevent their deportation as members of the Communist
party under the Internal Security Act of 1950.69 The group filed individual writs of habeas corpus challenging the retroactive application of
the 1950 changes, and alleging that their detention pending deportation
was unconstitutional because it violated due process. The Supreme
Court rejected the substantive constitutional challenge stating that "[s]o
long . . . as aliens fail to obtain . . . citizenship by naturalization, they
remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them ..." 70
Yet congressional plenary power over immigration did not suspend the
power of the court to hear habeas petition. 71
Noncitizens also used habeas corpus petitions to attack the executive's interpretation and application of the Internal Security Act. In
Galvan v. Press, 12 the Supreme Court described Galvin's habeas petition
as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the constitutional validity of the act as applied to a long term permanent resident.
Galvin argued that the Court should construe the term "member" to
include only those people who joined the Party "fully conscious of its
advocacy of violence."73 He contended that the evidence only showed
that he had belonged to the Communist Party, but failed to establish

65. The petitioners made a substantive due process argument that permanent resident aliens
should have a "vested right" to remain or that they could not be deported on "unreasonable"
grounds. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 584. See Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of
the Lawfally Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel,
69 YALE LJ. 262 (1959); Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfally Admitted
Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578 (1959) (criticizing
Harisiades as a form of unconstitutional banishment and questioning the courts reasoning).
66. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591-92.
67. The Court characterized the application of the law as not being retroactive but found
that even if it was, deportation was a civil sanction and therefore outside the constitutional
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws. See id. at 593-95. The ex post facto prohibition
is found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
68. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
69. See The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987.
70. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534.
71. In recent litigation, the government has asserted that Carlson stands for the proposition
that no judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d
396, 399 (9th Cir. 1996).
72. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
73. Id. at 525.
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his personal awareness of the commitment of the Party to violence. He
further argued that to construe the statute in any other manner would
constitute a due process violation.
In the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter carefully considered
Galvin's construction of the term "member" in the statute and reviewed
the evidence presented in the administrative hearing. He found the
administrative officer was "entitled to conclude" that the evidence established Galvin's membership in the Party. 74 He also rejected Galvin's
due process challenge, noting that although this construction may
"shock the sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process,"75
the Court was not "writing on a clean slate.''76
During this time, the Supreme Court decided two important immigration cases.77 In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy78 and
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 79 the Supreme Court upheld
provisions of the 1941 Act80 that allowed the executive to exclude individuals without a hearing on national security grounds during the national emergency proclaimed on May 27, 1941 (World War 11).81
Knauff, a noncitizen who married an American serving in the armed
forces in Germany, and Mezei, a lawful permanent resident who sought
reentry, were both excluded without an evidentiary hearing and without
administrative or judicial review. The Supreme Court rejected the
challenges made by Knauff and Mezei. 82 In a famous phrase, Justice
Minton writing for the majority stated, "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned. " 83
Knauff and Mezei established a new high watermark in the scope of

74. Although the Court was not reviewing the facts under a "substantial evidence" standard,
this opinion and others indicate that even in habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Court will evaluate
the competence of the evidence. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (discussed
supra text· accompanying notes 59-62).
75. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530.
76. Id. at 530-31.
77. For an excellent discussion of the historical and legal context of both cases, see
Weisselberg, supra note 28.
78. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
79. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
80. See Act of June 21, 1941, amending § I of the Act of May 22, 1918, 55 Stat. 252.
81. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 55 Stat. 1696.
82. While the Court did hear the habeas petitions in both cases, the Court limited its review
to whether the Attorney General could exclude without administrative or judicial hearings. See
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206; Knauff, 338 U.S. 537.
83. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.
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the plenary power doctrine at least as it applied to people seeking entry
to the United States. They also led Professor Hart to criticize the. Supreme Court in his famous article, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic. 84 Hart questioned the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold a statute which allowed the executive to act without any administrative process, fact
finding, or opportunity for the alien seeking admission to even know
the grounds for his or her exclusion. He argued that, at a minimum,
the Court could have used its power in habeas corpus to inquire into
the facts alleged to support the exclusion. 85
Passage of the Declaratory Judgment.Act in 193486 and the Administrative Procedure Act in 194687 expanded judicial review of immigration proceedings. Both statutes, in combination with general federal
question jurisdiction,88 made it possible for noncitizens to challenge the
actions of the government in immigration proceedings without the necessity of waiting for actual arrest or detention that were the necessary
predicates to habeas corpus jurisdiction.89 The government opposed
these expansions of judicial review, and in the important case of
Heikkila v. Barber, 90 the Supreme Court held that the finality provisions
limited noncitizens to review in habeas corpus.
In Heikkila, the Court considered whether noncitizens could use
the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") to challenge actions taken under the 1917 Immigration Act as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950.91
Section 10 of the AP A provides that a person suffering a wrong from

84. Hart, supra note 18.
85. See id. at 1391-96.
86. 40 Stat 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, et seq).
87. 60 Stat 243 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq.).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act nor the Administrative
Procedure Act directly confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court See infra note 213.
Other statutes used in combination with these acts included the mandamus statute. See 28
u.s.c. § 1361.
89. See LEIBMA.'1 & HERlZ, supra note 31, at § 8.2(d) n.42 (gathering cases analyzing custody in immigration cases as an element of habeas corpus jurisdiction). The modem interpretation of the custody requirement in habeas corpus is discussed infra Part V.
90. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
91. See id. Three Courts of Appeals reached this issue: Judge Goodrich for the Third Circuit in Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1948); Judge Bazelon for the D.C. Circuit in
Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949); and Judge McAllister for the Sixth Circuit in Prince v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1950). All held that a noncitizen for
whom a deportation order is outstanding may challenge the validity of the order under the
APA.
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an agency action can seek judicial action, with the exception that it is
not available if there is a "statute precluding judicial review." 92 Examining the finality language of the 1917 Act and the historical interpretation93 of these types of provisions, the Court concluded that the finality
provision precluded APA review. 94 The Heikkila opinion goes on to
conclude that noncitizens are not foreclosed from all judicial review but
must be afforded habeas corpus review as a constitutionally required
minimum. 95
Although Heikkila was decided after the passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the opinion expressly stated that
the Court was not considering the effect of the INA. 96 Two years after
Heikkila, the Court heard an almost identical challenge in the case of
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro. 91 However, in Pedreiro, the Court found that
the INA's provision making decisions of the Attorney General "final,"
although practically unchanged from the 1917 Act,98 was not intended
to preclude APA review or the use of declaratory judgment actions. 99

92. APA § 10 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 703).
93. Note that the often cited historical review ·in Heikkila is somewhat incomplete in that it
leaves out many of the very important immigration acts that shaped the history of judicial
review of immigration proceedings. See Heikkila, 345 U.S. 229. Justice Clark limited his history to the 1891 and the 1917 Acts. See id. at 232-34. These Acts do not represent a com·
plete history of judicial review in immigration proceedings.
94. See id. at 235.
95. See id. at 234-35.
96. See id. at 232 n.4.
97. 349 U.S. 48 (1955). Neither Heikkila nor Pedreiro are clear about the claims cognizable in habeas review. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954),
Justice Clark, who also authored Heikkila, granted Accardi's habeas corpus petition which raised
statutory and regulatory challenges to his deportation. The dissent criticizes this use of habeas
corpus. See id. at 270-71. However, the dissent in Pedreiro, while arguing that habeas corpus
is the only form of relief, cited the legislative history as saying that in a habeas petition the
"court determines whether or not there has been a fair hearing, whether or not the law has
been interpreted correctly, and whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the order
of deportation." Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at 56. The confusion over the range of cognizable claims
is discussed infra Part V.
98. The 1917 Act provided, relating to deportation: "In every case where any person Is
ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act . . . the decision of
the Attorney General shall be final." Section 19, 39 Stat 874, 889 (1917), amended by 54
Stat 1238 (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). By contrast, the 1952 Act provided,
relating to deportation: "In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United
States under the provisions of this chapter . . . the decision of the Attorney General shall be
final." 66 Stat 210 (1952).
99. It is interesting to note that Justice Frankfurter dissented in Heikkila, with Justice Black
joining, noting the intent of the legislature evidenced by the legislative history. See Heikkila,
345 U.S. at 237-41 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Black's majority opinion in Pedrelro
was essentially an expanded version of the Frankfurter dissent See Pedrelro, 349 U.S. at 48.
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The Court gave a three-part rationale for its decision. First, the purpose of the APA was to remove obstacles to judicial review in subsequently passed statutes, such as the INA. Next, the Court cited the
legislative history of both the APA and the INA and concluded that
Congress intended to allow for liberal judicial review. Finally, the
Court looked to section 12 of the APA. Section 12 provides that "no
subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so
expressly." Since the INA did not expressly state the intention to supersede or modify the APA, it remained a viable avenue for review. 100
These statutes, in combination with habeas corpus review as a last
resort, led to many novel and creative challenges and, in some notorious cases, lengthy delay in the execution of deportation or exclusion
orders. 101 In 1961, Congress adopted a new express provision for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders that was designed to expedite review· and avoid piecemeal litigation. Former INA § 106 102
established· a basic grant of judicial review through petitions for review
of final deportation orders to the circuit court of appeals and writs of
habeas corpus for exclusion orders in the district courts. 103 In addition
to the petition for review, section 106 preserved the writ of habeas corpus to challenge executive detention whenever the noncitizen was taken
into custody. 104
Although section 106 was created as the "sole and exclusive" form

Also interesting is the fact that Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion in Heikkila, and Justice
Douglas, who had joined in that opinion, changed sides and went with the majority in
Pedreiro. The rest of the majority in Heikkila dissent in Pedreiro, with the exception of Chief
Justice Vinson and Justice Jackson, both of whom had .left the court.
100. In Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956), the Court expanded this holding to
encompass exclusion orders as well. Shung's importance is that its language seemed to have
the effect of expanding all remedies available in deportation cases to exclusion hearings.
101. The most famous case is that of Carlos Marcello. Mr. Marcello was first ordered deported by the agency in 1953. He was never successfully removed and died at age 83 in the
United States. See L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A3. See also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 36, at 904 (discussion of Mr. Marcello); Mark A. Mancini, The Carlos Marcello Case, in
2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 2 (1990). For a chronology of litigation in deportation proceedings against Mr. Marcello, see United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir., 634
F.2d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 1981). Mr. Marcello was presented to Congress as an example which
supported a more streamlined system of judicial review.
102. 8 U.S.C. § llOSa (repealed in IIRAIRA § 306(a)).
103. This ste.'Ute was modeled on the Hobbs Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51.
104. See former INA § 106(a)(IO). The INA also contained an express grant of habeas
jurisdiction to test the validity of continued executive detention if the government had failed to
remove the noncitizen within six months of the final order of deportation. See former INA §
242(b). This provision was repealed in IIRAIRA.

274
1432

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1411

of judicial review of final orders of deportation under fonner INA
§ 242(b), 105 litigation soon arose about the type of actions, orders and
decisions of the agency that were within the tenn "final order." In an
important case, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 106 the Supreme Court held
that final orders did not include decisions collateral to the deportation
order. 107 Cheng Fan Kwok resulted in other types of immigration litigation in which noncitizens challenged other decisions and actions of
the INS. For example, noncitizens used this ruling to challenge denials
of adjustment of status to lawful pennanent resident 108 or the failure of
the INS to approve or adjudicate an immigrant visa petition. 109 Professor David Martin noted that Cheng Fan Kwok seemed to indicate a
willingness to expand judicial review, but also created new problems
for the efficient enforcement of the immigration laws. 110

105. Fonner INA § 242(b) set forth the structure of the deportation proceedings.
106. 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
'
107. In Cheng Fan Kwok, the Court had to detennine if a request to the district director for
discretionary relief fell within a final order which would be reviewable by the court of appeals.
The Court held that it was not, as it was collateral to a section 242(b) administrative hearing.
See id. at 216. The Court distinguished discretionary relief from other types of relief, such as
a stay of deportation or a denial of a motion to reopen, by noting that the latter two neces·
sarily follow from a section 242(b) administrative hearing. See id. at 212. In a situation
where the discretionary relief was sought from the district director, the administrative action is
completely distinct from a section 242(b) proceeding, and therefore did not fall under the judi·
cial review pattern prescribed by section 106. See id. at 212-13. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 937-39 (1983), the Supreme Court created more confusion in this area. The opinion re·
ferred to "all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent rather than only
those detennination actually made at a hearing." Id. at 937 (emphasis added). This language
apparently broadened the scope of section I 06 jurisdiction to allow Chadha to challenge the
constitutionality of the one-house veto of the administrative grant of suspension of deportation.
The confusion over the scope of section 106 final orders is discussed in ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 919·21. See also Susan M. Akram, Traps for the Unwary, or Major Issues
on Judicial Review of Deportation Decisions Under INA § 106, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NA·
TIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 367 (1995). This article provides an excellent discussion of the
types of claims found to be within and without the scope of section I 06 jurisdiction. Al·
though section 106 has been repealed, analogous arguments will undoubtedly be made to ana·
lyze the preclusive effects of the new section 242.
108. See, e.g., Che-Li Shen v. INS, 749 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1984); Shahla v. INS, 749
F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1984); ljoma v. INS, 854 F. Supp. 612 (D. Neb. 1993). But cf. Yeung v.
Reno, 868 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment
of status by district director).
109. See, e.g., DeFigueroa v. INS, 501 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1974).
110. See David Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and Other Unappealing Cases: The Next
Frontier of Immigration Reform, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 803 (1987). Martin advocates removing
the provisions of fonner INA § 106 which vacated the federal court's jurisdiction if the non·
citizen was removed (or voluntarily left) during the appeal. See fonner INA § I 06(c),
IIRAIRA has removed this provision and there is now no statutory obstacle to continuing a
petition for review after the noncitizen's departure or removal. The court of appeals may also
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Federal courts were also willing to consider cases that presented
"pattern and practice" violations of the immigration Jaws or cases that
challenged the legitimacy of INS procedures without requiring individual exhaustion of administrative review or the review provided in former
INA § 106. 111 Courts did not limit non citizens to the section 106 procedures when the issue to be presented in the case required the development of a factual record in federal district court. Without the district
court proceeding, the noncitizen could not establish an adequate record
in the administrative agency, and thus the court of appeals would not
have a record to evaluate when hearing an individual petition for review.112
Together, these patterns of litigation led to increasing congressional
and administration frustration. Congress made only minor changes in
the 1961 scheme for judicial review, and few were contemplated until
the early 1980s when Congress considered several statutes for reform of
the immigration laws. 113 The Administrative Conference of the United

issue a stay pending the adjudication of the appeal. See INA § 242(b)(3)9B). The same
should be true in habeas cases. Once the habeas petition is filed, even removal does not vacate the court's jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV. Unfortunately, the statute does not
include Professor Martin's recommendation that the elimination of the departure rule should also
be accompanied by a requirement that the government must bear the expense of returning
noncitizens who are successful on appeal: "[t]his guarantee not only reflects simple fairness. It
would also provide an added incentive for the Justice Department to look carefully at every
appealed case or motion to reopen, before actual deportation, to see whether the Department
Martin, supra, at 819.
,
would consent to a stay of deportation."
111. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (class challenge to
political asylum procedures). See also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (1 lth
Cir. 1986) (awarding attorneys' fees and reaffirms jurisdiction); but cf Dhangu v. INS, 812
F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1987); Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1986); Bothyo v.
INS, 783 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1986); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985).
These cases hold, generally, that the exhaustion requirement in INA § l06(c) cannot be waived.
In IMMIGRATION PROCESS & POLICY, the casebook authors suggest that this exception to section
106 was used too frequently and in one case had completely "eviscerated INA § l06(a) by
tolerating a truly audacious 'end run."' ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 940-41 n.20
(discussing Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990)).
112. The purpose of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is to allow the agencies
to develop their own records, and, possibly, correct their own errors. Exhaustion leads to a
better record for judicial review. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Currie
& Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1975). David Martin has questioned this assumption when the
administrative ;irocedures do allow for the development of an adequate record. See David
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1247, 1313-14, 1325 (1990).
113. See Omnibus Immigration Control Act (including the Air and Expeditious Appeal, Asylum and Exclusion Act) of 1981, S. 1765 and H.R. 4832, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222 and H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
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States ("ACUS") also commissioned several studies of these issues. In
an article based on one of these studies, Stephen Legomsky described
the prevailing attitudes:
Recent congressional bills have taken aim at both administrative
and judicial review structures in the field of immigration. Within the Department of Justice, there is talk of curtailing administrative review of certain controversial categories of decisions . .
" . And the subject of judicial review has become a perennial
battlefield in this corner of the law. Pressures are building, and
something is certain to give soon. 114
Professor Legomsky's detailed study suggested substantial revision in
the administrative process and adjustments to the judicial review
scheme under former INA § I 06 and other INA provisions. 115 Paul
Verkuil's study focused on the initial administrative hearings procedures

(S. 2222 passed the Senate on August 12, 1982 by an 80-19 vote, but H.R. 5872, and later
H.R. 6514, never came to vote in the House); Immigration Reform and Con'trol Act of 1983,
S. 529 and H.R. 1510 (1983) (S. 529 passed the Senate 76-18 on May 18, 1983, and H.R.
1510 passed the House 216-211 on June 20, 1984. A conference began on September 13,
1984, but no final agreement was reached and the legislation died when Congress adjourned on
October 11, 1984). These bills contained provisions reforming and streamlining the administrative and judicial processes. Supporters of the proposed legislation sought to eliminate or at
least restrict the "multi-tiered" judicial review process and the "procedural morass" which allegedly had enabled dilatory tactics in the exclusion and deportation processes. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982; Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and S. 2222: Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refagees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. of Immigration and Refagee Policy of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary,
97th Cong., I St Sess. (Oct 14 and 16, 1981 ).
114. Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study
of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1986) [hereinafter "Forum Choices")
(footnotes omitted).
115. Professor Legomsky's administrative recommendations were adopted by the ACUS, I
C.F.R. § 305.85-4. His judicial review recommendations were not included. For example, he
called for more clarity in former INA § 279 which granted subject matter to district courts
over "all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of [title II of the
INA]." Some courts read section 279 as precluding general federal question jurisdiction and
others read it as an express general grant of federal court jurisdiction in immigration cases.
Yet, some courts read this section to allow additional review of exclusion or deportation orders
that were intended to be covered in section 106. Although Professor Legomsky did not invite
Congress to use section 279 as a preclusion statute, the new legislation recognized the varied
judicial interpretations. More than ten years after his study, Congress amended the provision to
allow only the government to assert federal court jurisdiction under its terms. I discuss section
279 in Part IV and in Lenni B. Benson, The "New World" of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 32 (1997). It is beyond the
scope of this Article to discuss all of Professor Legomsky's thoughtful recommendations and
observations.
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and identified factors which would be constitutionally required. 116 He
noted that providing more expansive administrative review should minimize the intrusiveness of judicial review. 117 Professor David Martin
studied the adjudication of political asylum claims. 118 Many of his
suggested administrative reforms were later adopted by the INS. 119
During this same time period, Congress considered other major
substantive changes to the immigration laws. The compromise legislation finally adopted created the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 ("IRCA"). 120 IRCA balanced the creation of employer sanctions against two legalization programs designed to legitimate some
existing undocumented populations. 121
Although limits on federal court jurisdiction and review were proposed during this time period, 122 rigorous opposition which questioned
the constitutionality of the limitations 123 and the compromise limitation
of review for people seeking legalization under the "amnesty" and "seasonal agricultural worker" programs forestalled any sweeping change of
section 106. 124 The compromise limitation consisted of language which
specifically limited federal court review of claims raised by legalization
seekers. The statutes provided that "there shall be no administrative or
judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section . . . there shall be judicial review of
such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or

116. His study fanned the basis of Paul Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984).
117. See id. at 1180.
118. Professor Martin's study is discussed in Martin, supra note 112, at 1325.
119. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Techniques for Managing High-Volume Asylum
Systems, 81 IOWA L. REv. 671 (1996) (discussing the proposals, refonns, and state of asylum
adjudication prior to the 1996 legislation).
120. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat 3359.
121. The first program, called "amnesty," allowed people who could establish continuous unlawful presence prior to January I, 1982 to apply for pennanent residency. See INA § 245A.
The second program was adopted to legalize agricultural workers who may have only made a
·
seasonal appearance in the United States. See INA § 210.
122. Congress was interested in limiting the availability of administrative and judicial review
to correct what it perceived as an inefficient system. See William Smith, Immigration Law
Reform: Proposals in the 98th Congress, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 7 (1983).
123. See discussion and materials infra notes 294-95.
124. See S. REP. No. 99-132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 48 (Aug. 28, 1985) (reasons that to
insure "reasonably prompt detenninations" no judicial review is provided under the legalization
program). But cf H.R. REP. No. 99-682, Pt I, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 74 (July 16, 1986)
(providing for 'i11ited administrative and judicial review of denials of applications for legalization). The final version of the law retains the latter approach. See IRCA §§ 210(e)(3),
245A(f).
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deportation under section 106." 125
The Supreme Court in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center 126 found
that this language did not preclude pattern and practice violations or
allegations of unconstitutional implementation of the legalization programs.127 The Court held that, despite the limit on review, the district
court had jurisdiction to hear a class action challenging the procedures
used in the seasonal agricultural worker ("SAW") program. In part, the
Court's holding was based on the rationale that allowing the class action would expedite the adjudication of the SAW claims. Justice
Stephens rf.250ned that limiting review to individual claims filed in the
court of appeals, after the exhaustion of the administrative procedures,
would have the effect of creating even longer delays. 128
' More than ten years after the creation of the legalization and seasonal agricultural worker programs, several large class action Jaw suits
were still raising challenges to the regulations and implementation of
the program. 129 Thousands of noncitizens class members awaited adjudication of their claims. 130 In Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. ,1 31
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in McNary but rejected the
lower court's certification order on ripeness grounds. The district court
had certified a class including all people who would have qualified for

125. INA §§ 210(e), 245A(f)(4). These sections authorized the creation of a single level of
appellate review. The INS created the Legalization Appeals Unit. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190
(May I, 1988). See also Francesco Isgro, Administrative and Judicial Review of Denials of
Temporary Resident Status, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 473, 477 (1988) (written by the associate general counsel of the INS, this article describes the legalization programs).
126. 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
127. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (I Ith Cir. 1986); Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
128. The Court noted that waiting for individual deportation orders to be entered and reviewed would create long delays, delays that Congress had intended to eliminate when they
passed the petition for review provision. See McNary, 498 U.S. at 490. The scope of the
pattern and practice exception has been refined in subsequent cases; however, declaratory and
injunctive relief are still viable remedies, though recently limited by IIRAIRA. See Robert
Pauw, Judicial Review of "Pattern and Practice" Cases: What to Do When the INS Acts Unlawfal/y, 70 WASH. L. REV. 779 (1995). For a discussion of some of these limits in the new
legislation, sec Benson, supra note 115.
129. See Robert H. Gibbs, It Ain't Over 'Ti/ It's Over: Amnesty Issues Persist A Decade
After /RCA, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1493 (Oct. 28, 1996). Robert Gibbs notes that over
2.6 million people legalized their status under the !RCA programs but that tens of thousands of
claims were still pending ten years later. This article also describes several class actions
brought on behalf of people who failed to file claims for legalization due to the INS's improper regulations.
130. Two national class actions resulted in over 400,000 late applications. See id. at 1502.
131. 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
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legalization but did not apply due to the erroneous INS policy. The
Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded to the lower court to
determine whether members of the class had actually had their applications rejected 132 or who could otherwise articulate a justiciable claim. 133
On remand, the district court narrowed the class to include persons who
had actually filed an application and those who might have filed a
claim but for the front desk rejection policy. 134
Frustrated over the delays in adjudicating the IRCA legalization
claims, Congress specifically addressed this and other similar class
actions by limiting federal court jurisdiction to those persons who "in
fact filed an application . . . or attempted to file a complete application
. . . with an authorized legalization office of the Service but had the
application and fee refused by that Officer." 135 The government moved
to dismiss the amended class based on this new jurisdictional statute.
On April 30, 1997, the Ninth Circuit dismissed' the reconstituted class
and upheld the constitutionality of Section 377. 136 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the new statute violated the separation of powers by finding that the statute was changing the law applicable to the case rather than interfering with the judicial process. 137
The Ninth Circuit also found that the statute did not completely immunize the policy from constitutional attack so as to raise due process
concerns because the statue only restricts claims to "those who have
been directly affected by INS conduct." 138 Attorneys for the plaintiffs
in a similar case have filed an amended complaint asserting jurisdiction

132. The INS had a policy which instructed employees of the legalization offices or the designated agencies to reject the applications of those who appeared statutorily ineligible at the
"front desk." See id. at 61-62.
133. A footnote in the opinion suggested the possibility that other persons could maintain a
justiciable claim even though they had not been directly "front-desked." See id. at 66 n.28.
134. Unpublished order, described in the 9th Cir. decision at 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094, at

•6.
135. IIRAIRA § 377 (amending INA § 245A(f)(4)). Section. 377(b) stated that the amendment "shall be effective as if included in the enactment of [IRCA]." The Conference committee report described this section as intended to "put an end to litigation seeking to extend the
amnesty provisions of [IRCA), and to limit claims under that section to aliens who in fact filed
an application for legalization under that section within the prescribed time limits, or attempted
to do so, but their application was refused by an immigration officer." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
I 04-828, at 230 (1996).
136. See Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, No. 96-15495, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094 (9th
Cir. Feb. 11, 1997).
137. See id. at •11-12 (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding a similfl!' Congressional statute which directly affected pending cases)).
138. Id. at •iJ.
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for a national class action under the writ of habeas corpus. 139
Congress was also growing concerned over the numbers of
noncitizens convicted of crimes, noncitizens incarcerated in state and
federal prisons, and the relatively low number of deportations of convicted criminals. In a series of bills from 1988 to 1994, Congress
amended the grounds of deportability to increase the ability of the INS
to deport noncitizens. In an effort to expedite the deportation and
removal process, Congress created a form of ministerial deportation. 140
This procedure bypassed the normal administrative hearing, administrative review and judicial review except in a very narrow form. 141 In
this special procedure, the noncitizen would receive a form, A Notice
of Intent to Deport, from a deportation officer of the 1Ns. t42 The
noncitizen would then be allowed ten days to present a written rebuttal
stating the grounds for why the person should not be deported. t 43 A
different officer of the deportation section would review the rebuttal
and had the power to order the person deported. No other procedure
was authorized except that the non citizen could seek judicial review in·
the form of a habeas petition limited to the issues of alienage, identity,
and proof of conviction. 144
In the next section, I will explore some of the factors which motivated Congress to adopt the 1996 legislation. I will describe the judicial review provisions of the 1996 legislation in Part IV.

139. See Gibbs, supra note 129, at 1502 (discussing LULAC v. INS, 956 F.2d 914 (9th
Cir.), rev'd and remanded on jurisdictional ground sub. nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), and renamed Newman v. INS after the filing of an amended complaint).
140. These procedures were never widely implemented. In IIRAIRA, Congress repealed the
statutory authority, replacing it with different streamlined procedures. See infra note 164 and
discussion in Part IV.
141. See Pub. L. 103-416, Tit II, §§ 223(a), 224(a), 108 Stat 4322.
142. See fonner INA § 242A.
143. See id.
144. See id. § 106(d). Although the statute apparently created a limited fonn of habeas
corpus procedure, nothing in the statute eliminated the general grant of habeas corpus statutory
authority in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As will be discussed below, courts may view the failure to
expressly repeal this other authority as a preservation of the writ of habeas corpus. See discussion of implied repeal of habeas corpus infra Part V.
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CONGRESS AND THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORMS

"ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH!" 145

A number of highly publicized events and political factors led Congress to reform judicial review of immigration actions. Immigration
law became a prominent subject of political debate. 146 Immigration
policy was debated by candidates for the presidency, 147 was the subject
of state wide referenda, 148 and was a frequent topic in both state and
congressional elections. Many state governments began calling for the
federal government to do "something" about illegal immigration. 149 The

145. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3, sc. 1. The rhetoric of battle or war is often
used in the debates of immigration policy.
146. Immigration law and policy is consistently front page news. A search on NEXIS reveals that between January of 1994 and May of 1997, the New York Times has published 23
articles on .immigration related topics on its front page, and in California, where the topic receives much more attention, the Los Angeles Times has published 462 articles on immigration
related topics on its front page since 1994.
147. Some GOP candidates took extreme positions on immigration policy. Governor Pete
Wilson pushed for a constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to children born on United
States soil to undocumented noncitizens. See Ronald Brownstein, Immigration Debate Splits
GOP Hopefals, LA. TIMES, May 14, 1995, at Al. Patrick Buchanan took the most extreme
position, calling for a complete moratorium on most forms of immigration. See id. Currently,
there are several bills pending in the House of Representatives that would either amend the
Constibltion or the INA in an effort to restrict birth right citizenship. See H.RJ. Res. 60,
lOSth Cong. (1997) (amending the Constibltion); H.RJ. Res. 26, 10Sth Cong. (1997) (same);
H.RJ. Res. 4, lOSth Cong. (1997) (same); H.R. 7, lOSth Cong. (1997) (amending the INA).
The Democratic National Platform welcomed legal immigration and supported legal immigration policies but called for greater efforts to control illegal immigration. See 1996 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS, 1996 Democratic Platform, Position Paper, Aug. 28, 1996.
148. Proposition 187 in California was adopted in 1994 by nearly .60% of the votes cast
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 4821S(a) (West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a)
(West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.S(c) (West Supp. 1995). Proposition
187 prohibited the state of California from providing health, welfare, or schooling to undocu~
mented aliens. The proposition has been enjoined by the Federal District Court in Northern
California primarily on the basis that immigration law is preempted by federal legislation and
the state cannot permissibly seek to regulate this area See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction),
aff'd sub. nom. Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997). Initially, the conference report for IIRAIRA had provisions similar to Proposition 187, known as the Gallegly
Amendment; however, this amendment was dropped due to an explicit veto threat from President Clinton. See 142 CONG. REc. HI 1071 (1996).
149. Several states also filed suit against the federal government seeking reimbursement for
the cost to the state associated with the presence of undocumented aliens. State claims included unreimbursed medical expenses, welfare, schooling expenses, and housing. The suits argued
that the federal government failed to adequately enforce the immigration laws both in preventing undocumented migration and in removing aliens found to be in violation of the laws. All
of these suits were dismissed for failing to state a claim for relief. See e.g., Texas v. United
States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.
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media and political statements often referred to an "out of control"
border. 150 Others wanted to reduce the numbers of legal immigrants. 151
The push for change occurred before the work of the United States
Commission on Immigration had completed its study of existing immigration policy. 152 Many opponents to immediate legislative change argued that the reforms of the prior major legislation, or of the agency
reforms, were not yet fully implemented. 153

I997); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d I094· (11th Cir. I995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct I674
(I996); New Jersey v. United States, 9I F3d 463 (3d Cir. I996). In one case, state counties
sued the federal government See Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. I996) (suit
by New York state counties and legislators). llRAIRA also contains provisions which allow
reimbursement to states for the cost of incarcerating illegal immigrant felons. See INA §
24I(i).
ISO. The rhetoric used to discuss this complex issue is often that used to describe invasions
of enemies or pestilence. For example, the press routinely used imagery of invasion in report·
ing the foundering of the ship, the Golden Venture, in New York Harbor. The Golden Ven·
ture was operated by smugglers and carried approximately 285 people who sought illegal entry
to the United States. See Robert McFadden, Smuggled to New York: The Overview-7 Die as
Crowded Immigrant Ship Grounds Off Queens; Chinese Aboard Are Seized for Illegal Entry,
N.Y. nMES, June 7, I993, at Al. Governor Pete Wilson and the Proposition I87 campaign
used video footage of illegal entries at the Mexico border in campaign television commercials.
See Dennis Love, Demagogue or Sav1ry1 Tactician? Can .Pete Wilson Turn Proposition I87,
Affirmative Action Into His Issue?, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, I995, at Fl.
Others analogize immigration to environmental disasters. For an excellent discussion of
the inappropriate use of terms describing environmental pollution or abuse in the context of
immigration poiicy, see Peter L. Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the Alien Benefits Debate,
42 UCLA L. REV. IS77 (I995). Professor Kevin Johnson has also written about the inappro·
priate images used to describe noncitizens. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los O/v/dados: Images of
the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993
BYU L. REv. 1139 (I993).
151. Congress did not enact the express limits on numbers and qualifications of new immi·
grants originally proposed. Congress did raise the income level required to sponsor family
members for immigration. See INA § 213. It may be that this change and others will in fact
reduce the number of people who qualify for legal immigration.
IS2. The United States Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by the late Barbara Jor·
dan, was in the process of conducting a study which was to be published in June I997 which
would provide recommendations concerning permanent and temporary legal immigration to the
United States. See Testimony of Barbara Jordan, Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Re·
form Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, House Judiciary Comm., Feb. 24,
I997. However, llRAIRA was passed prior to the issuance of the commission's report, and
many Democrats in the House complained that the House Conference Report was issued without
their input See I42 CoNG. REc. Hl1071 (I996). The Commission had issued a report which
called for better enforcement of the existing immigration laws. See RESTORING CREDIBILITY,
U.S. CoMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM (I995).
IS3. For example, many non-profit advocacy organizations argued that reforms such as expe·
dited removal at the ports of entry were not needed since regulatory changes had greatly re·
duced the number of applications for political asylum. See 142 CONG. REc. SI 1886-01,
11906-11907 (I996).
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Nevertheless, in 1996, Congress adopted several statutes which
changed the enforcement of the immigration laws and, in many cases,
the ability of people to immigrate to this country. First came the
AEDPA, which was adopted by Congress near the anniversary of the
bombing of the Federal Court building in Oklahoma City in April of
1995. 154 On its face, this bill precluded aliens convicted of certain
criminal offenses from seeking judicial review of final orders of deportation or exclusion. 155 Then on the last day of the session, Congress
attached to one of the appropriations bills the IIRAIRA. 156 IIRAIRA
primarily concerns the ability of the INS to enforce the immigration ·
laws of the United States. The statute blends together the formerly
separate exclusion and deportation hearings by substituting a new "removal" proceeding and creates a form of expedited removal at border
posts, 157 eliminates several forms of relief from deportation, 158 restricts

154. The immigration portions of the bill were in part originally inspired by the fear that the
bombing in Oklahoma City had been the work of foreign terrorists. In June of 1997, Timothy
McVeigh, a native born United States citizen and fonner member of the armed forces, was
tried and convicted of conspiracy and murder in connection with the bombing. Even though
there were no aJlegations that the Oklahoma bombing was in any way Jinked to foreign terrorists groups, some members of Congress were also seeking to speed the deportation of aliens
after the delay in removing Sheik Rahman, the Egyptian cleric who was convicted of inspiring
the bombing of the World Trade Center. See 142 CONG. REc. S3352-0l (1996) (Senator
Hatch argued that the passage of AEDPA will help in the expedient trial and sentencing of the
perpetrators of the Oklahoma City Bombing. Senator Bieden argued that the World Trade
Center Bombing, along with Oklahoma City and the Locherbe, Scotland disaster, where a
PanAm plane exploded due to a terrorist bomb, have made it necessary to pass the bill.).
Sheik Rahman had been admitted to the United States as a tourist He delayed his deportation
by applying for political asylum. When his application for asylum was denied he obtained the
usual stay of deportation while he pursued judicial review of the denial of his application. See
Robert D. McFadden, The Twin Towers: The Overview: Agents Step Up Search for Bombing
Suspect's Links, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, at Al. Sheik Rahman was convicted of conspiracy
to bomb the World Trade Center and sentenced to life in prison.
155. The AEDPA also removed the ability of some criminal aliens to seek a waiver of exclusion or deportation available if the alien had held lawful domicile for seven years and could
demonstrate that he or she would face extreme hardship if deported or excluded. This waiver
was called the section 212(c) waiver.
156. See supra note 5.
157. Although the statute appears to attempt to eradicate the differences which have been
inherent in exclusion and deportation proceedings by creating a single type of "removal proceeding," many of the former distinctions between exclusion and deportation continue to be preserved, such as the differences in burdens of proof. The expedited removal provisions grant
the INS authority to disregard the entry doctrine by treating some people who are physically
within the United States territory as if they had not made an entry because they have not been
inspected and admitted. See INA § 235(b)(l)(iii)(II). The entry doctrine reflected both statutory and constitutional differences between the treatment of noncitizens within the territory of the
United States and those seeking admission at a port of entry. See Stanley Mailman, "Admis-
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preexisting waivers and discretionary fonns of relief, creates new bars
to political asylum, including a time limit of one year from entry for
such applications, and attempts to remove federal court review of administrative action or severely curtail the scope and type of review
available. 159 IIRAIRA also completely repealed the fonner statutory

sion" and "Unlawful Presence" in the New /IRA/RA Lexicon, in 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAw I (1997) (discussing historical development of entry doctrine and the impact of
IIRAIRA changes).
The ability of Congress to eliminate the entry doctrine presents a serious question which
implicates the tradition of recognizing that the Constitution requires greater due process
protections for those noncitizens within the territorial borders of the United States. The wis·
dom of the entry doctrine has long been the subject of debate. See T. Alexwider Aleinikoff,
Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITI. L. REv. 237
(1983) (arguing that the Constitution should not be interpreted differently for people depending
on their immigration status); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership In the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITI. L. REv. 165, 230-34 (1983) (arguing
that people who make illegal entries should not be afforded the same levels of due process as
lawful entrants). This debate about the proper legal treatment of people who have made Illegal
entries is also summarized as a dialogue in ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 505-10. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the entry doctrine, but I note it here as one of
the mwiy important examples of constitutional questions presented by the new legislation. Its
, is hardly coincidental that Congress is limiting federal court jurisdiction at the very same mo·
ment that it seeks to statutorily overturn a long-established judicial doctrine which afforded
noncitizens greater due process protection. IIRAIRA also chwiged the re-entry doctrine for
returning lawful permanent residents by defining a safe harbor period of six months absence
during which a lawful permanent resident could return without having to re-establish admissibili·
ty. See INA § 10l(a)(l3). But although this safe harbor may seem beneficial, it is not necessarily consistent with the principles of due process which lead to the creation of the Fleutl
doctrine, a judicially created exception to the re-entry doctrine for brief, casual, wid Innocent
departures. See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
158. For example, the elimination of suspension of deportation relief, see former INA § 244,
was in direct response to the myth that aliens applying for suspension of deportation often
abused this form of relief by delaying deportation proceedings until the requisite seven years
had been established. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt 1, at 122 (1996). By stripping or lim·
iting noncitizens of various forms of relief, Congress completely disregarded a report issued by
the Attorney General which had determined that noncitizens were not abusing the immigration
system. See Justice Dept. Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 INTERPRETER RE·
LEASES 901 (July 22, 1991). This report was submitted to allay Congress' fears that deportable or excludable people were prolonging their stays in the United States by failing to consoli·
date their requests for discretionary relief. The Justice Department concluded "that the number
of cases in which aliens file multiple applications for relief or motions to reopen comprise Jess
than five percent of the total caseload." Id. For an analysis of how the new cwiccllation of
removal provisions and the restrictions on judicial review will result in the likelihood of arbl·
trary and unjust decisions, see William C.B. Underwood, Note: Unrevlewab/e Discretionary
Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885
(1997).
159. For Congress, the limitation on the availability of judicial review was implemented to
eradicate the delay in the removal of noncitizens from the United States. However, this basis
is nothing more than a myth. As an empirical matter, judicial review of immigration proceed-
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section governing judicial review of deportation and exclusion proceedings which had been in place since 1961. 160 The judicial review provisions of the recent legislation are described in detail in Part IV.

ings is not the major, or even a significant, cause of delay in the removal of noncitizens. In
March 1996, the Inspector General conducted a random review of 1,000 files and concluded
that the INS failed to remove 89% of the people who had outstanding final orders of deportation, but were not in the current detention of the agency. Of those detained, the INS was able
to remove 94%. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Inspection
Report, March 1996, Report No. 1-96-03. This disparity might suggest that increased detention
should immediately be implemented to increase the rate of removal. I dispute that assumption
for a variety of reasons including the increased cost along with purely humanitarian concerns.
Nevertheless, the point is that these were final orders. There was no judicial review barring
the agency's ability to remove the alien, and the agency did not argue that judicial review had
prevented the removal of the aliens.
Examining this from another angle, in fiscal year 1996, the Immigration courts (not including the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")) heard 262,572 cases, and completed approximately 246,426. See Prepared Statement of Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals, before the House Judiciary Committee Immigration and Claims Subcommittee
concerning JIRA/RA, Federal News Service (February 11, 1997). These completed cases included 150,121 removal (deportation, exclusion, and voluntary departure) orders; 7,469 grants of
suspensions of deportation; 2,561 waivers under 212(c); 5,140 grants of asylum; and 4,138
adjustments of status. See id. The Executive Office for Immigration Review anticipates approximately 300,000 cases for fiscal year 1997, with completed cases ranging from 270,000 to
280,000, and for fiscal year 1998, the BIA expects approximately 325,000 cases and hopes to
complete between 290,000 and 300,000. See id. The BIA, in fiscal year 1995, heard approximately 17,500 cases, with completed cases at roughly 12,000. See id. In fiscal year 1996, the
number of cases rose 20,423, with completed cases rising by approximately a third to 16,721.
See id. Of those 16,721 cases, 9,558 removal orders were issued. See id. The BIA projects
approximately 24,000 cases in 1997, with completed cases between 20,000 and 22,000. See id.
And for fiscal year 1998, Mr. Schmidt recognized that the, effects of IIRAIRk will be "felt at
the appellate level," projecting a casefoad increase to at. least 26,000. See id.
Moreover, in their important 1990' study evaluating the. number of immigration cases in
federal courts, Peter Schuck anu' Theodbre- Wang found thar deportation appeals increased from
twenty-three in 1979, to 111 in 19.90, and exclusion appealS' increased from two cases in 1979,
to eight in 1990. See Peter H. S"chuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REY. 115, 136 (1992).
From 1991 to 1996, a search replicating the methodology used in that study found 208 cases
in 1991, in 1992 and 1993, 204 and 284 cases respectively, in 1994 and 1995, 344 and 391
cases respectively, and 401 cases in 1996.
Therefore, I submit judicial review is not the root of our immigration system's problems.
Congress' fearrthat noncitizens are exploiting the system has no basis in fact I do not assert
that judicial review may never cause delays; however, the percentage of possible cases is extremely small in comparision to INS's failure to remove non-detained aliens with final orders
of removal. Further, even with a minute number of cases seeking judicial review, the current
legislation still does not reach Congress' goal of streamlining since it does not have the power
to eliminate the writ of habeas corpus. As discussed in Part V, habeas corpus can be used to
delay and frustrate expeditious removal.
160. Former section 106 of the INA was repealed and replaced by new INA § 242.
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1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION

In AEDPA, Congress focused on the deportation of noncitizens
convicted of crimes. Congress amended the general grant of jurisdiction contained in former section I 06 to limit the scope of judicial review of deportation or exclusion orders. AEDPA provided that persons
convicted of "aggravated felonies" 161 and ordered deported after a deportation hearing and administrative review before the Board of lmmigrati(;m Appeals could not seek judicial review. 162 The exact language
of the bar is "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order
of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
committed a [statutorily covered] criminal offense." 163
When Congress enacted AEDPA, there were several other immigration bills pending in the House and Senate. 164 These bills were not

161. AEDPA expanded the definition of an aggravated felony. See AEDPA § 440(e). The
definition was amended again in IIRAIRA § 321, codified as INA § 101(a}(43). See infra
note 164.
162. AEDPA, also removed several forms of relief from deportation for people convicted of
crimes. One form of relief eliminated was the discretionary waiver available to long-term permanent resident aliens, known as the 212(c) waiver. See infra note 276 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the bar to section 212(c) relief in exclusion proceedings.
The BIA interpreted AEDPA as preserving 212(c) relief in exclusion proceedings. See Jn
re Fuentes-Campos, Int Dec. 3318 (BIA 1997). The statutory disparity between relief available
to people in exclusion versus people in deportation had led the Second Circuit to find that
failure to extend 212(c) relief to people in deportation would violate equal protection. See
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). Because of Francis, the INS eventually allowed
lawful residents in either exclusion or deportation to apply for the waiver. The new disparity
has ·a1so lead to equal protection challenges. See Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D.
Cal. 1997) (finding BIA interpretation irrational given the subsequent repeal of section 212(c) in
IIRAIRA). Congress also repealed section 212(c) and replaced it with a cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents. See INA § 240A. IIRAIRA purports to eliminate the distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings. It is much more difficult to meet the
statutory prima facie requirements under the new cancellation of removal provisions. For a
very clear examination of the relief available after IIRAIRA, see Nadine Wettstein, The 1996
Immigration Act: New Removal Proceedings, . Cancellation of Removal, and Voluntary Departure,

73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1677 (Dec. 9, 1996).
163. See AEDPA § 440a.
164. See, e.g., S. 269, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Alan K. Simpson in early
1995), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 169, 653 (1995); s. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (reform bill aimed at legal immigration, also introduced by Senator Simpson}, discussed in 72 INTER·
PRETER RELEASES 1605; S. 754, 104th Cong. (1995) (the Administration's Immigration Reform
Bill), discussed in 72 INTERPETER RELEASES 377 (1995); H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. LaMar Smith of Texas), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 943 (1995), H.R.
2202, 104th Cong. (1995) (also introduced by Rep. Smith), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEAS·
ES 1303, 1371, 1447, 1481 (1995); and S. 1664, 104th Cong. (1995) (which passed the Senate
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limited to restricting judicial review for people convicted of aggravated
felonies. At the end of the session, the Congress adopted IIRAIRA
and its sweeping changes to judicial review.
IIRAIRA eliminates the former section 106 entirely and replaces it
with a provision which, in some circumstances, allows judicial review
in the circuit courts of appeals. 165 However, the new provision limits
the availability of the petition for review for people in disfavored
groups or for people presenting disfavored claims. 166

A. Disfavored Groups
1. People with Criminal Convictions
The principally disadvantaged group contains people in regular
removal proceedings who have been convicted of crimes. 167 It is diffion May 2, 1996 and, along with H.R. 2202, became the basis for IIRAIRA).
165. See infra Chart 1 (illustrating the general judicial review process under INA § 106 (re- ·
pealed 1940)). For additional diagranis of the prior judicial review process, see ALEINIKOFF ET
AL., supra note 36, at 932-33. IIRAIRA also revised INA § 279, which gave federal district
courts subject matter jurisdiction over some types of immigration claims. The amendment eliminates the jurisdiction except for claims brought by the United States government Section 279
was used in support of lawsuits which were not seeking judicial review of deportation or exclusion orders, but were challenging some type of INS action outside the scope of an exclusion or
deportation order. See discussion of INA § 279 supra note 115. For a discussion of the impact of the elimination of section 279 as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction for claims
against the United States government, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY 350-53 (1992).
166. See INA § 242. In the general case, where the petitioner is not one of the disfavored
groups or making a disfavored claim, the petition for review is filed in the circuit court of
appeals within thirty days of the final order of removal. See id. § 242(b)(1 ). Most importantly, the filing of the petition no longer creates an automatic stay of removal, although a stay
may be requested. See id. § 242(b)(3)(8}. For a discussion of the petition for review process,
see Benson, supra note 115, at 32. A· diagram of the judicial review process for the general
case is found in Chart 2 at the end of this Article. Note that the use of italic type in the
chart represents my analysis of additional avenues for judicial review via the writ of habeas
corpus. The petition for review must be filed within thirty days of the BIA's final order.
This is a reduction from the 90 days previously authorized in section 106. Section 242 also
changes the venue for the petition. It must be filed in the circuit where the removal hearing
took place. See INA § 242(b}(2). Previously, the petition could also be filed in the circuit
where the noncitizen resided. See INA § 106(a)(2) (repealed 1940). This may be a great
tactical advantage for the INS because of the increased used of detention in connection with removal proceedings. When a noncitizen is detained, the INS can select the site of the detention. Some of the largest detention centers are located in Oakdale, in rural Louisiana, and
Krone, in Southern Florida. These centers are within the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively. These particular circuits have generally been viewed as less willing to overturn INS administrative decisions. The INS regularly limits the application of cases to the physical jurisdiction of each· circuit See Steve Y. Koh, Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 430 (1991).
167. See Chart 3 at the end of this Article for a diagram of the judicial review process for
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cult to summarize the types of convictions which will result in the bar
to judicial review. It is misleading to say that the bar applies only to
those with felony convictions or particularly serious crimes. The statute lists a broad range of criminal conduct that can lead to the application of this bar. 168 Relatively minor criminal offenses can result in the
loss of the right to file a petition for review. 169

people convicted of certain crimes as expressly provided in the INA. Chart 4 provides my
analysis of the judicial review process when the writ of habeas corpus is added and the ability
to contest inclusion in the disfavored group is preserved in the petition for review. These
default grants of jurisdiction are explained later in this section.
Judicial review for people in judicial removal or ministerial removal is described below.
"Ministerial" removal refers to a procedure that replaces the "administrative deportation" procedure set forth in INA § 242A (repealed 1996). Although these procedures have been usually
referred to as administrative removal, I have used the term "ministerial removal" to distinguish
them from the standard removal proceeding which occurs before an immigration judge. In
ministerial removal, the removal decision is handled solely by non-judicial officers of the INS
and no admini~trative hearing or administrative appeal is a part of the procedure. It is possible
that the failure to have an independent hearing officer may in and of itself present a constitutional procedural due process violation. In Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), the Supreme Court had rejected a challenge to immigration proceedings which were presided over by
hearing officers who were not independent of INS management or control. In 1984, the Department of Justice reorganized the INS to create the Executive Office of Immigration Review
("EOIR"). EOIR hires and manages the Immigration Judges and the staff of the Board of
Immigration Appeals. EOIR's management and hiring procedures differ from those of the general INS. This structure is described in Forum Choices, supra note 114. The ministerial procedure would be conducted without the participation of any member of EOIR.
168. Moreover, the statute broadened the definition of conviction to include a wide variety of
criminal sentencing procedures, such as deferred adjudication of guilt or suspended sentences
which in standard criminal law might be thought to abate the collateral consequences of a
regular conviction. See INA § 10l(a)(48)(A). As one commentator has noted:
Section 10l(a)(43) of the INA ..• began as one paragraph in 1988. Eight
years later the provision consists of twenty-one paragraphs . . . . In 1988 the statute
identified three general crimes. Today over fifty crimes or general classes of crimes
are enumerated.
[A]lmost all crimes in which the sentence [could be] over one year probation or
prison time will be considered aggravated felonies . . . .
Richard L. Prinz, Criminal Aliens Under the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, In INTRODUCING
nm 1996 IMMIGRATION Acr 62, 64-66 (1996). For a general discussion of criminal convictions and collateral consequences, see Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal
Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269 (1997). See generally DAN
KEsSELBRENNER & LoRY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES (1997).
169. For example, under these provisions,
a legal permanent resident convicted of one minor drug possession charge, or two
misdemeanor petty theft or public transportation fare evasion charges-turnstile jumping in the New York City subway system leading to a crime of 'theft of services'
misdemeanor conviction is considered a crime of 'moral turpitude'-is now subject to
automatic deportation without any opportunity to [apply for § 212(c) relief].
Yesil v. Reno, 1997 WL 394945, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1997) (quoting Moiica v. Reno,
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Congress simultaneously preserved judicial review for two groups of
people in immigration proceedings. 17° First, judicial review is preserved
for a noncitizen, of any immigration status, who is convicted of a
crime in a federal court and who is ordered removed as part of the
judicial proceeding. These individuals may challenge the conviction
and the order of removal in the court of appeals. 171 The second group
includes those individuals who are processed in the special ministerial
administrative deportation procedure which eliminates the immigration
judge and Board of Immigration Appeals. 172 In this procedure, a removal or deportation officer presents the nonresident with a written
notice of intent to remove. The nonresident is then afforded ten days
to present written rebuttal to the notice. The rebuttal is reviewed by a
second deportation officer who is empowered to issue a final order of
removal. 173 This procedure can be selected by the INS for use with
people who have not acquired lawful permanent resident status and
have been- convicted of an aggravated felony. Although this purely
ministerial removal process bypasses the administrative hearing and
administrative appeals, it does expressly mention judicial review of the
administrative action. 174 It seems anomalous that a resident alien is
refused direct judicial review, while a person who may have no legal
status receives it. 175

Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 24,
1997)).
170. See infr'O Chart 3.
171. See INA § 238(c)(3)(A)(i). The appeal is to be "considered consistent with the requirements of section 242." See id. § 238(c)(3)(A)(ii).
172. See id. § 238.
173. See id. § 238(b)
174. See INA §§ 238(b)(4)(E). This language bolsters the analysis that at least removability
is subject to review. See discussion infra text accompanying note 179.
175. Noncitizens may prefer the administrative hearing procedures and administrative appeal to
the ministerial procedure in INA § 238 as the administrative process provides more opportunities to defeat removability or takes longer. Why would Congress afford an express right to
judicial review for the individual with no legal status? If efficiency was the primary goal,
why did Congress provide for appellate review of judicial deportation orders originating in district court? Perhaps lawful permanent residents would make an equal protection argument that
Congress has no rational reason for eliminating judicial review for the lawful permanent resident while preserving this right for the nonresident alien in judicial removal proceedings. Such
an argument was upheld in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), to establish the right
of lawful permanent residents to apply for the discretionary waiver of excludability found in
former INA § 212(c). Congress had provided for a waiver for legal residents in exclusion proceedings but not in deportation proceedings. The court found no rational reason for the distinction. In section 238, the lawful permanent resident appears to lose direct (other than habeas) judicial review, while the nonresident in judicial removal is expressly granted a right to
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Although Congress may have wanted to prevent litigation over the
issue of when the bar on judicial review applies, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the court has jurisdiction to determine if
the statutory bar was applicable. 176 In Coronado-Durazo, the petitioner
disputed that his conviction for solicitation to possess cocaine was subject to the jurisdictional bar on judicial review under AEDPA. Given
the use of imprecise terms such as "crimes of moral turpitude" to define who is within this disfavored group, it can be expected that other
petitioners will dispute their inclusion in the barred group. 177 It is also
probable that petitioners will seek judicial review of the merits of the
order of removal, arguing that they cannot be subject to the bar on
judicial review until it is judicially established that the predicate facts
and legal issues establish.their membership in the disfavored group. 178

judicial review.
176. Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 108 F.3d 210 (9th Cir. 1996), petition for rehearing denied
and new opinion substituted 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26900 (Sept 28, 1997). The Ninth Circuit exercised the jurisdiction granted under fonner INA § 106 in order to detennine if the
convictions had stripped the court of its jurisdiction. See also Choeum v. INS, 113 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 1997) (court retained jurisdiction to consider whether noncitizen was member of barred
class); Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 140, 141-44 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that conviction did not
meet the definition of preclusion statute). But cf. Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d 159 (10th Cir.
1997) (finding that Congress meant to preclude challenges to the finding of deportability as
well as to claims for reliet).
177. There are many circuit court of appeals decisions which discuss the BIA's evaluation of
the nature of moral turpitude or other issues about the classification of the crimes. See, e.g.,
Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting INS conclusion that conspiracy to
violate the federal currency laws and violations of currency reporting laws were crimes of moral turpitude rendering the noncitizen deportable under fonner INA § 2421(a)(4)). See also
KEsSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 168, § 6.7, App. E. In the casebook IMMIGRATION
PROCE.SS AND POLICY, the authors question whether Congress has invited the agency and courts
to legislate by using such a vague tenn as "moral turpitude." See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 36, at 551.
178. This challenge might be based on both statutory and constitutional claims. The statute
requires the evidence of removability to be supported by clear, convincing, and probative evidence. See INA § 240(c)(3)(A). In Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966), the Supreme
Court interpreted this phrase to require "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." It is
unclear whether the Woodby ruling is based on an interpretation of the statute or whether this
standard is mandated by the due process clause, but nothing in IIRAIRA alters the statutory
standard of proof. Noncitizens will certainly argue that the holding of Woodby requires judicial
review to test whether the evidence meets this standard. Hiroshi Motomura discusses Woodby
and the Supreme Court's avoidance of direct reliance on the Fifth Amendment. See Motomura,
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 572-74. The Tenth Circuit ruled that IIRAIRA
(AEDPA) removed the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal to consider the merits of the deportation (removal) order. See Berehe, 114 F.3d 159. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit exercised
its jurisdiction to detennine whether the convictions were "crimes of moral turpitude" which
would eliminate the petitioner's claims for discretionary relief. The petitioner had also not
challenged the grounds of deportability but conceded them in the immigration hearing.
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2. People Subject to Expedited Removal
One of the most controversial areas of eliminating judicial review
concerns the lack of administrative and judicial review for persons
subject to the new expedited removal provisions. 179 These individuals
have been refused entry by an admission officer because the officer
finds they lack valid entry documents 180 or have made a misrepresentation in seeking admission. 181 The statute grants a limited form of administrative review of the inadmissibility determination before an immigration judge only if the applicant is making one of two "special
claims": (1) a new claim of asylum, or (2) prior admission as a lawful
permanent resident, asylee, or refugee. 182 From this limited administra-

179. See infra Chart S for a diagram of expedited removal and judicial review as envisioned
by llRAIRA and the implementing regulations. The text in italics represents my analysis of
available judicial review via habeas corpus and declaratory judgment actions.
180. This Article has not explored the use of habeas corpus by noncitizen "stowaways" who
have traditionally had few statutory or constititonal rights. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469
U.S. 1311 (198S) (allowing habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and INA § 106(a), but
limiting the scope of review to the jurisdictional facts which lead to the preclusion of review
or statutory relief). Due to the special status of stowaways, I am not suggesting that these are
the appropriate precedents for the determination of the future scope of review under the habeas
statute. See 3 GoRDON ET AL., supra note 2, at § 81.04[b]. INA § 23S(a)(2) contains provisions for stowaways which state that they are not eligible to apply for admission, nor are they
eligible for a section 240 hearing. They may, however, apply for asylum and this may lead to
bring this claim before an immigration judge. See Fang-Sui Yau v. Gustafson, 623 F. Supp.
ISIS (C.D. Cal. 1985) (granting a writ of habeas corpus and remanding for a hearing before
the IJ to determine eligibility for asylum).
181. Section 23S refers to inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(a)(7).
These grounds of inadmissibility are broader than they may first appear. The grounds have
been used to exclude persons who present a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa. If the inspector does not agree that the visa category is appropriate for the purpose of the applicant's visit,
the inspector may find the person inadmissible for lack of documentation.
See INA §
212(a)(7). For example, a business person with a valid B-1 business visitor visa may be refused admission if the officer believes that the business person will actually perform "work"
and be compensated for that work in the United States. Before expedited removal, the business visitor could challenge the admission decision in an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge. The visitor could also appeal the judge's ruling to the BIA. See, e.g., Matter of
Opferkuch, 17 l&N Dec. IS8 (BIA 1979) (employee of foreign-owned business may use the
business visitor visa when his sole purpose is to gather information for his company on a temporary basis). But cj Matter of Neill, 15 l&N Dec. 331 (BIA 1975) (engineer denied admission as business visitor because his visit to consult with clients in the United States was not of
a temporary nature). See infra note 182, for a discussion of possible habeas challenges to admission decisions.
182. INA § 242(e)(4) creates a very limited form of habeas corpus petition. People who
have been granted asylum or permitted to enter the United States as refugees are not yet permanent resident aliens. They are entitled to seek adjustment as a lawful permanent resident
once they have resided in the United States as a refugee or asylee for a period of one year.
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tive· review, only the person making a "special claim" may seek judicial
review of the order of expedited removal. 183 Even when judicial review is granted, the statute limits the relief to an order of remand for a
full administrative removal hearing. 184 The INS regulations have also
added limited administrative review for persons making claims of United States citizenship. 185
If the noncitizen is not a returning resident, asylee, or refugee, the
statute does not provide for administrative or judicial review of the
expedited removal order. However, noncitizens who wish to contest

See INA § 209(b)(5). Section 242(e)(4) allows the petitioner to dispute the allegation of alienage. Perhaps, then, citizenship claims will also be heard in this habeas proceeding. Whether
this type of habeas proceeding must include an evidentiary hearing is unclear. In 1905, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an exclusion act which insulated from judicial
review the factual determinations of the inspecting administrative official. See United States v.
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (This case is also discussed supra Part II.). Yet under the exclusion statute applicable at the time, the person claiming citizenship was allowed an opportunity to present witnesses and develop evidence before the administrative officer and the statute
created an administrative appeal. The new statute and regulations do not afford an equal
amount of administrative procedure. See supra note 181, for a discussion of the regulations
and other issues concerning citizenship claims.
183. See INA § 242(e)(4)(B)
184. See id.
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.6. Under the regulations, a person making a claim of United States
citizenship which is not verifiable by the admission officer will be referred to an immigration
judge for a review of the expedited removal order. There is no further administrative review
of the IJ determination that the person is not a citizen. People who wish to challenge the INS
determination of citizenship in an expedited removal proceeding should file in federal district
court using the provisions of the Declaratory Judiment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. and ha·
beas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Prior to llRAlRA, section 360 of the INA
had not. permitted a Declaratory Judgment challenge if the issue of citizenship arose in connection with "any exclusion proceeding." But cf. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (allowing
some claims of citizenship to be made in declaratory judgment proceedings notwithstanding the
limits of section 360). The holding in Rusk also casts doubt on the continuing validity of Ju
Toy.
In a "housekeeping" provision of llRAIRA, directed at conforming the new term of "removal," Congress amended INA § 360 to refer to "removal" proceedings. INA § 360 does not
refer to "expedited removal." Congress appears to have failed to realize that citizenship claims
might be made in expedited removal proceedings. On its face, the limits of INA § 360 do
not apply. The absence of discussion of citizenship claims in section 235 might be a basis to
argue that citizenship claims must be heard in regular section 240 hearings; however, the INS
disagrees and the interim regulations provide for an extraordinarily streamlined administrative
process with review only before an IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(iv). Further, section 360
seems to be specifically contradicted in section 242(b)(5), which provides for judicial review of
citizenship claims in the court of appeals and if a fact finding hearing is required, for remand
to the federal district court. See INA § 242(b}(5). Cf Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276
(1922) (judicial fact finding required for persons making a citizenship claim inside the U.S.).
For excellent material on citizenship claims, see Gary Endelman, How to Prevent loss of Citizenship, 89-11 to -12, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (1989).
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the officer's decision may be able to file for habeas corpus review. 186
The possibility of habeas review does not remove the practical difficulty of filing the habeas petition. 187
Additionally, Congress limited challenges to the expedited removal
system as a whole in section 242(e)(3) by providing that any challenge
to the constitutionality of the system must be brought within sixty days
of the implementation of the program. 188 A suit was filed by several

186. In Kamuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929), Preston Albro, an attorney from Buffalo, New York, filed a habeas petition on behalf of Mary Cook and Antonio
Danelon. Both Cook and Danelon were lawfully domiciled in Canada. Cook was a citizen of
the United Kingdom and Danelon of Italy. They sought daily admission to the United States
as business visitors pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, § 3. This statute
contained no express provision for judicial review of admission decisions. Although the petitioners had been crossing the border from the Canadian side of Niagra Falls to the New York
side for some time, a border inspector refused their admission as nonimmigrant business visitors. See Karnuth, 279 U.S. at 234. The petitioners challenged the border inspector's decision. The petitioners filed a habeas petition in district court instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor. The district court entertained the petition, despite the fact that the petitioners
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies (today, exhaustion would be required in most
cases). The habeas petition was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. Although the
Court upheld the exclusion order, the Court reviewed the agency's interpretation of the immigration laws notwithstanding the habeas context The Court also rejected the petitioners contention that they were business visitors as defined by the 1924 Immigration Act, § 3. See id. at
242-44. Many years later, the Supreme Court held that Congress could authorize exclusion
without an administrative hearing or judicial review. See United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950). Abra is not mentioned in the Knauff decision.
The 1961 amendments to the INA granted administrative and judicial review of an exclusion
determination. See former INA § 106. In future challenges to expedited removal, it may be
that Knauff will be limited to its national security context and that Abra will provide authority
for habeas review of the admission decision. But cf Meng Li v. Eddy, A97-231 CV (JKS)
(D. Alaska July 2, 1997) (unpublished order) (finding that section 242 precluded all habeas
challenges to expedited removal orders except for the limited provisions found in the statute).
Meng Li had a valid B-1 visitor visa and was refused entry by the inspector on the ground
that he did not believe she was entering the United States for a business trip. He ordered her
removed for visa fraud or willful misrepresentation of fact See INA § 212(a)(6)(C). She
spent one month in detention while awaiting the outcome of the habeas petition. See Jailed
Beijing Woman Heading Home, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1997, at B-3. The denial
of habeas relief is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Telephone interview
with Margaret Stock, Esq., attorney for Meng Li (July 21, 1997).
187. Albro is an example of a habeas proceeding involving a third-party petitioner. See
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, § 8.3 (discussing third-party petitioners in habeas corpus
proceedings). See also United States ex rel. United States Lines v. Watkins, 170 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1948) (transportation company acted as petitioner for noncitizen). The INS is not uniformly granting attorneys access to noncitizens or putative citizens who are being detained pending
their expedited removal. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained
Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997), for a discussion
of detention and legal representation.
188. See INA § 242(e)(3)(A) and (B)
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non-profit organizations even before the implementation. 189 It is possible that future claims might be barred as following outside the statute
of limitations for the challenge. 190
B. Disfavored Claims
1. Claims for Discretionary Relief
Section 242 attempts to remove judicial review of most
discretionary relief. 191 This is a very important limitation.
that the vast majority of cases involve review of the denial
tionary relief. 192 Th~ statute does preserve judicial review

claims for
I believe
of discreof claims

189. AILA v. Reno, CA 97 CV 00597 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 1997).
I90. A similar time bar to litigation was included in section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act.
That section provided:
(I) A petition for review of action of the Administrator [regarding any emission
standard] may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia .•.. [Any such petition] shall be filed within sixty days from the date
notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register,
except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day,
then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days
after such grounds arise . . . .
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been ob·
tained under paragraph (I) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal
proceedings for enforcement . . . .
Notwithstanding this statutory bar, the Supreme Court allowed a limited form of review of the
agency action in a criminal prosecution alleging a violation of an "emission standard." See
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). Later, in Un/led States v.
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Supreme Court held that where an administrative
finding would later be a critical element in a criminal prosecution, "there must be some mean·
ingful review of the administrative proceeding." Id. at 837-38. These cases suggest that prosecutions for criminal re-entry after expedited removal may necessitate judicial review of the INS
determination. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider avenues of judicial review of
immigration decisions which may arise in subsequent criminal or civil proceedings.
191. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii).
192. I cannot provide detailed empirical evidence to support this claim. However, the Schuck
and Wang study, see supra note 159, at 142, includes an analysis of immigration litigation in
both the district courts and circuit courts from 1979 to 1990. This study indicates that 54% of
the cases involved requests for relief from deportation. See id. at 144. A large percentage of
these cases involved claims for political asylum. See id. IIRAIRA does not remove judicial
review of most issues in political asylum cases. A search of the electronic databases of
LEXIS and Westlaw revealed that 73% of the immigration cases for 1996 involved judicial
review of the abuse of discretion in denying relief. These cases were found by conducting the
same search used by Schuck and Wang, see id. at 126 n.55, and adding the following focus
request: "abuse Is discretion Is deny or deni!."
The relief available under the immigration laws is often committed to the discretion of
the agency. See, e.g., INA § 240A (cancellation of removal). Daniel Kanstroom has carefully
cataloged the types of discretionary decision making in the immigration laws. See Daniel
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Jmmlgra-
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that the INS improperly denied an application for political asylum. 193
However,. Congress may not have successfully eliminated all judicial
review in these cases. Judicial review should be available to test the
agency's interpretation of statutory eligibility for the relief. In many
cases involving discretionary relief, the noncitizen must first establish
prima facie eligibility for the relief. Only after this prima facie case is
met does the agency exercise its discretion by deciding whether the
noncitizen should receive the relief. 194 For example, if a noncitizen
wishes to apply for Cancellation of Removal, the noncitizen must establish that she: (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence for not less than five years, (2) has resided in the United
States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any
status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 195
There are many cases where the noncitizen has disputed the INS's legal
conclusion that he or she was statutorily ineligible to request the discretionary relief. 196

lion Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 767-71 (1997). Given the new congressional limits on judicial review, he calls on the agency to exercise self-restraint and to promulgate rules to limit
and guide the exercise of discretion. See id. at 717, 805. See also Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1994)
(criticizing existing "discretion talk" as inappropriately determinate and suggesting that judicial
review is essential to a dialogue that supports the development of law).
193. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii). There are specific limits on the scope of judicial review in
the statute governing asylum claims. The statute also precludes judicial review of some of the
issues concem:iig statutory eligibility to request asylum. See id. § 208(a)(3). See also id. §
208(d)(7) ("Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural
right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.").
194. The government appears to agree that the noncitizen may seek review of statutory eligibility. See Tefel v. INS, No. 97-0805-ClV-KING, 1997 WL 369980, at *42 (S.D. Fla. May
20, 1997). Although section 242(a)(2)(8) is not expressly discussed in the court's opinion, the
government argued that noncitizens would be abfe to file petitions for review in the courts of
appeal to challenge the agency's interpretation of statutory eligibility for discretionary relief.
Professor Kanstroom suggests that discretionary decision making would have much greater
clarity if the two step process were labeled "interpretive discretion" when the agency is determining statutory eligibility and "delegated discretion" when the agency is determining whether
the noncitizen should receive the relief. He explains that these labels would then guide the
appropriate judicial deference afforded to the agency action. See Kanstroom, supra note 192,
at 751-66. He also notes that in the absence of judicial review, these distinctions would also
help Congress set standards for the proper exercise of discretion and that the agency through
regulations should also clarify and cabin its own discretionary decision making. See id. at 805.
195. See INA § 240A(a). This statute replaces the former waiver for long-term residents
founci in former INA § 212(c).
196. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (challenging the INS definition of seven years of "lawful unrelinquished domicile" necessary to establish eligibility for former INA § 212(c) relief). See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 22, at 621-24 (additional arguments
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The language of the statutory bar to judicial review is also imprecise. The statute provides that there shall be no judicial review of
"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA] section
[212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245]." 197 A possible construction of
this provision would be that it bars judicial review only when the agency grants relief. The statute refers solely to decisions "regarding granting" relief. It says nothing about "denial." In another provision, the
statute bars judicial review of decisions granting or denying relief. 198
Advocates will argue that this language demonstrates that Congress
knew how to preclude all judicial review of claims denying relief. 199
2. Claims for Injunctive Relief
In section 242(f), Congress sought to prevent injunctions which
would limit the INS's implementation of the provisions of IIRAIRA.
The statute states that no court, except the United States Supreme
Court, may grant an injunction "to enjoin or restrain the operation of
the provisions of part IV of this subchapter ... other than with respect
to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated."20° Congress
probably intended this provision to prevent class-wide injunctions such ·
as those which have prevented the INS from removing large numbers
of people or from implementing changes in the past. 201 Part IV of the
subchapter of the amended INA covers inspection, apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens.202 It does not cover subchapter I which
contains provisions concerning the authority of officers, the implementation of regulations, and the operation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Litigants will argue that they seek to enjoin the implementation of the law or the regulations and not the particular statutory provision included in the subchapter.203

limiting this bar to review).
197. INA § 242(a){2)(B)(i).
198. See, e.g., id. § 212(h} C'No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this section."); § 208(a)(3) ("No court shall
have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).").
199. This argument was made by Lucas Guttentag in The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal
Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions and Constitutional Rights, 14 INTERPRETER RELEASES
245, 250 (Feb. IO, 1997).
200. INA § 242(f){I}.
201. See the discussion of the legalization litigation supra Part II.
202. Title II (now subchapter II} includes sections 231-44.
203. This argument was already successfully presented in Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIVKING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 1997). Tefe/ is discussed more in Part IV.B.3.
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This section also seeks to limit injunctive relief in individual cases
by requiring that the noncitizen establish that his or her removal would
be "prohibited as a matter of law."204 The application of this subsection is unclear. It may have been meant as a guide to the court of
appeals in granting discretionary stays of removal while a petition for
review is pending. This subsection might also be used to argue that ·
Congress anticipated continuing habeas corpus jurisdiction and wished
to set standards for the granting of a stay of removal in that context.
If this construction is correct, the articulated standard of proving an
error of law is much broader than the government position that habeas
review is limited to cases where removal would result in a "manifest
injustice" or "s!.!bstantial constitutional error."20s
3. The "Catch-All" Barriers
Congress apparently created two subsections of section 242 as
"catch-all barriers"206 that would gather all other possible claims and
either restrict or eliminate judicial review of these claims. The most
important barrier is found in section 242(g):
Exclusive Jurisdiction: Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
The effectiveness of this catch-all subsection will depend on the
ability of lawyers to argue that the express provisions do not apply or
that the provision is insufficient to eliminate other grants of jurisdic-

Similar language was used in the fonner version of section 279 which had previously been
used by litigants to assert federal court jurisdiction. In that statute, jurisdiction was available
for decisions within Title II of the INA. Courts sometimes refused to exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to section 279 and read it as a restraint on general federal question jurisdiction when
the noncitizen was challenging an action or regulation governed by Title I (now subchapter I).
See, e.g., Yim Tong Chung v. Smith, 640 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding review of denial of work authorization precluded because it was not within Title II of the INA);
Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding jurisdiction of the court
limited to Title II).
204. INA § 242(f)(2).
205. Part V provides a discussion of the types of claims and fonns of habeas review which
survive the 1996 legislation.
206. The "catch-all" appellation merely describes the probable intent of Congress, for as l
will show, many types of claims will evade these barriers.
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tion. 207 Congress does not clearly bar all judicial review because it
uses language which itemizes the types of decisions covered by the bar.
Therefore, it is not clear that this provision prohibits claims that do not
arise in the context of removal or claims that do not directly concern
the Attorney General's treatment of proceedings or removal orders
against aliens.
The second subsection does not directly forbid judicial review but
rather tries to gather all other permissible claims and channel them into
review of the final order of deportation. Those noncitizens who have
any express right to judicial review of the final order may file a petition for review in the court of appeals.208 Section 242(b)(9) provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including inter. pretaticn and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall
be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section.
This subsection was apparently meant to overturn the holdings in
Cheng Fan Kwok v. JNS1- 09 and McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center2 10
and to follow the reasoning suggested in Thunder Basin Coal Mining
Co. v. Reich.211 These decisions allowed litigants to evade the "sole

207. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wallis, No. 96-3518-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 1997) (ruling that even if section 242(g) were effective at that time, bond determinations would be outside the scope of the actions covered by the subsection). But cf Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d
1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that section 242(g) precludes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 of claims that the Department of Justice breached agreement not to commence deportation
proceedings but acknowledging that jurisdiction remains in habeas to consider "substantial" constitutional questions). Rama/lo is discussed in the text beginning infra note 235.
208. See INA § 242. If the noncitizen is one of the people barred from judicial review,
subsection 242(b)(9) does not appear to apply as the subsection assumes some form of judicial
review.
209. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
210. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 126-39.
211. 510 U.S. 200 (1994). In Thunder Basin, the plaintiff filed a pre-enforcement injunction
against the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA"), alleging both statutory and constitutional violations if MSHA was allowed to enforce an administrative order. The Mine Act
provided for administrative review before an independent commission and then a petition for review in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that Congress had intended to preclude pre-enforcement district court jurisdiction. The Court stated that "whether a statute is
intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure
and purpose, its legislative history, Block [v. Community Nutrition Inst., 461 U.S. 340, 345
(1984)], and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review." Thunder Basin, 510 U.S.
at 207. The Court distinguished McNary by stating that the language of the INA "did not evi-
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and exclusive" procedures set forth in fonner section 106. Asserting
Cheng Fan Kwok, some litigants successfully characterized the nature of
their district court action as outside the scope of a removal order and
therefore not limited to the section 106 petition for review procedure.212
Relying on McNary, federal district courts entertained challenges to INS
enforcement practices when the allegations require a trial court and
evidentiary hearings to develop an adequate record for review. 213 In
dence an intent to preclude broad 'pattern and practice' challenges ... and acknowledged that
'if not ailowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, [litigants] would not as a practical
matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review."' Id. at 213 (quoting McNary, 498 U.S.
at 494, 496, 497).
212. The noncitizens usually asserted that the district court had jurisdiction based on the APA
combined with general federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that the APA
lacks an express grant of jurisdiction. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 703 and ultimately rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction as precluded by the
Social Security Act). Federal question jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The APA
recognizes that Congress may also preempt agency action from APA judicial review. Where
Congress appears to do this, courts usually read the preclusion statute as impliedly precluded
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(I). See generally 2 KENNETH
DAVIS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11 (3d ed. 1997) (addressing judicial review
of agency adjudications). Another exception to judicial review under the APA arises when the
court finds that the decision has been completely committed to agency discretion and there is
no meaningful standard of review to apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2). This exception is
sometimes used in immigration cases challenging discretionary waivers such as waiver of the
home resiqency iequirement for certain exchange visitors (J-1 visas). See, e.g., Korvah v.
Brown, 66 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1995). See also the critique of similar reasoning in Nafziger,
supra note 22.
213. See, e.g., Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1994). Campos discusses the
McNary exceptions to the section 106 review and distinguishes Thunder Basin on the ground
that McNary allows district court jurisdiction over both statutory and constitutional claims which
could not be developed in an individual case or required a factual record in a trial court. In
Campos, the plaintiffs asserted that Immigration Judge Nail, who sat in Arizona and Nevada,
had failed to exercise independently his discretion to grant change of venue requests for any
Central American who had not established a residence in the United States prior to apprehension in Arizona or Nevada. The district court had ruled that the individual plaintiffs could not
establish the factual record necessary to the resolution of their claims if they were only allowed
to challenge Judge Nail's practice before the court of appeals in individual petitions for review.
The Ninth Circuit agreed.
Not all noncitizens succeed in distinguishing Thunder Basin. In Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d
416 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court's grant of
jurisdiction where the noncitiz~n sought to enjoin the INS deportation proceedings. Mr.
Massieu, the former Deputy Attorney General of Mexico, had fled after his resignation and
allegations of criminal conduct A few days after his arrival in the United States, the Mexican
government charged Massieu with several crimes. The United States government brought four
unsuccessful extradition proceedings. On the same day as the dismissal of the last extradition
proceeding, the government commenced deportation proceedings. Massieu had alleged that the
deportation proceedings were a sham for an "illegal de facto extradition" to Mexico. The INS
alleged that Massieu was deportable under section 24l(a)(4)(C)(i), which states "[a]n alien
whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds
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cases that arose outside of the direct review of removal orders, litigants
also used other grants of jurisdiction to seek mandamus and declaratory
judgements.214
Litigants are likely to find a variety of ways to try to evade the
strictures of section 242 due to these precedents. They will also rely
on the long line of cases which hold that courts should narrowly construe statutes which seek to limit judicial review and, absent the express
intent of Congress, should preserve review of constitutional challenges.215 Congress may have thought that these catch-all barriers would

to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United
States is deportable." INA § 241(a)(4)(C)(i). Massieu also sought to enjoin the deportation
proceedings alleging, among other things, that section 241(a)(4)(C) was unconstitutional. The
district court accepted jurisdiction, enjoined the deportation proceedings and found section
241(a)(4)(C} unconstitutional for three reasons: void for vagueness, a violation of due process as
the Secretary of State's detennination is allegedly unreviewable, and the provision is an unconstitutional delegation of power which lacks sufficiently intelligible standards to direct the Secretary's actions. See Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 711 (D.N.J. 1996). The Third Circuit
reversed, stating that Thunder Basin required the Court to assess carefully the intent of Congress in delaying judicial review of administrative action. The Court found that Congress had
meant to create an efficient and streamlined procedure which avoided unnecessary delay when it
enacted fonner INA § 106 in 1961. The Third Circuit ruled that Massieu had failed to exhaust his administrative hearings and that his constitutional claims, unlike those in McNary,
could be dealt with in the petition for review following the deportation hearing, notwithstanding
the inability of the IJ or BIA to consider constitutional challenges to the statute. See Mass/eu,
91 F.3d at 422-23. The deportation hearing proceeded in the Spring of 1997, and in late
May, the IJ ruled that Massieu was not deportable as charged because the government failed to
meet its burden of proof. (Unpublished order). The Mexican government has reported that
they will continue to seek his deportation. See Robert L. Jackson, Mexico Official Caught Up
in U.S. Legal Maze Crime, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at Al4.
214. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201; Kummer v. Shultz, 578 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Tex. 1984)
(attempting to use mandamus to compel adjudication of an immigrant visa petition). In an unusual case, mandamus was used to prevent the INS from commencing a second deportation
proceeding where the government was barred by res judicata principles. See Ramon-Sepulveda
v. INS, 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987) (mandamus relief granted to prevent INS from bringing
new deportation proceedings based on assertion of a res judicata defense). In a case pending
in federal district court, a Rwandan petitioner sought mandamus to compel the administrative
adjudication of an asylum claim pending before an asylum officer for over twelve months.
Among other r.laims, the petition alleges that the INS is intentionally delaying the adjudication
of Rwandan asylum claims and thus impennissibly discriminating against Rwandan applicants on
the basis of national origin. See Karani v. Reno, CV 97-619 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Lee J,
Teran, Obtaining Remedies for INS Misconduct, 96-5 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (May 1996) (discussing mandamus, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and other actions to remedy agency miscon·
duct).
215. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The Abbott opinion quotes a statement in Rusk v. Cort, a case concerning limits on the use of declaratory judgements to assert
claims of citizenship: "[O]nly upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk
v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)). Other famous cases also reflect the presumption of
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demonstrate an intention to block judicial review, but as several recent
cases illustrate, the attempt may have failed. 216
In Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno,211 the
government used section 242 to support its motion to dismiss a suit
and injunction, alleging that the INS had been motivated to instigate
deportation proceedings against eight members of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") engaged in activities protected by
the. First Amendment. 218 The case has a long history in the federal
courts.219 After the passage of IIRAIRA, the government moved to
dismiss the suit, arguing that the recent amendments eliminated the
federal court jurisdiction and the substantive claims of the litigants. In
an unpublished order, the district court rejected the government's motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court

preserving judicial review, especially for constitutional questions. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) (continuing to consider constitutional allegations of denial of equal protection notwithstanding congressional statute, which insulated the actions of the Director of the
CIA from judicial review); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667
(1986) (interpreting statutory preclusion of judicial review of Medicare claims as not.excluding
judicial review of regulations promulgated under the Medicare statute); Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361 (1974) (notwithstanding statute precluding review of claims for veterans' benefits,
jurisdiction remained to consider constitutional issues); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S.
535 (1988) (notwithstanding statutory prohibition of all judicial review of Veterans Administration benefit rulings, statute did not preclude collateral statutory claim); Lindahl v. Office of
Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 791 (1985) (statute which made all disability determinations final, co:iclusive and not subject to review was not a bar to claims of departure from
substantial procedural rights or claims of error "going to the heart of the administrative determination") (internal quotations omitted). Cf Thunder Basin Coal Mining Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200 (1994) (finding that statutory scheme reflected congressional intent to preclude preenforcement judicial review; discussed supra note 211).
216. This Article was completed in August 1997.
217. Nos. 96-55929, 97-55479, 1997 WL 395300 (9th Cir. 1997)
218. See id. .at *I. Six of the noncitizens are lawful permanent residents and two were in
lawful nonimmigrant status_ at the time that the deportation proceedings began. See id.
219. The INS began deportation proceedings in 1987, claiming that the members of the PFLP
were deportable under current immigration laws for advocating communism. The eight members of the PFLP and a committee of United States citizens filed an action in federal district
court claiming that this sectfon of the Immigration Act was unconstitutional. These particular
charges were subsequently dropped, leaving only charges based on certain technical visa viola·
tions. Later, the government once again initiated deportation proceedings, alleging "terrorist
activity" against two of the members of the PFLP. In response, all eight members filed an
action in federal district court, asserting general federal question jurisdiction, alleging that the
INS had engaged in unlawful selective prosecution. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing,
the district court enjoined the continuation of the deportation. The Ninth Circuit had affirmed
the granting of the injunction in a 1995 opinion which held that noncitizens could assert First
Amendment protections and that there was sufficient evidence that the INS had targeted the
Palestinians for speech and associational activities to support the issuance of a preliminary in·
junction. See id. at *1-2.
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order, finding that section 242(f) specifically granted jurisdiction to enjoin deportation (now removal) proceedings in cases where the proceeding was contrary to law. 220 The PFLP members had met this standard
by proving that the government was motivated to commence the deportation proceedings by the First Amendment protected activities. In a
careful analysis of section 242, Judge Nelson found that Congress must
have meant to preserve federal court jurisdiction, given the presumption
of the preservation of judicial review and the explicit exclusions from
jurisdiction found elsewhere in section 242 and other provisions of
IIRAIRA. She rejected the government's assertion that section 242(g)
removes jurisdiction in cases denying commencement of removal proceedings because deportation proceedings had already begun when the
federal court action was filed. She also ruled that the bar to jurisdiction in subsection (g) specifically preserved the grant of jurisdiction
found in other parts of section 242 such as the provision of subsection
(f), applicable in this case, which allowed injunctions in individual
cases.
Judge Nelson also found that the catch-all consolidation subsection
in section 242(b)(9) did not remove the district court's jurisdiction nor
did it require the PFLP members to have to submit to a deportation
hearing and administrative review before they could make their consti"tutional selective prosecution challenge. Judge Nelson concluded:
Even if subsection (b)(9) applies along with subsection (g), we
believe that subsection (f) must be incorporated as well, and
that (f) must be read to preserve judicial review of constitutional claims such as the ones at issue here. Any other reading
would present serious constitutional problems. 221
Judge Nelson goes on to explain that some claims require factual proof ·
which could not be established in the administrative proceedings nor
developed on review in the court of appeals.222

220. See id. at *4.
221. Id. at *5. The opinion is also following the well established maxim that courts should
construe stal!Jtes to avoid constitutional doubts. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
222. See id. at *5-6. Judge Nelson notes that in llRAIRA, Congress specifically forbids the
remand to the agency or district court for the development of a factual record which was previously allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). Thus, this change, which Congress probably
meant to expedite judicial review under new section 242, may have created a basis for asserting alternative jurisdiction in the federal district courts. For a case which generally discusses
remand under former INA § 106 using 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c), see Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d
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The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 242 is an example of
the ways in which courts read preclusion statutes to preserve their jurisdiction. This case suggests that other noncitizens may file federal district court actions seeking to enjoin removal proceedings where the
noncitizen can establish selective prosecution or assert some other constitutional or statutory right which would render removal "contrary to
law." Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
would preclude preemptive suits, yet there are enough recognized exemptions to this doctrine223 to suggest that litigants, especially those
seeking to vindicate constitutional claims, may use this strategy to
evade the limits on judicial review.
In Tefel v. Reno,224 a class action including approximately 40,000
noncitizens, 225 Judge King found that the federal courts retain jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining the INS from removing
noncitizens. 226 The government argued that either subsection 242(f) or
(g) eliminated the federal court jurisdiction. Although he found that
section 242(f) was not applicable to actions filed before April 1, 1997,
King also ruled that this provision did not apply where the noncitizens
"seek to enjoin constitutional violations and policies and practices of
the [INS] . . . . Rather than seeking to enjoin the statute, they are
seeking its implementation under the appropriate standard."227 The
plaintiffs asserted that the BIA's decision that found that Congress
meant to preclude retroactively applications for suspension of deporta-

1378 (8th Cir. 1995).
223. Exhaustion is generally not required when agency precedent clearly indicates it is useless
to exhaust, or when the party is asserting constitutional claims that the agency has no power to
hear. See, e.g., Farhoud v. INS, 114 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1997) (exception to the exhaustion requirement for constitutional claim); Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1188 n.I (9th Cir.
1994) (willing to consider constitutional claims not raised before the BIA due to inability of
BIA to consider equal protection challenge); Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir.
1994) (discussing the exception for most constitutional claims); El Rescate Legal Servs. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 959 F2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (exception to exhaustion for constitutional challenge to procedures raising due process issues).
224. No. 97-0805-CIV-KING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 1997).
225. See id. at *5. A similar class action is pending in California. See Barahona v. Reno,
CV No. C97-0895 CW (N.D. Cal. 1997). On March 28, 1997, in an unpublished order, Judge
Wilken granted class certification and a preliminary injunction enjoining deportation of class
members. The INS appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal is
still pending as of July 1997.
226. See Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *5. The INS filed an appeal of Judge King's order but
Attorney General Reno also appeared to wish to resolve the issue through other means. See
infra note 230.
227. Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *6.
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tion under former INA section 244 was violative of several constitutional rights. They argued that the INS should be estopped from applying this ruling to cases where noncitizens have relied on the availability of this relief in abandoning claims for political asylum or other
forms of relief from deportation. The plaintiffs similarly argued that
the removal of the relief constituted a denial of due process and equal
protection. The government responded that the parties would have the
ability to present constitutional and nonconstitutional claims as a part of
their petition for review before the court of appeals. 228 The district
court concluded that these types of claims require the development of a
factual record which could not be created before the agency and would,
therefore, not be reviewed as part of the administrative record before
·the court of appeals. "[R]equiring [the plaintiffs] to raise such claims
only before the Court of Appeals is tantamount to denying Plaintiffs' a
forum before which they can raise their constitutional claims. "229
Judge King also rejected the government's argument that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. He found that
exhaustion would be futile because the BIA had issued an opinion
which would definitively bar their applications for suspension of deportation.230 Further, he found that exhaustion is not required where the
party is challenging the constitutional implementation of the law, not

228. See id. at *3. Inherent in the government's argument of continuing jurisdiction in the
court of appeals is the assumption that noncitizens seeking to challenge their statutory eligibility
for discretionary relief may continue to do so notwithstanding the bar on judicial review of
decisions "regarding the granting" of relief. See supra Part IV.B.I.
229. Tefe/, 1997 WL 369980, at *4.
230. The petitioners were seeking to overturn the BIA decision Matter of NJB, Int. Dec.
3309 {BIA 1997). In this case, the BIA held, in a 7-5 ruling, that pending cases would be
bound by the new provisions in llRAIRA that discontinued the practice of counting the time
spent in deportation proceedings towards the minimum seven year residency requirement for
suspension of deportation. On July 10, Janet Reno announced that she would review the BIA's
decision. In doing so, Ms. Reno noted, "[w]e must recognize the special circumstances of
individuals whose cases were pending when the new law was enacted, and avoid any unfairness
that could come from applying new rules to pending cases. We want to ensure that
[llRAIRA] will not have an unduly harsh effect ...•" Depiirtment of Justice News Release,
Administration ·Proposes Finetuning for 1996 Immigration Law to Mitigate Harsh Effects of
Applying New ilules to Pending Cases, 1997 WL 381828 {D.OJ. July 10, 1997). The Administration announced a legislative proposal which would essentially apply the old law on a caseby-case basis to applicants whose cases were pending prior to April I, 1997. See id. at •J.
The Attorney General vacated Matter of NJB on July JO, 1997, in a one paragraph order.
One possible explanation of the administration's reaction may be that if Tefel or similar cases
continued, noncitizens might have established some substantive due process rights to combat
retroactive elimination of relief from deportation.
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the particµlar outcome of any case.231 Judge King also noted that the
plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that many people would never
be able to wait for judicial review of their administrative removal order
because they would lack the funds to pursue an individual appeal.
Judge King concluded that without representation in the class action,
"these Plaintiffs will be denied any forum to raise their constitutional
,
and statutory claims. " 232
Judge King also held that subsection {g), the catch-all barrier, applied to cases filed before April 1, 1997; however, he determined that
the suit before him was not, in fact, within the "catch-all" barrier. He
accepted two arguments presented by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that the plain language of subsection (g) only covered the actions
of the "attorney general" and therefore did not cover decisions of the
BIA or other subordinate officials.233 Second, the plaintiffs relied on
McNary to argue that section 242(g) could only preclude judicial review of those matters within the scope of a final order of removal and
that it did not limit pattern and practice challenges which cannot be
litigated as part of the administrative proceedings. They argued that a
broader reading of section 242(g) would bar judicial review of any
claim that was not part of the administrative order. Adopting the
broader reading would render the statute unconstitutional as a violation
of separation of powers. Judge King agreed that the statute must be
interpreted based on the plain language of the provision and construed
to avoid an abolition of federal court jurisdiction to present constitutional claims. "Although the Congress may define the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, it may not intrude upon the judiciary's essential
function by denying any judicial forum to a plaintiff who asserts a
violation of constitutional rights."234
Not all litigants are successful in characterizing their claims as
falling outside of the scope of section 242. In Ramal/o v. Reno,235 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that section 242(g)
barred general federal question jurisdiction where a noncitizen tried to
enjoin deportation proceedings. Ramallo sought to enforce an agreement with the INS in which the agency agreed not to enforce an out-

231. See supra note 223 (discussing the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement).
232. Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *5.
233. The INA contains the following definition: "'Attorney General' means the Attorney General of the United States." INA § 10l(a)(5).
234. Tefe/, 1997 WL 369980, at *4.
235. 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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standing order of deportation. 236 The district court granted specific
perfonnance of the oral agreement based on the theories of promissory
and equitable estoppel.237 The government appealed this decision, and
during the appeal Congress enacted IIRAIRA.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected
Ramallo's arguments that her lawsuit arose in a context which was
outside of the intended bar of section 242(g). 238 Judge Edwards said
that regardless of Ramallo's characterization of her claims, in essence,
she sought to prevent the INS from executing an outstanding order of
deportation. Given the express language of sub~ection (g), he ruled
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals could entertain
her suit. He noted that Ramallo was not precluded from all fonns of
judicial review and suggested that she could raise any substantial constitutional claims in the a writ of habeas corpus.239
Although Congress may have been intending the 1996 legislation to

236. In 1986, Marlena Rarnallo, a lawful pennanent resident, was convicted of conspiracy to
import cocaine. Following her conviction, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against
her, and she sought a section 212(c) waiver. Before the deportation proceedings could conclude, Rarnallo, the INS, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, entered into an agreement that In
exchange for Rarnallo's testimony against certain drug traffickers, the INS would not deport
her. As part of the agreement, she withdrew her application for section 212(c) relief. As a
result, a final order of deportation was entered against her. It was her understanding that the
final order would be quashed at a later date. In recognition of her cooperation, the INS filed
a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings on February 10, 1992 on Ramallo's behalf.
The IJ granted the motion and set a deadline for the submission of a new section 212(c) application. Rarnallo's counsel failed to submit the application on time and the IJ denied the appli·
cation both for lack of prosecution and because the Judge found her to be statutorily ineligible
for the relief because she had lost her pennanent resident status in 1988 when the deportation
order became final. Rarnallo appealed the denial of the section 212(c) waiver to the BIA.
The government reversed its earlier support of her application and moved to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that Rarnallo had traveled outside the United States subsequent to the entry of
the final order of deportation, thereby executing the order and vacating all BIA jurisdiction to
consider an appeal. The BIA granted the INS motion to dismiss the appeal on March IO,
1994 and Rarnallo filed a timely petition for review with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rarnallo then moved to hold the petition for review in abeyance while the parties negotiated a
settlement Ultimately, settlement negotiations failed and she brought an action in the federal
district court seeking specific perfonnance of the INS promise not to deport The INS began
deportation proceedings seeking Rarnallo's deportation as an aggravated felon. Rarnallo filed an
action in the federal district court seeking to enjoin the deportation proceedings. See id
237. Questior.s were also raised as to the district court's jurisdiction under fonner INA § 106.
The government argued that the court of appeals, and not the district court, had jurisdiction
pursuant to section I06. The district court rejected this argument noting that the case did not
involve a question as to the deportation; rather, it dealt with a contract dispute between
Rarnallo and the Government See Rarnallo v. Reno, 918 F. Supp. 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
238. See Ramallo, 114 F.3d at 1213.
239. See id at 1214 (citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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limit judicial review of INS action, the reality is that the removal of
express provisions in the INA will encourage litigants to reframe their
claims to take advantage of alternative grants of jurisdiction. Tefel and
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee present examples of the
types of challenges that focus on constitutional issues in an effort to
distinguish· the case from judicial review of a final order of removal.
As Congress eliminates the forms of relief from removal and tightens
the issues which may be appealed in the petition for review, litigants
may resort to these pattern and practice or constitutional challenges to
both the substantive and procedural provisions of the law. The same
pattern of forcing the litigation into constitutional arenas also appears in
those cases which seek judicial review of a final order via the writ of
habeas corpus. The opinion in Ramallo illustrates this pressure to ere~
ate a constitutional issue in habeas corpus review. In the next part, I
will explore both statutory and constitutional habeas corpus as the most
likely basis for judicial review of final removal orders. The impact of
the constitutionalization of immigration litigation, both under habeas
corpus and the pattern and practice litigation, is explored in Part VI.

V.

BACK TO THE

FUTURE: THE RETURN

OF HABEAS CORPUS

To remove a person from the United States or to bar entry, the
governmeqt must have actual or constructive custody over that person. 240 Consequently, noncitizens have used habeas corpus petitions to
obtain judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders for over one
hundred years. This section will discuss the statutory and constitutional
sources of habeas corpus jurisdiction. It will also discuss the types of
claims which a court may entertain as part of habeas review. 241 In the
last part of this section, I explore some of the ways that Congress defeated its goal of streamlining judicial review by ignoring habeas corpus jurisdiction. Further, if the government succeeds in asserting that
the scope of review in habeas corpus should be limited to "serious
constitutional issues," Congress and the Executive will have created a
system which may lead to the constitutionalization of ·immigration law.

240. See discussion of custody requirement infra note 306.
241. For clarity and to mirror the more common judicial usage, I will use the phrase "scope
of review" instead of the term "cognizable claims." The scope of review depends, in part, on
whether the habeas petition is based on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or whether it is a pure constitutional
habeas. See the discussion of Constitutional habeas in the next section.

308
1466

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1411

A. Statutory Habeas Corpus in Immigration Cases
Although Congress repealed the grant of habeas jurisdiction fonnerly found in INA section 106,242 it did not alter the habeas corpus jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 243 Section 2241 grants jurisdiction
to federal district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for persons "in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United
States" and for persons "in custody under or by color of the authority
of the United States."244 Section 2241 was the jurisdictional basis for
judicial review in the earliest immigration cases and continued to be the
principal method of testing the legality of immigration orders until the
1952 Act allowed declaratory judgment actions and APA review. 24 s In
an effort to remove declaratory judgments and to streamline review,
Congress created fonner section 106 which moved most review to the
courts of appeal but also created specific habeas corpus jurisdiction in
the district courts. 246 Habeas corpus under section 106 was the only

242. Fonner INA § J06(a)(IO), which provided for habeas review of aliens "in custody," was
modified in AEDPA § 440(a) and removed in IIRAIRA. Section 106 also provided for habeas
corpus review of exclusion orders. Deportation orders were reviewed via petitions for review
in the court of appeals. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102 (discussing fonner INA §
106). See also infra Chart I (depicting fonner INA § 106 review procedures).
243. The constitutional guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus is discussed below. In one
instance, IIRAIRA creates a special fonn of habeas for lawful pennanent residents and asylees
who are challenging expedited removal under INA § 235. See INA § 242(e)(2). This provision is discussed in Part IV, supra text accompanying notes 179-84. Whether this limited
habeas impliedly repeals the general grant of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will have to be
litigated. Given the precedents which found no implied repeal of section 2241 in other context, I believe it is unlikely that the statute is effective to limit the nature and scope of habeas
relief. When section 106 created habeas review of exclusion orders, litigants often asserted
both section 106 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, §
81.03. See also Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8959, at *77-103 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1997) {affinning habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 and noting prior practice). The APA also mentions habeas corpus in its judicial review
provisions, see 5 U.S.C. § 703, however, this may be a reference to habeas under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 as the APA does not independently confer jurisdiction. See discussion of APA jurisdiction supra note 212.
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). This statute also confers jurisdiction on circuit court judges In
their individual capacity and to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides, "Writs of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and
any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions."
245. See disc.ussion of these cases supra Part II.
246. In 1961, Congress adopted fonner INA § 106. See discussion of this change in Part II.
The 1961 amendments and legislative history are also discussed in Continuing Dialogue, supra
note 26.
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fonn of review for orders of exclusion, but habeas was also authorized,
in addition to the petition for review, when the alien was taken into
custody pursuant to an order of deportation. 247
Nothing in AEDPA or IIRAIRA specifically amended 28 U.S.C. §
2241, nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress considered
habeas under this statute. 248 The Supreme Court has rejected arguments
that other provisions of AEDPA concerning federal habeas review of
state criminal convictions were effective to impliedly restrict 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.249 Moreover, the Supreme Court has long read statutory limits
on habeas corpus jurisdiction narrowly, refusing to find implied repeals
of alternative avenues of habeas corpus jurisdiction.250
In AEDPA, Congress barred a class of noncitizens convicted of
certain crimes from the fonns of review previously available in § 106.
The express language provided that final orders "shall not be subject to
review by any court."251 In the litigation concerning the effect of this
provision, several courts of appeal found that although this bar did
repeal the authority to hear a petition for review, some fonn of habeas
corpus review remained. 252 In a ~ew cases, the noncitizen sought habe-

247. See fonner INA §§ 106(b), 106(10). The government has argued that Congress repealed
the authority for habeas in immigration cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when it created section
I 06. There is no mention of general habeas statutes in INA, nor is there a clear discussion in
the legislative history surrounding section I 06, of how Congress thought section 106 would
revise habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See supra Part II. Some courts continued to
use section 2241 with section 106 when exercising habeas review. See Mondragon v. Ilchert,
653 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1980). See also the discussion in Mojica v. Reno of the 1961 legislative history and the government argument .that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was impliedly repealed at
that time. See Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *32-34.
248. Judge Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, makes similar findings in Mojica;
"There was no mention of section 2241 of title 28 in AEDPA . . . . Neither the [IIRAIRA's)
transitional rules, nor its pennanent provisions, specifically address or amend the habeas jurisdiction of the district courts under section 2241 of title 28." Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS
8959, at *85. "[T)here is nothing in either the text or history of the AEDPA or the
[IIRAIRA] that specifically mentions section 2241, much less limits or repeals it" Id. at *101.
See also discussion of prior congressional considerations of habeas limitation infra note 293.
249. See Lindh v. Murphy, 19n U.S. LEXIS 3998 (June 23, 1997); Felker v. Turpin, 116
S. Ct 2333, 2338 (1996) (Court held that under the well established "clear statement" rule, 28
U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction cannot be repealed by "implication").
250. See, e.g., F.x Parle Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 105 (1868).
251. AEDPA § 440a.
252. The government argued that section 440a of AEDPA actually repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and that only a limited fonn of constitutional habeas review remained. See, e.g., FigueroaRubio v. INS, 108 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (11th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (dismissing petition for review but referring to statutory habeas); Kolster v.
INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996) (dismissing the petition for review, but finding some fonn
of habeas review remains); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117

310
1468

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1411

as review in the federal district court without attempting to file a petition for review in the court of appeals. 253 Thus the result of the language of AEDPA was not elimination of judicial review, but rather a
shift of forum and form. 254
The statutory preclusion in IIRAIRA is much broader than the
AEDPA provision because of the language of section 242(g) which
states: "Except as provided for in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law" no court shall have jurisdiction to review final
orders of removal. 255 In some cases, the government has argued that
this phrase is meant to override or impliedly repeal the grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as well as other forms of federal court
jurisdiction. 256 At the same time, the government maintains that the
repeal of the statutory basis for habeas corpus is not a violation of the
suspension clause of the Constitution257 because some form of limited
S. Ct 1842 (1997); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing petition for
review and referring to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396
(9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing petition for review and acknowledging statutory habeas); MedczRosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 694 (1997). I am one of
the law professors who joined in filing an amicus brief in Duldulao when it was before the
Ninth Circuit Following the Ninth Circuit decision dismissing his petition for review, Mr.
Duldulao sought habeas review in the federal district court in Hawaii. See Duldulao v. Reno,
958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (allowing habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but limiting the
scope of review available to "grave constitutional claims" and denying the petition).
253. Some cases were filed directly in the district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See,
e.g., Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609
(N.D. Ga. 1996). See also Vakalala v. Schiltgen, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2101 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
26, 1997).
254. In some cases, the government argued that the court of appeals, rather than the district
courts, should exercise this limited habeas review in order to preserve the intent of Congress to
streamline judicial review. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(rejecting the government's argument in light of the Second Circuit's dismissals of petitions for
review under AEDPA). The issue of the appropriate forum for habeas review is pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a consolidated petition for review and appeal from
a denial of the writ of habeas corpus in Magana-Pizano v. Sonchik, Nos. 97-15676 and 9770384 (9th Cir. 1997). I am one of the law professors who joined in filing an amicus brief
in these consolidated appeals.
255. The full text of section 242(g) is found in Part IV.B.3 supra.
256. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8959, at *78-86 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) and cases supra note 252. The government has
also argued that statutory habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains, but asserted that the scope
of review is limited to a constitutional minimum. See, e.g., Vakalala v. Schiltgen, No. C-97042 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2101, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (government argued
that assuming section 2241 continues, the petitioners' claims were not within the residual con·
stitutional habeas function); Moore v. District Dir., 956 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D. Neb. 1997) (INS
conceded that district court maintained habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to extent
required by the Constitution).
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
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constitutional habeas continues to exist.258
Putting aside the argument of a complete repeal of statutory habeas
which will be explored in the next section, the next question is what is
the scope of the review authorized by the statute. The litigation to
date and the general history of habeas corpus review suggest that precision in defining the scope of habeas corpus will be unattainable. 259
As I have discussed, habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was the
vehicle for judicial review of immigration orders until Congress created
the petition for review process in 1961. Habeas corpus was clearly
used to mount constitutional challenges to the substantive immigration
laws and to the procedures used in implementing the statutes.260 But
habeas. was not solely limited to constitutional challenges. Habeas was
also used to review the agency's statutory interpretation,261 to review
whether the agency failed to exercise discretion granted under the statutes,262 and to review claims challenging the evidence presented in the
administrative hearing. 263
The federal district courts that have heard habeas corpus petitions
following the passage of AEDPA and IIRAIRA reflect the difficulty in
detennining the exact scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Some
district courts have felt compelled to construe statutory habeas very
narrowly in order to preserve the intent of Congress to generally limit

pended except where "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it"
258. See Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997). In Yang, Judge Easterbrook agreed
with this construction of llRAIRA and wrote that "effective April I, 1997, [section 306(a) of
llRAIRA] abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ unaided by
statute." Id. at 1195. See also Keister v. INS, IOI F.3d 785, 790 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996) (suggesting a "free standing" authority to hear constitutional habeas claims). This view of continuing habeas corpus jurisdiction is discussed in the next Part.
259. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1487-1505 (discussing judicial and scholarly
debates about the historical role of habeas corpus). One author, in trying to determine the
types of issues which might be considered in habeas corpus review of military courts martial,
commented that beyond constitutional issues and issues of pure jurisdiction "lies fog." See D.
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 874 (3d ed. 1982). Professor Fallon uses
the confusion and possible limitations inherent in habeas corpus review to support his argument
that appellate review of administrative agencies is the best vehicle to protect judicial review and
separation of powers values. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 967-70.
260. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (hearing challenges to the grant of plenary
power to the inspection officer in the 1891 Immigration Act).
261. See cases discussed supra note 54.
262. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (habeas review
of alleged failure to exercise discretion). CJ Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349
U.S. 280 (1955) (accepting refusal to grant relief from deportation based on finding that BIA
had exercised discretion).
263. See cases and authorities cited supra note 55.
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judicial review in the type of immigration cases before them. For
example, some courts refuse to use 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the noncitizen seeks to review some other agency action such as the denial of
a stay of deportation while a motion to reopen is adjudicated by the
BIA. Under the prior section 106(a)(l 0), noncitizens often filed a habeas petition and sought a stay of the order of deportation while the
agency adjudicated a motion to reopen. These courts read the elimination of the special form of habeas in former section 106 as evidence of
the intent of Congress to limit habeas availability. 264 These courts are
drawing a distinction between review of a final order and review of
stays pending adjudication of a discretionary motion or action. The
courts rejecting habeas jurisdiction apparently believe that the repeal of
section 106(a)(l0) ended habeas jurisdiction, or that they must read 28
U.S.C. § 2241 restrictively to fulfill congressional intent to avoid delay
in the execution of removal orders.26s
The federal district courts do not appear to dispute that habeas can
be used to review a final order of deportation, but they disagree on
what claims may be heard in those petitions. Some opinions have
concluded that even under statutory habeas, the court can only consider

264. See, e.g., Lalani v. Penyman, 105 F.3d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1997} (finding federal district
courts had the authority to issue habeas corpus stays in this situation but noting that when
section 242(g) became effective on April 1, 1997, it would eliminate the basis for the court's
jurisdiction); Vayspitter v. United States Attorney Gen., 1997 WL 299372, at •3 (E.D. La. June
3, 1997} (section 242(g) divested the court of jurisdiction to review the execution of deportation orders by the Attorney General); Fedossov v. Penyman, 969 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Ill.
1997} (finding that section 242(g) barred habeas review of the district director's denial of a
stay of execution); Benziane v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 238, 240 (D. Colo. 1997} (finding
section 242(g) eliminates federal court jurisdiction to issue a stay of deportation and habeas
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and would only allow a stay where petitioner challenges the underlying deportation order). Cf Ugwoezuono v. Schiltgen, 1997 WL 142804, at •1 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 1997} (upon order of the Ninth Circuit vacating prior refusal to grant habeas, accepted
habeas to review denial of stay of deportation}.
265. See cases supra note 264. The immigration statutes no longer remove federal court jurisdiction when the noncitizen leaves the country or is removed by the INS. As a result, the
noncitizen could theoretically file a petition for review regarding the denial of a motion to ,
reopen or of some other action even if the order is executed. This assumption presumes that
the noncitizen is not otherwise barred under section 242 from filing a petition for review and
that the motion is not vacated by departure. The current agency regulations continue to vacate
motions to reopen or reconsider when the noncitizen departs the United States or is removed
by the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1997).
Denial of a motion to reopen has been held to create an independent right to file a petition for review because the denial constitutes a new final order. See Giova v. Rosenberg, 379
U.S. 18 (1964). The IJ or BIA has discretion to grant motions to reopen. See INS v. Jong
Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). See also United States v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451-52
(1985) (denial of a motion to reopen is based on abuse of discretion, not de novo review).
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challenges which articulate a "grave constitutional error or a fundamental miscarriage of justice."266 Other courts have adopted a similar standard, requiring the articulation of a "substantial constitutional issue,"267
while other courts have adopted a standard from criminal law habeas
jurisprudence, finding that review is limited to whether the execution of
the removal order would constitute a "manifest injustice."268 As of July
1997, only one district court opinion has stated that statutory habeas is
not limited and covers a broad array of legal issues.269
At first glance, it might seem that these narrow constructions of
habeas review would achieve the congressional goal of streamlining or
curtailing judicial review. ;However, certain habeas decisions reflect a
broader type of review taking place under the label of restrictive review. For example, in Eltayeb v. Ingham, 210 the district court announced that habeas review after AEDPA was limited to determining
whether the deportation would result in a miscarriage of justice. The
court then reviewed the allegation of the alien that the INS had erroneously denied his request for a motion to reopen. 271 The district court
concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that the denial of the
m<;>tion to reopen was abusive and therefore had not presented a case
where deportation would constitute a miscarriage of justice.272 Thus

266. See, e.g., Vakalala v. Schiltgen, No. C-97-0492 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2101, at *11
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (grave constitutional error or fundamental miscarriage of justice);
Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Haw. 1997) (same); Powell v. Jennifer, 937 F.
Supp. 1245, 1252-53 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same).
The apparent origin of the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard is Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). Hill concerned federal post conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 and requ:red that the petitioner prove that the violation of a nonjurisdictional federal statute or rule in federal criminal conviction created a "fundamental defect which inherently results
in a complete miscarriage of justice . . . ." Id. at 428. The standard is misapplied in habeas
review of administrative action where there has been no judicial process or review.
267. See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1997) (habeas review remains for
substantial constitutional errors); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I, 7 (D.D.C. 1997) (substantial
constitutional claims).
268. See Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp 95, JOO (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Mbyia v. INS,
930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative Deportation Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1859-62 (1997).
(critiquing Mbyia as applying an inappropriate scope of review).
269. See Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at
*100-03 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997).
270. 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
271. This type of question would have previously been heard in a petition for review and the
court of appeals would have determined if the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion.
See discussion of motions to reopen as new final orders supra note 265.
272. See Eltayeb, 950 F. Supp. at JOO.
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habeas review appeared to mirror both the scope and standard of review which might have occurred via a petition for review.
Yesi/ v. Reno213 presented another case where the district court
judge considered what type of claims might be presented in a statutory
habeas petition after the passage of AEDPA. Mr. Yesil alleged that the
agency had erroneously interpreted his statutory eligibility for a discretionary waiver of deportation. Judge Chin of the Southern District of
New York found that he did not have to decide the exact nature of
habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and whether it allowed
review of statutory interpretation because the allegation of an erroneous
statutory violation depriving a long-term resident of any possibility of
relief from deportation could constitute a due process violation. Therefore, Mr. Yesil had presented a constitutional claim which clearly supported statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction.274
In contrast, Judge Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York,
found that statutory habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is not limited to
pure constitutional issues but may be used to challenge the agency's
interpretation of statutes. In Mojica v. Reno, 215 the petitioners sought
review of the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of Soriano, 216 which

273. 958 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
274. See id. at 839. As this Article was nearing completion, Judge Chin issued a second
order denying the government's motion to reconsider. The government had asked him to reconsider his finding that· Mr. Yesil should be allowed to apply for section 212(c) relief given
the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of Soriano, slip op. Att'y Gen., 1997 WL 159795
(Feb. 21, 1997). Judge Chin found that the Attorney General had improperly interpreted
AEDPA as requiring retroactive application of the bar to section 212(c) relief. Further, he
found that even if the provision were meant to apply retroactively, "it would be manifestly
unjust to apply" the bar to Yesil. See Yesil v. Reno, No. 96 CIV 8409, 1997 WL 394945, at
*29 (S.D.N.Y. July IS, 1997). "[F]airness requires that Yesil be returned to the position he
would have been in had the law properly been applied by the IJ and BIA." Id.
275. Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997).
Mojica involves review of the habeas petitions of two noncitizens, both long term permanent
residents of the United States.
276. Slip op. Att'y Gen., 1997 WL 159795 (Feb. 21, 1997) (reversing the vacated decision
by the BIA, Int Dec. 3289 (BIA 1996)). The Attorney General concluded that imposing the
new limits on § 212(c) relief to pending cases would not have an impermissible retroactive
effect in violation of the Supreme Court's analysis in Landgraf v. US/ Film Products, 511 U.S.
244 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court set forth a test to determine impermissible retroactive effect in statutes that have no express effective date. Courts must first consider whether
the application would impair rights a party possessed when she acted, increase liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. See id. at 280.
The Attorney General concluded that retroactive loss of the possibility of a section 212(c)
waiver did not alter the consequences of the noncitizen's behavior. The mere possibility of
relief from deportation did not impair a right, increase liability, or impose new duties. See
Matter of Soriano, supra, at *6. Some federal courts have agreed with the retroactive applica-
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held that the elimination of section 212(c) relief in AEDPA was meant
to apply retroactively to pending cases. In addition to this statutory
issue, the petitioners raised several constitutional challenges to the Attorney General's decision and to the e1imination of judicial review.
Judge Weinstein found that he had jurisdiction to consider the statutory
issues and did not address the additional constitutional challenges.277
Judge Weinstein rejected the government's arguments that the scope
of habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 could be limited by "accommodation" to congressional policy goals. 278 "Fidelity to Felker and
Yerger and the requirements of the clear statement rule militates against
reading such limitations into the scope of section 2241. By its terms,
section 2241 is not limited to constitutional claims or claims of fundamental miscarriage of justice."279
After determining that he could review the statutory claim under
section 2241, Judge Weinstein rejected the Attorney General's decision
in Soriano. 280 He also refused to accord her interpretation of the statute any deference because he found that the statute was unambiguous
and that her opinion was based on her application of Landgraf and
other judicial precedents rather than an interpretation of an ambiguous
provision of the statute authority delegated to her. 281 After discussing
the serious consequences of criminal convictions for noncitizens and the
possible reliance noncitizens in the criminal justice system may have
placed in the availability of a waiver of deportation, he concluded that

tion. See, e.g., Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (applying AEDPA bar to
alien convicted of drug possession before enactment).
277. Although Mojica appears to have been resolved on statutory grounds, Judge Weinstein
provides a detailed analysis of the international law and constitutional law background:
In construing a statute courts approach their task with the assumption that Congress
and the President acted with sensitivity to the fundamental thrust of our history as
one of the world's foremost proponents of the rule of law and human rights, including fairness to all within our borders. It is therefore appropriate when deciding the
meaning of the important new statutes dealing with legal permanent residents to put
these provisions in their historical and constitutional setting.
Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *28. Unlike other courts, Judge Weinstein appears to
be expressly acknowledging the constitutional (and international human rights) norms which
inform his reading of the immigration statute. See id. at *3-4. See generally Motomura,
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9.
278. See Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *IOI.
279. Id.
280. See id. at *169. Judge Weinstein also found that her opinion lacked legal support and
had not articulated a rational basis for the retroactive application. He did not reach the issue
of whether the Attorney General had the statutory authority to overturn the BIA decision. See
id.

281. See id. at *165-68.
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Congress did not make the section 212(c) bar retroactive. "It is not for
the Attorney General to usurp Congress's obligation to think seriously
about whether any national interest is served in the upsetting of past
law including the past bargains ·that underlie the criminal justice system
and international concerns. "282
The government may continue to argue that the provisions of
IIRAIRA intend to restrict judicial review to the constitutional minimum. As has been noted, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted this reading and suggested that the language
of section 242(g) has impliedly repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for review
of immigration orders. 283 The next section considers some of the jurisdictional and functional issues concerning constitutional habeas corpus.
B. Constitutional Habeas Corpus

If the 1996 immigration legislation did repeal the statutory form of
habeas corpus in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is there any basis for federal court
habeas jurisdiction?284 The Constitution does not expressly provide a
grant of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions; rather, the Constitution
preserves access to habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause. 285 The
exact nature of the writ of habeas corpus preserved by the Suspension
Clause itself is debated. 286 Some interpreters of the Constitution will

282. Id. at *168. See the continued discussion of constitutional implications infra Part VI
and text accompanying notes 356-59.
283. See Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997).
284. This issue may also become important if Congress explicitly repeals 28 U.S.C. § 2241
in future immigration statutes.
285. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except where "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."
286. The respected immigration law treatise, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, notes
[m]ost of the time it has not been important to distinguish between statutory and
constitutional habeas corpus: habeas corpus has generally conformed to the outlines
established in the general federal habeas corpus statute. But some proposals for
immigration reform, including a bill that passed the Senate in 1983, would have
limited the writ in deportation and exclusion cases to its minimum content "under the
Constitution.
3 GoRDON ET AL., supra note 2, § 81.04 (footnote omitted) (specifying that content would not
be easy) (citing to S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 56970 (1983)).
Professor Legomsky briefly considered the question of the suspension clause limits on
habeas corpus jurisdiction in his comprehensive article concerning judicial review of immigration
cases: "That question -is difficult enough to answer in the abstract. The history of constitutional prohibition is sparse, and the existence of a broadly construed federal habeas statute has
enabled the Supreme Court to avoid the constitutional issue." Forum Choices, supra note 114,
at 1342 (footnotes omitted).
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argue that the Suspension Clause only protects the type of common law
writ of habeas corpus available in 1789 when the Constitution was
adopted.287 Others may look to the Supreme Court's discussions of the
history of the writ of habeas corpus and the prior periods when Congress limited federal court jurisdiction and the ability of federal courts
to exercise the writ. 288
The Supreme Court hinted at a distinction between statutory and
constitutionally minimal habeas corpus review in Heikkila v. Barber. 289
In that opinion, Justice Clark found that in several immigration laws,
Congress had intended to preclude judicial review "to the fullest extent
permitted under the Constitution," yet federal courts continued to review the legality of ·deportation and exclusion orders in habeas corpus
proceedings because of the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus.290
Congress has struggled to understand the distinction between statu-

287. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1465-77 (discussing development of the writ
of habeas corpus); LIEBMAN & HERlZ, supra note 31, at ch. 2. See also, Developments in the
Law Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 31. · Even if a narrow view of habeas is accepted, it
may be very difficult to describe the scope and application of the writ Historical interpretations will undoubtedly vary. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
& IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITIJTION (1996).
.
288. Judicial debates about the meaning of constitutional habeas corpus are also common.
See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (debate between Brennan and Harlan over the historical development of the writ of habeas corpus to review state criminal convictions). The debate is excerpted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1488'-97. Scholarly criticism of the
Supreme Court legal history appears in Lewis; Mayers, The Hal"Jeas Corpus Act of 1867: The
Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33' U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965), and Dallin H. Oaks, Legal
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966). Cf Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas.Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965);
Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
Gary Peller,
579 (1982).
One district court has already concluded that the only form of habeas which survives is
the type of writ which existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention. See Charan v.
Schiltgen, No. C 96-3061 FMS, 1997 WL 135938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1997). In this opinion,
Judge Smith finds that IIRAIRA removed jurisdiction to hear habeas under any federal statute
and thus only the form of habeas protected by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution remains available. He concluded that this constitutional form of habeas only allows the federal
court to inquire whether the INS has custody pursuant to an order issued by the proper jurisdictional body. This form of habeas would not allow the district court to correct any action of
the INS even if it was based on errors of law or fact See id. at *4. Judge Smith appears
to disregard the Supreme Court debates referenced above that have often resulted in a broader
reading of the common law writ of habeas corpus.
289. 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (considering the availability of habeas corpus review for aliens
facing exclusion or deportation).
290. Id. at 235 (aliens historically have been able to "attack a deportation order" by habeas
corpus).

In
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tory and constitutional habeas corpus review in prior years when they
considered proposed statutory refonns of judicial review. The 1961
creation of section 106, with its provisions for appellate court review
and a separate guarantee of habeas corpus review, 291 appears to have
been motivated by concerns that eliminating habeas corpus would be
unconstitutional. 292 In the early 1980s, Congress c_onsidered refonns of
section 106 which would have limited habeas to the "constitutional
minimum."293 The congressional hearings indicate a grave concern that
the elimination of habeas corpus review would not withstand judicial
scrutiny.294 Ultimately the IRCA did not contain any significant alternations to judicial review. 295 In contrast, there is no record of congressional consideration of the possible role of habeas corpus jurisdiction

291. In 1961, fonner INA § 106 was created. This section specifically referred to habeas
corpus as the fonn of review for exclusion orders and whenever an alien was in the custody
of the INS. Under the fonner statute, an alien in deportation proceedings could file a petition
for review. If she lost that petition, she could file a writ of habeas corpus once the INS
moved to execute the final order of deportation. In cases where the alien did not have a stay
of deportation, the writ of habeas corpus was filed under section I06(a)(I 0) to prevent the removal of the aiien even while the petition for review was awaiting adjudication.
292. See Continuing Dialogue, supra note 26.
293. Several different restrictive fonnulations were proposed in various Senate bills between
1982 and 1984. Some proposals limited judicial review of exclusion orders to ,"the right of
habeas corpus under the Constitution of the United States." See S. 2222, § 123(b), as ana·
lyzed in S. REP. No. 97-485, at 35 (1982). The Senate bill introduced in the 98th Congress
also included this provision. See S. 529, 98th Cong. (1983). At the same time, the House
bills made statutory review in the court of appeals the "sole and exclusive procedures" for exclusion cases. This would have made the review procedure identical for both exclusion and
deportation cases. See H.R. 1510.
In hearings on S. 529 before the judiciary committee, David Martin, then a professor at
the University of Virginia law school and currently INS general counsel, testified that the
phrase "under the constitution" is a "delphic phrase," but he admired the Senate's "boldness"
for incorporating the phrase directly in the legislation. See Immigration Refo1m and Control
Act: Hearings on S. 529 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refagee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 331 (1983) (statement of David Martin,
then Professor at the University of Virginia Law School) [hereinafter "March 1983 Senate
Hearings on S. 529"]. Professor Martin also testified that the scope of review required "under
the Constitution" was clarified by the Senate Committee Report which stated that habeas could
be used to examine only questions of procedural due process which were fundamentally and
clearly prejudicial to the noncitizen. See S. REP. No. 97-485, supra, at 13-14.
See also GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, § 81.04. These proposed limits arc discussed in
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at ch. I.
294. Several prominent immigration lawyers and scholars testified about the consequences of
the limits on judicial review and the likely revival of habeas corpus review. See, e.g., March
I983 Senate Hearings on S. 529, supra note 293, at 345 (testimony of David Carliner on be·
half of the ABA).
295. The Immigration Refonn and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986),
was enacted after nearly ten years of refonn proposals.
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when it adopted the sweeping limitations in the 1996 legislation.296
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of current legislative intent
and the evidence of past legislative concerns and the historical use of
habeas corpus in immigration cases, the government has continued to
argue that the catch-all language in section 242(g) effectively eliminates
the statutory right to a writ of habeas corpus and that habeas is limited
to its constitutional minimum. 297 In Yang v. INS, Judge Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit seemed to have no difficulty· in defining the types
of justiciable claims which are not available under the constitutional
writ of habeas corpus. He wrote that noncitizens could not assert
claims solely challenging statutory or regulatory interpretations, nor
could a noncitizen seek review of discretionary actions. 298 His opinion
acknowledged that procedural due process challenges would be included
in constitutional habeas review. 299
If Judge Easterbrook is correct,300 what are the implications of this
interpretation? Litigants will be compelled to characterize their claims
as constitutional claims, and courts will exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction if only to determine that the claim is not of constitutional mag-

296. The Congressional Record does not reveal a discussion of habeas corpus in immigration
cases during the consideration of the 1996 legislation. The only mention I found was in the
explanation of the Administration's proposed refonn bill which would have substituted the petition for review to the court of appeals for habeas corpus review for exclusion cases. See
Hearings on H.R. 1915 and H.R. 1929 Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims, 1995 WL 407976 (June 29, 1995) (testimony of T. Alexander Aleinikofi). The lack
of discussion of habeas corpus in immigration cases during the consideration of the AEDPA
legislation is particularly interesting, as much of AEDPA concerned congressional limits on
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions. See generally Note, Rewriting the Great
Writ: Standards of Review of Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 US.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1868 (1997) (describing the AEDPA changes). The author was among other professors
who wrote letters to Congress about the ill-advised nature of the judicial review restrictions and
suggested that habeas corpus jurisdiction would be implicated. One of these letters was introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Leahy. See 142 CONG. REC. Sll906-07 (daily
ed. Sept 30, 1996). Further, the IIRAIRA provisions were adopted following the Supreme
Court's decision in Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct 2333, 2338 (1996), which held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 would not be repealed by implication. Given the presumption that Congress knows the
state of the law, and if the past consideration of specific exclusions are read to limit implied
exclusion, courts should be reluctant to find an implied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
297. This argument was accepted in Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997).
298. See id. at 1195 (citing United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) and United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 132 (1924)).
299. See Yang, 109 F.3d at 1196-97.
300. I do not agree with his assessment and believe his opinion is wrong in assuming an implied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In an opinion issued several weeks following Yang, the
Seventh Circuit appeared to leave open the possibility of asserting habeas jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. See Chow v. INS, 113 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1997).
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nitude. The stakes for the government are that the habeas corpus form
raises issues of constitutional power. Further, if the litigant is successful, the precedent would be established on constitutional grounds and
thus have much greater implications for the adjudication of other similar petitions.301
But perhaps the issue of repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be resolved in another way. If IIRAIRA repeals the statutory basis for
habeas corpus jurisdiction, then the question is what gives a federal
court jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims of habeas corpus? Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.302 Where the Constitution
does not expressly create original jurisdiction, Congress must create a
statute conferring federal court jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this general
proposition, one circuit court of appeals has referred to a "free standing" power in the federal courts to hear a constitutional writ of habeas
corpus.303 This also appears to be the position of the government in
arguing that IIRAIRA repealed habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
but acknowledging that some limited habeas corpus review for pure
constitutional questions remains. This reading may be necessary to
avoid the construction of the statute as a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus and thus avoids the finding that the provision is unconstitutional as a violation of the Suspension Clause. 304

301. These implications and others are further examined in Part V.C.
302. See Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. {I Cranch) 137 (1803).
303. See Kolster v. INS, IOI F.3d 785, 790-91 n.4 (!st Cir. 1996).
304. There is another way to read the elimination of federal court jurisdiction of habeas corpus without finding that it suspends the writ. The statute might be construed as eliminating
federal court jurisdiction, but allowing the states to exercise habeas corpus over immigration
cases. This is a difficult construction, for the heading of section 242(g) reads "Exclusive Jurisdiction," which at least implies an intent to have exclusive federal court jurisdiction. This construction would require a reexamination of the ruling in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397
(1871). The Supreme Court held that no state court has the power to use habeas corpus to release an individual from federal custody. The reasoning of the court in Tarble 's Case appears
to rely in part on the availability of a federal writ' of habeas to test the validity of the detention. See id. at 409. Professor Hart also suggested that state courts would ensure judicial
review in situations where Congress eliminated federal court jurisdiction. See Hart, supra note
18, at 1363-66. He did not specifically discuss state court judicial review as a solution for
immigration cases although a significant portion of his article concerns federal court review of
immigration issues. Congress would clearly want to avoid the possibility of habeas review in
state and territorial courts in immigration cases and the possible dilution of federal power over
immigration.
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C. How Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Defeats Streamlining and Creates
Constitutional Challenges
Even if habeas is limited to its narrowest fonn, there are many
reasons why this type of judicial review will not result in the certain,
efficient removal adjudication system that Congress desired.
·
1. The Evolution of the Custody Requirement
The traditional strict custody requirement, which was part of the
early habeas corpus jurisdiction, has been greatly expanded over the
past forty years. In the criminal law context, the Supreme Court has
dramatically extended the right to seek habeas corpus review by expanding the conception of "custody." The modern trend has been to
recognize general constraints on liberty as sufficient to create habeas
corpus jurisdiction.305 Today, most courts recognize that constructive
custody is sufficient for habeas corpus subject matter jurisdiction.306

305. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1973) (holding that a person
conditionally released on his own recognizance pending execution of sentence is "incustody"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241-43 (1963)
(holding that a state parolee, under a parole order that imposed numerous conditions and restrictions on his liberty, was "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to entitle
him to habeas review).
306. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 985 F. Supp. 828, 837-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (petitioner under
final order of deportation but not in actual custody of the INS; applying 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
Cf. United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir., 634 F2d 964, 966-72 (Sth Cir. 1981) (holding that "actual, physical custody in a place of detention," or release on bail or personal recognizance after such, is required for district court habeas jurisdiction, yet allowing habeas review
because alien was under supervised parole and thus "in custody"). The Fifth Circuit may have
read a strict custody requirement into former INA § I 06 because the Court was trying to understand why Congress allowed both a petition for review and habeas jurisdiction to review
deportation orders under the former INA § I 06. The Fifth Circuit coupled a strict custody
requirement with a broad scope of review in habeas to reconcile the "streamlining" goals of
Congress in adopting section 106 in 1961. See the discussion in El-Youssef v. Meese, 678 F.
Supp. 1508, 15!3-17 (D. Kan. 1988) (not determining custody issue but addressing the scope
of review in habeas corpus under former INA § 106). See, e.g., Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten,
27 F.3d 487 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the combination of an INS detainer and a final
deportation order lodged against petitioner met the custody requirement of the former INA §
106(a)(IO), even though petitioner "[was] serving time for a criminal conviction and [sought]
relief not from the conviction itself, but from orders [that arose] from his deportation proceedings). See also Flores v. INS, "524 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (finding deportation order was significant interference with freedom to support habeas jurisdiction); Lieggi v.
INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, IS (N.D. Ill. 1975) (resident alien only under demand to surrender for
deportation allowed habeas), rev'd without opinion, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976); Varga v.
Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. 282, 285-86 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (holding that the requirement of custody
was satisfied since petitioner was subject to a deportation o~der, even though he was not in
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The government will undoubtedly try to establish a very strict custody
requirement to narrow the ability of aliens to seek judicial review and
even to avoid review. 307 Actual custody may also become the rule
rather than the exception given the new statutory requirements of detention and the immigration policies increasing discretionary detention. 308

_2. Removal Does Not Defeat Jurisdiction
The right to habeas corpus review attaches with the custody of the
noncitizen but is not defeated by removal of the person from the jurisdiction of the court or the territory of the United States. There are
early cases allowing habeas corpus jurisdiction to continue even after
the petitioner's departure. 309 Continuing jurisdiction is also consistent
with the statutory change which repealed the former elimination of
federal court jurisdiction when the noncitizen left or was removed from
actual physical custody due to posting of a bond). For additional cases, see LIEBMAN &
HER1Z, supra note 31, § 8.2(d)(18), at 206 & n.42.
Courts have also relaxed the venue requirements of habeas jurisdiction. See, e.g., Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493-501 (1973) (concerning habeas review
of a state criminal conviction). In contrast to the new section 242, which seeks to restrict
venue selection to the location of the immigration proceedings and thus gives the INS great
control over th~ forum, venue under habeas may be appropriate wherever the attorney general
or her delegates exercise control over the noncitizen or where he resided before custody was
established. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8959, at *116-20 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) (absent specific statutory restrictions, venue
is appropriate based on "traditional venue considerations" of location where the material events
took place, convenience of the forum, location of witness, etc.); Nwankwo v Reno, 828 F.
Supp. 171, 174-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding, limited to its facts, that venue proper where alien
fonnerly resided although not in custody in that district; Attorney General was appropriate offi·
cer where writ presented solely questions of law and did not require production of the alien).
Cf. Ozoanya v. Reno, No. 96-1985, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *24-25 (D.D.C. June 25,
1997) (transferring pro se habeas petition filed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana because petitioner was incarcerated in the INS Oakdale, La., detention
center).
There are also issues of personal jurisdiction. See Carvajates-Cepeda v. Meissner, 966 F.
Supp. 207, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding the court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner's
custodian); Ozoanya, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9101, at *24-25 (holding the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian and transferring the case accordingly). Cf. Yesil, 958
F. Supp. at 835-36 (finding personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York over the
New Orleans INS District Director).
307. Even if courts do not require actual custody, the INS appears to demand it. In New
York, attorneys report that the INS is issuing a surrender notice to all noncitizens who file
petitions for habeas corpus and the noncitizen must submit to detention. See Memorandum of
Ken Schultz, President New York Chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association,
May 1997 (on file with author).
308. See Margaret H. Taylor; The 1996 Immigration Act: Detention and Related issues, 14
INTERPRETER RELEASES 209 (Feb. 3, 1997).
309. See LIEBMAN & HER1Z, supra note 31, at § 8.2(b).
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the United States.310 Of course, if removal is the principal goal, then
this factor does not defeat Congress' plan. But, nevertheless, the continued appeals will result in administrative costs and possible further
government expense.311
3. Multi-Tiered Review
Habeas decisions under 2S U.S.C. § 2241 may be appealed to the
circuit courts of appeals and by certiorari to the Supreme Court.312 The
creation of multiple levels of review is one of the reasons the government is arguing that the limited form of constitutional habeas review
should take place in the courts of appeals. 313 Judge Easterbrook has
also noted lhat Congress could not have intended for habeas review in
the general case because multiple layers of review defeat the very efficiency Congress sought to create.314 Multi-tiered review obviously
requires more time and resources for all of the parties. In the past,
reform bills would have eliminated habeas review in the district court
and moved all review to the courts of appeals. 315
Even if noncitizens are limited to habeas under the Constitution, the
cases are likely to be appealed. The jurisdictional authority for an
appeal is as unclear as the jurisdictional authority for constitutional

310. Fonner section 106(c) provided that the voluntary or involuntary departure of the alien
during the pendency of judicial review tenninated the federal court jurisdiction. Most circuit
courts interpreted this departure requirement strictly. See, e.g., Quezada v. INS, 898 F.2d 474
(5th Cir. 1990); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the prior
statute which eliminated jurisdiction upon departure, see Peter J. Spiro, Leave for Appeal:
Depalure as a Requirement for Review of Deportation Orders, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 281
(1988). A few circuit courts recognized a narrow exception to the tennination of jurisdiction.
These courts allowed continuing jurisdiction where the alien was removed in violation of her
statutory, due process or other constitutional rights. See Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th
Cir. 1977). These cases are discussed in Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or By Crook: Exploring
the Legality of an INS Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 813 (1994).
311. For exa."Tlple, in Singh v. Waters, 87 F.3d 346 (9th Cir. 1996), the court pennitted the
INS to locate and return Mr. Singh to the United States at the government's expense.
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).
313. To date, the courts of appeals have dismissed petitions for review and referred the peti·
tioner to the district court to file a habeas petition. See, e.g., Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396,
400. (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing appeal of deportation hearing based on criminal felony charg·
es); Duldulao v. INS, 958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (habeas writ dismissed on grounds
that abuse of discretion by officials and improper admission of hearsay at hearing could not be
the basis for a habeas claim but were a veiled attempt at direct review). See also supra note
254 (discussing of the pending consideration of this issue in Magana).
314. Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997).
315. See, e.g., Forum Choices, supra note 114, at 1345-48 (discussing advantages and disad·
vantages with exclusive review of habeas corpus orders by courts of appeal).
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habeas/ 16

4. Lack of General Res Judicata Principles
Traditionally, res judicata principles have not been applicable in
habeas corpus. The very purpose of the writ is to establish the legality
of the underlying custody and not to protect the efficiency or finality
concerns served by the res judicata doctrine. 317 To avoid repetitious
litigation in the new section 242, Congress incorporated res judicata
type limits on judicial review of immigration cases. 318 If Congress had
provided for habeas review under section 242, then habeas petitions
would have been limited by these statutory limits. But when the default grant of habeas jurisdiction is asserted, it is not at all certain that
the same restrictions on relitigation of issues will apply. Of course,
courts may use other devices such as the "successive petitions" or the
"abuse of the writ" doctrines319 to limit habeas petitions, but the point
is that Congress, by failing to specifically address habeas corpus jurisdiction, has thrown open this issue at least for the near future.
5. Evidentiary Hearings
Habeas corpus jurisdiction might also lead to the possibility of
expansion of the administrative record by new evidentiary hearings.
Congress avoids this result for those proceedings covered by section
242.320 Possibly, federal district courts may order discovery or evidentiary hearings in habeas proceedings. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and the rule of civil procedures apply. 321 In other areas of habeas
corpus, special rules of civil procedure apply. 322 However, it is not

316. See discussion of jurisdiction for constitutional habeas supra text accompanying notes
302-04.
317. See LEIBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, §§ 2.4(b), 2.4(d), 28.2.
318. See INA § 242(c)(2). These same limits were also in the section 106 statute and were
designed to limit the scope of habeas review following consideration of a petition for review.
319. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, § 28.4. The "miscarriage of justice" standard is
also used in these doctrines which limit repetitious review. See supra note 266 for a discussion of the origin of the "miscarriage of justice" standard.
320. See INA § 242(b)(4)(A).
321. FRCP Rule 8l(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
· These rules are applicable to proceedings for· . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent
that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States
and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions. The writ of habeas
corpus, or the order to show cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of
the person detained.
322. See, e.g., Rule 6 for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (state criminal habeas review); 28 U.S.C. §
2243 (federal prisoner habeas).
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clear that those restrictions should apply to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It is
also not clear that pure constitutional habeas review includes a right to
evidentiary hearings.
Certainly, cases which have invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a part of
their jurisdictional authority have resulted in discovery and evidentiary
hearings, but these cases also asserted general federal question jurisdiction. 323 Although Congress may, by implication, repeal section 1331
jurisdiction, it has not impliedly repealed some form of habeas jurisdiction.324 Thus, district courts will develop individual rules for the handling of these cases until Congress acts to clarify the jurisdiction and
procedure.
6. Expansion of Constitutional Rights for Noncitizens
Prior to 1961 when habeas corpus was the main vehicle for review,
courts were interpreting a "different" constitution. There has been an
expansion of many constitutional rights and evolving concepts of procedural due process, equal protection and other constitutional doctrines
which protect individual rights. In the general arena of administrative
law, there has been a vast expansion of procedural due process guarantees.325 Despite the rhetoric of the immigration plenary power doctrine,
some recent Supreme Court cases have applied constitutional due process to immigration cases.326
Faced with the confusion over the type of issues which can be
heard in habeas corpus petitions, litigants will attempt to assert constitutional claims to preserve the court's jurisdiction.327 Of course, not

323. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (remanding for consideration of habeas
relief; jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 3331).
324. See supra note 212.
325. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (creating a.balancing test to determine procedural due process in administrative proceedings). Even with subsequent retrenchment, contemporary constitutional rights analysis is much broader than the case law of the early
part of this century.
326. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (finding that returning lawful permanent resident was entitled to procedural due process in exclusion proceedings at the border).
This case has Ii'- direct implication for the expedited removal proceedings which is why the
statutory scheme contemplates a referral for a full removal proceeding when a claim of lawful
permanent resident status is made. But perhaps future courts will find other aliens with significant ties to the United States have significant due process claims notwithstanding a lack of
formal immigration status. See also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 1997
WL 395300 (9th Cir. 1997) (1st Amendment); Rafeedie v. Reno, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (1st Amendment); Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) (equal protection);
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (equal protection).
327. See, e.g., In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605 (Cir. Ct. Dist. Cal. 1882) (reading Chow's
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every case will contain a constitutional claim. However, where it is
possible for litigants to allege a constitutional violation, they will do so
to support the court's exercise of jurisdiction.328 The unintended result
may be that some judges, in an effort to overturn abusive discretionary
actions or erroneous statutory interpretations, may base their decisions
on constitutional grounds. This constitutionalization of immigration law
is explored in the next section.

VI.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
AITACKING JUDICIAL REVIEW

Less than one year after the passage of IIRAIRA, it is too soon to
predict all of the consequences of the congressional attack on judicial
review in immigration cases. This Article has focused on the probable
judicial reaction of both reviving habeas corpus jurisdiction and finding
jurisdiction to review cases presenting "pattern and practice" constitutional challenges to the immigration laws or procedures. But limiting
judicial review to constitutional claims necessarily invites the courts to
evaluate the constitutional rights of noncitizens. The 1996 legislation
expanded the grounds of deportation and eliminated or altered many
forms of discretionary relief. Given the possible lifetime banishment of
long-term permanent residents or other sympathetic noncitizens, courts
may look for ways to limit the government's power over immigration.329 It ·may be that some courts will feel compelled to curtail the
immigratiod plenary power doctrine and to allow noncitizens to assert a
full array of substantive constitutional rights. .
In the past, due to the immigration plenary power doctrine and its
restraint on the development of substantive constitutional rights, courts
employed a variety of stat~tory construction techniques or procedural
due process surrogates that resulted in the protection of noncitizens. In

claims as presenting a due process challenge to the nature of the deportation hearing itself and
suggesting habeas review would be available but not deciding the jurisdictional authority for
habeas); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1997) (transferring the petition for adjudication but finding that the noncitizen had raised the following possible constitutional challenges:
due process right to counsel, due process refusal to change venue, due process right to appeal
a deportation order, equal protection denial of relief).
328. See Leoni Benson, Surviving to Fight Another Day: Preserving Issues for Appeal, in II
1995-1996 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 353-66 (R. Patrick Murphy et nl.
eds., 1995). In that article, I. discuss how to preseive constitutional claims in administrative
hearings before an agency not empowered to rule directly on constitutional claims.
329. See INA § 212(a)(9).
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two important articles, Hiroshi Motomura documented both of these
approaches. He first wrote of the presence of "phantom norms," representing constitutional values in immigration decisions that influenced
judicial interpretation of statutory and regulatory provisions. These
phantom constitutional norms sometimes led courts to shield the noncitizen from the harshness of the plenary power doctrine without ruling
on the substantive constitutional claim.330 In a second article, Professor
Motomura explored how courts in immigration cases sometimes relied
on procedural due process surrogates for substantive constitutional
rights. 331 Both of these approaches avoided the substantive constitutional issues. Professor Motomura gave several reasons why judicial analysis distorted by phantoms or surrogates is problematic and ultimately
ill-advised.332 This analysis is a helpful starting point for evaluating the
impact of the constitutionalization of immigration cases.
The constitutionalization of.immigration law will distort the development of immigration law by limiting judges to exclusively consider
"substantial constitutional issues." Constitutionalization may eliminate
the technique of relegating constitutional norms to influential phantoms.
If courts cannot rely on statutory or regulatory construction then, in
some cases, the phantom substantive constitutional norms will be made
"real" and the substantive constitutional rights of noncitizens will be
directly enforced.333 The ironic result may be that Congress, in exercising both its plenary power over lower court jurisdiction and its plenary
power over immigration, has created an environment which might ultimately lead the judiciary to reduce congressional and executive power
over immigration through vigorous protection of the habeas corpus
petition or by preservation of other types of jurisdiction to consider
constituitonal claims. The more likely, immediate result may be that
lower courts will follow the precedents of the plenary power doctrine
and therefore reject substantive constitutional challenges.334 Neverthe330. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutionql Norms, supra note 9.
331. See Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 9.
332. Professor Motomura recognized that even if courts abandoned these strategies, they
might not necessarily also abandon the plenary power doctrine. However, he argued that opinions which openly confronted the lack of substantive constitutional rights for noncitizens would
lead to a more honest and thoughtful development of immigration law. See id. at 1699-1704;
Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 612-13.
333. A recent example is the protection of First Amendment rights in American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee v. Reno, discussed in Part IV.
334. See, e.g., Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting elimination of petition
for review as a violation of due process or the separation of powers and partially relying on
the plenary power doctrine deference to Congress); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, No. 96-
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less, the direct consideration of these issues may lead to a "steady
erosion" of the plenary power doctrine. 335
Given that procedural due process is one of the only constitutional
protections courts have recognized, constitutionalization of immigration
litigation will also lead to a dramatic increase in claims based on procedural due process. In some cases, these claims will be based on
recognized procedural rights, but in others, the claim will be meant as
a replacement for some other substantive constitutional right or even as
a substitute for the lack of substantive statutory protections.336 While I
hope that courts will vigorously preserve the due process rights of
noncitizens, inappropriate reliance on procedural due process can have
negative consequences for all parties.
In the landmark case Mathews v. Eldridge, 331 the Supreme Court
created a three-part balancing test for detennining whether an administrative procedure meets the requirements of procedural due process.
The first factor is to identify the individual's interest at stake in the
administrative adjudication or application of a rule. Second, the court
should examine the probable value of additional procedural safeguards
and the ability of these safeguards to ensure accurate decisionmaking.
These two factors must be balanced against the governmental interests
at stake. The government's interest includes the burdens on efficient
enforcement and the cost of additional or substitute procedures. The
Supreme Court specifically referred to these balancing factors in
Landon v. Plasencia, 338 a case which established that lawful pennanent
residents were entitled to procedural due process in exclusion proceedings. In several different contexts, lower courts have used the Mathews
v. Eldridge factors to order new and different procedures. These

15495, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1997) (rejecting the claim that the
retroactive statutory change concerning eligibility to contest the government regulations concerning eligibility for legalization partially relying on plenary power rationale); Duldulao v. Reno,
958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (district court rejected ex post facto challenge to elimination
of relief from deportation).
335. This description is the hopeful prognosis of Professor Legomsky in his article Ten More
Years of Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 936-37. He reluctantly buries his prior hopes of
complete abandonment and suggests that the transformation of immigration law will come from
a continued weakening of the doctrine. See id. He wrote the article before the current attacks
on the courts' jurisdiction to conduct any review at all.
336. Professor Motomura thoroughly documented this point in Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 9.
337. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
338. See supra note 9, at 34-35. The Supreme Court did not decide what procedures were
necessary but remanded to the lower courts to consider the Mathews v. Eldridge factors.
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changes were necessary to protect the due process rights of noncitizens;
nevertheless, the court ordered changes led to years of delay in adjudication. 339 Of course, Congress and the INS might have avoided the
litigation by adequately protecting these rig~ts. Several scholars have
noted that where Congress delegates almost unlimited control to the
INS and does not carefully delimitate the scope of the agency's powers,
courts are likely to ·~ump in" to create new procedural due process
limitations in an effort to protect the interest of the noncitizen and to
try to ensure accuracy in decisionmaking. 340
Judicial creation of new procedural due process protections can lead
to reluctance to create new substantive statutory rights. For example,
Congress may have created bars to eligibility for relief from removal
for certain aliens with criminal convictions out of a perception that
these people abused procedural protections to delay their removal. By
eliminating the statutory relief, Congress may have believed they eliminated all of the substantive rights which required procedural protections.
Long-term permanent residents will now present substantive due process
claims to remain in the United States. In the past, these claims have
not prevailed. 341
Procedural due process: can also add to the cost of programs. If
courts create new. procedures, Congress cannot anticipate the cost of the
immigration enforcement or adequately define the administrative structure. Yet Congress should recognize that it bears at least partial responsibility for the courts stepping in to determfoe the appropriate pro-·
cedure. A partial remedy for the uncertainty created by judicial enforcement of procedural due process norms is congressfonar enactment
of legislation that both clearly defines eligibility for relief· from removal
and includes detailed, fair procedures that the agency must follow in
implementing the Jaw. 342

339. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Seivs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993). See also discussion
supra Part 11.
340. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ;}.liens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Pm. L. REv. 237, 259 (1983); Motomura, Procedural Surrogates,
supra note 9, at 1701; Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 606;
Verkuil, supra note 116, at 1179-82. See also Martin, supra note 112, at 1267.
341. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (no substantive right to remain in the United States upholding retroactive deportation for past membership in the Communist Party and rejecting claim that deportation is a form of ex post facto punishment prohibited
by the Constitution).
342. Congress has, from time to time, taken greater care in specifying procedural protections
for noncitizens. For example, Congress clarified the notice and procedural protections required
in dc;portation hearings in former INA § 242, amended and recodified in new INA § 240.
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Constitutionalization of immigration litigation also raises troubling
problems for noncitizens. Establishing a substantive constitutional claim
or a procedural due process claim often requires that the noncitizen
develop a factual record in a district court.343 It can be difficult, even
impossible, to develop a sufficient record to assert either a substantive
or a procedural due process claim in the administrative proceeding. As
noted previously, neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA has the
authority to hear or decide many forms of constitutional questions. 344
·In these administrative proceedings or in appellate review specifically
limited to the administrative record, the noncitizen will not have had an
opportunity to develop the factual predicates necessary to the finding
that some constitutional right has been harmed. Many of the recent
constitutional challenges have been brought in class action suits in district court where advocates have directly challenged the agency's implementation of the law or the lack of procedural protections in the statutes. 345 To present these types of claims, teams of lawyers have had to
conduct factual investigations, formal discovery, and survive rounds of
procedural motions. Similarly, where attorneys wanted to protect substantive rights, they have frequently used an offensive strategy by filing
actions to enjoin the INS from initiating or continuing removal actions.346 These strategies also require sophisticated counsel. Pro se
petitioners are unlikely to adequately assert "selective prosecution," First
Amendment protections, lack of substantive or procedural due process
or arguments based on principles of equitable estoppel.347

343. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 104S, JOSS (9th
Cir. 199S} (selective enforcement claims cannot be heard or developed in administrative proceedings}, reaffd, 1991 WL 39S300 {9th Cir. 1997).
344. See supra cases discussed in note 223. But cf. Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d IS62, IS67
(9th Cir. 1994} (some due process objections must be raised in the administrative process to
allow the agency an opportunity to cure the procedural defect}.
34S. See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Reno, S09 U.S. 43 (1993} (considering due process
challenge to INS implementation, but remanding for determination of standing}; Reno v. Flores,
S07 U.S. 292 (1993} (reviewing and rejecting due process challenge to juvenile regulation}; INS
v. National Ctr. for Immigrant Rights, S02 U.S. 183 (1991} (due process challenge to INS
bond and work authorization avoided by statutory interpretation}; McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991} (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear due process
challenges to the manner in· which the INS administered statutory procedures}.
346. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, No. 96-SS929, 1997 WL
39S300 (9th Cir. 1997}; Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-080S-CIV-KING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla.
May 20, 1997).
347. For example, in a recent case, a detained lawful permanent resident filed a pro se habeas corpus petition and the district court judge appointed pro bono counsel to brief the arguments in support of the habeas petition. See Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I (D.D.C.
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Finally, exclusive constitutional decisionmaking may lead to a fonn
of balkanization where parties assert competing views of the constitutional rights of noncitizens.348 Constitutionalization does not allow for
the same variety of nuanced analysis or the careful development of
rights and interests that a traditional judicial process includes. 349 Constitutional adjudication can be a blunt instrument which creates both
constitutional winners and losers and then enshrines the victory in stare
decisis.
.
If full substantive constitutional rights are established, Congress and
the Executive may have a diminished capacity to develop immigration
policies or to respond to particular emergencies. Although I support
the abolition of the plenary power doctrine, I recognize that the establishment of full constitutional rights may weaken the ability of the
government to use categorical approaches that, in many instances, have
been unobjectionable.3so For example, suppose that the Supreme Court
1997). Mr. Ozoanya was particularly fortunate to have had Robert E. Juceam, Douglas W.
Baruch, and R. Patrick Murphy of the finn of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson and
Kimberly Kolch of Proyecto Libertad. Robert Juceam has litigated several immigration cases
before the Supreme Court. Both he and Mr. Murphy, another very experienced immigration
attorney, have edited the Annual Conference Books of the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association for many years and are respected for the breadth of their knowledge. Mr. Ozonaya
and his attorneys were able to amend his pleadings and to articulate a number of constitutional
challenges, including a due process challenge to the retroactive elimination of relief from deportation and lack of counsel, an equal protection challenge to the BIA's interpretation of the
elimination of the fonner INA § 212(c) relief, and a due process challenge to the failure of
the INS to adequately infonn noncitizens of their appellate rights. These claims were not resolved but transferred with the habeas petition to the Western District of Lousiana because the
court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Ozoanya's custodian. See id. at 8.
The Court ordered a stay of Mr. Ozoanya's removal pending the adjudication of his habeas
petition. It is not likely that Mr. Ozoanya would have had the legal expertise to raise these
Constitutional issue had he continued pro se.
348. The judicial avoidance of constitutional decisionmaking in statutory interpretation is motivated in part to avoid a confrontation with the political branches. See Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubts). The same prudential reasons which support such a canon
argue against exclusive constitutional litigation. There is a large body of literature concerning
the efficacy and role of the canons in statutory and constitutional construction. See, e.g., Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Construction, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529
(1992). See also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960) (canons on
statutes); RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 285 (1985) (criticizing the inappropriate
avoidance of c:mstitutional issues).
349. Professor Motomura described the. problem of developing a clear and honest dialogue as
occurring because the immigration plenary power doctrine precluded the enforcement of constitutional nonns, and modern courts, in trying to evade the strictures of the doctrine, evaded the
full discussion through subconstitutional rationales. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutional
Norms, supra note 9, at 549, 607-13.
350. Unfortunately, history shows many examples of racist and ethnic discrimination in our
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had been limited to consideration of the equal protection question -raised
in Jean v. Nelson. 351 In that case, a group of Haitians challenged the
INS policy of routinely refusing "parole" admission to people from
Haiti when the agency routinely released others from custody. The
petitioners alleged that this distinction was based on impermissible
national origin discrimination in violation of their Fifth Amendment
rights to equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court did not
reach the constitutional issue but found that the facially neutral detention regulations prohibited discrimination in the implementation of the
immigration laws and remanded the case to allow the lower court to
determine if the INS had actually discriminated. Justice Marshall filed
a detailed dissent, arguing that the statutes and regulations challenged
could not be read as precluding national origin discrimination and that
the Court had to reach the constitutional claims. Justice Marshall
found that even aliens seeking initial entry to the United States are
entitled to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. He recognized that his holding might restrict the ability of Congress or the Executive to base some aspects of immigration policy on
national origin distinctions:
This dissent is not the place to determine the precise contours
of petitioners' equal protection rights, but a brief discussion
might clarify what is at stake. It is clear that, consistent with
our constitutional scheme, the Executive enjoys wide discretion
over immigration decisions. Here, the Government would have
a strong case if it showed that (I) refusing to parole Haitians
would slow down the flow onto United States shores of undocumented Haitians, and that (2) refusing to parole other groups
would not have a similar deterrent effect. Then, its policy of
detaining Haitians but paroling other groups might be sufficient-

immigration laws. I do not mean to ignore the errors of the past. Even when discrimination
may not have been intentional, considerations of national origin and race appear to have inappropriately influenced the enforcement of the immigration laws. See Martin, supra note 112, at
1305 (including statistics that might indicate disparate treatment in the adjudication of asylum
applications based on nationality of applicant}. This point was noted in Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over
Immigration, 11 N.C. L. REv. 413, n.151 (1993} (analyzing Supreme Court decisions which use

plenary power doctrine or similar constructions to discourage immigration litigation and to overturn judicial challenges}. Professor Johnson interprets Professor Martin's statistics as indicating
disparate treatment in adjudication of asylum applications based on the nationality of the appli·
cant.
351. 472 U.S. 846 (1985}.
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ly related to the valid immigration goal of reducing the number
of undocumented aliens arriving at our borders to withstand
constitutional scrutiny . . . .
It is also true that national origin can sometimes be a per-1
missible consideration in immigration policy. But even if entry
quotas may be set by reference to nationality, national origin
(let alone race) cannot control every decision in any way relat.
.
.
ed to 1mm1gration
....352
Of course, the Supreme Court's recognition of equal protection rights
does not necessarily mean that the Court would establish a strict scrutiny test for national origin discrimination in this context. Perhaps the
court would only require a form of intermediate scrutiny or, most probably, adopt a form of a low level rational basis test. 353
National origin is one of the characteristics which affects many
aspects of immigration law and policy. For example, nationals of certain countries are exempt from visa requirements for nonimmigrant
visits of less than ninety days. 354 As Justice Marshall mentioned, our
immigrant quota system is based on categories of preferential qualifications such as employment or family relationship, but all of these preferences are limited by overall national origin country quotas. 355 Congress
has sometimes used national origin considerations to dictate special consideration of claims of religious persecution or political asylum. 356
Supporters of full equal protection rights for noncitizens will applaud
the judicial scrutiny of these national origin classifications, but even a
low level rational basis test may mean increased litigation which in and
of itself might unduly frustrate the statutory or regulatory scheme.357

352. Id. at 880.
353. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (suggesting that the decisions
of the government excluding aliens on ideological grounds need only be supported by some facially legitimate and bona fide reason).
354. See INA § 217. Canadians are exempt from the visa stamp requirement except for
treaty trader or treaty investor petitions and for immigrant visa entry. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.1.
355. See INA § 203. These quotas are set by birth in a country, not citizenship. There are
few exceptions to the national origin quota rules. See INA § 202(b) (cross-chargeability based
on marriage or transient birth}.
356. See, for example, the Lautenberg amendment granting Jews, Orthodox Christians, and
Ukrainian Catholics special consideration in requesting refugee status in the former Soviet Union
and other former communist countries. See Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, tit.
V, § 5990, 103. Stat. 1261 (1989), codified at INA § 207.
357. Perhaps it was concern about the possible establishment of Fifth Amendment protections
that led the government to pursue the strategy of interdiction at sea and to rely on the Supreme Court jurisprudence which has led to a lessening of constitutional protections for gov-
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Although this is not the time or place to begin a detailed analysis
of predicting exactly how the constitutionalization of immigration law
may effect immigr~tion adjuciation, I will briefly explore one other
example. In Mojica v. Reno,358 Judge Weinstein found that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 allowed him to consider the statutory challenges of the petitioners, and he found that the Attorney General had improperly interpreted
AEDPA tc require application of the bar to section 212(c) relief to
cases pending when AEDPA was enacted. He stated repeatedly that
the case involved an issue of statutory interpretation. The petitioners
raised several constitutional challenges, including a claim that retroactive application of the bar to relief would deny substantive and procedural due process. Ultimately, he ruled that retroactive denial of section 212(c) relief to the petitioners was prohibited as an improper interpretation of the statute and that a retroactive interpretation was constitutionally prohibited.359 Judge Weinstein's opinion leaves little doubt that
he was prepared to find that if the statute required retroactive application, it would violate due process.360 If this holding was ultimately
sustained, noncitizens would undoubtedly challenge the elimination of
other statutory forms of relief and retroactive grounds of deportability.
Again, although I would agree that Congress should be limited in the
adoption of retroactive legislation as it is in other areas of law, I recognize that the establishment of this constitutional right for noncitizens
would significantly alter the ability of Congress to define the member-

emment conduct outside the territory of the United States. The interdiction programs withstood
statutory and treaty challenges in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). For a
critique of these geographical limits to constitutional obligations, see NEUMAN, supra note 6.
358. Mojica is discussed in the text beginning supra note 275.
359. Judge Weinstein's opinion clearly indicated that retroactive application of the bar would
violate due process. He distinguished Harisiades as concerning only whether the ex post facto
clause prohibited retroactive grounds of deportability and as failing to address the lawful perma·
nent resident's due process interests. A thoughtful examination of the constitutional illegitimacy
of retroactivity in immigration law is found in Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Ex Post Facio
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv (forthcoming 1997) (unpub·
lished manuscript on file with author).
360. Justice Weinstein discusses the constitutional restraints on retroactive legislation at length.
See Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y.
June 24, 1997). He also seemed equally willing to consider international treaty obligations
owed to lawful permanent residents and to base his rejection of the retroactive application of
the bar on those grounds. See id. I have not considered how international treaty obligations
might also restrict congressional power to eliminate judicial review. For a discussion of modem international law restraints on immigration power based on traditional notions of sovereignty, see Henkin, supra note 6. See also Michael A. Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965.
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sh~p of our community.361

The constitutionalization of immigration law is a far cry from the
stated congressional goal of "streamlining" judicial review. To some
degree, 362 the integrity of our immigration laws and the continued support of the people of the United States for future immigration, requires
that the government improve its ability to remove people who have
violated our laws and its efficient use of immigration laws to prevent
abuse of the system. Yet Congress has failed to consider adequately
how the strong presumption of continuing judicial review over constitu-.
tional questions and the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction will
alter the streamlined design. A better approach would be to recognize
the protected spheres of jurisdiction in habeas and constitutional adjudication and build a system which also allows consideration of important
subconstitutional issues.363

361. For example, until 1972, there was no ground of deportability for active participation in
Nazi persecution during World War II. See INA § 237(a)(4)(D). The retroactive application
of this statute was upheld in several challenges. See, e.g., Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1986) (rejecting challenge to retroactive ground of deportation based on due process, equal
protection, and the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder).
362. As I have explained earlier, I do not believe that Congress can fairly accuse judicial
review for the problems of delay or inefficiency in immigration law enforcement And even if
some individuals did use the statutory appeals to delay removal, other provisions of IIRAIRA
would appear to frustrate the tactics of delay. For example, the fact that the statute no longer
eliminates jurisdiction when the noncitizen departs helps to preserve the right to judicial review
and yet allows the government to execute the final administrative order. I recognize that many
people will not be able to afford attorneys to pursue the judicial proceedings if they are removed, but this is a practical obstacle not a statutory preclusion.
363. Perhaps immigration law will follow the course of judicial review of administrative decisions regarding the award of benefits by the Veteran's Administration. Congress tried to eliminate all judicial review of administrative benefits determinations. That attempt led to some of
the same problems created by the 1996 immigration legislation. The former 38 U.S.C. §
211 (a) barred review of decisions of the Administrator on benefits questions. However, in
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a federal court could
review constitutional claims of the benefit recipients. This, in turn, led to increasing numbers
of constitutional challenges. In Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724 (ED.N.Y. 1982), the court
noted the appearance of regular claims being brought as constitutional issues. In rejecting the
claim that Veterans Administration's (VA) failure to provide medical care and treatment violated
the Supremacy clause, the court noted, "[P)laintifrs attempt to elevate their claims to a constitutional level is certainly inventive, after careful consideration the court concludes that no bona
fide constitutional issue [has been] presented." Id. at 730. For a contemporary discussion of
how this precl:ision statute might lead to constitutionalization, see Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion
of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1983).
In 1988, Congress passed the Veterans Judicial Review Act, 102 Stat 4105. This Act
established an Article I court called the Court of Veterans Appeals. The Act gave this court
jurisdiction to hear review of direct challenges to the VA regulations, and review of benefit
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If the present attacks on judicial review are left undisturbed, it may
be that over time, with enough case Jaw, the contours of judicial review of immigration cases will result in the efficient removal of
noncitizens. But until that theoretical day of legal certainty, it is my
belief that what Congress has done in trying to limit judicial review is
to move many of the battles into the ever changing territory of habeas
corpus jurisdiction and to create an environment that may lead to the
inappropriate constitutionalization of immigration cases.

adjudications. Perhaps the return to judicial review was motivated by the fear of the growing
constitutionalization of benefis adjudications. The return of judicial review is discussed in Jona·
than Goldstein, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial Review • . • SLOWLY!,
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (1989).
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CHART 1

POSSIBLE JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER OLD§ 106 (1961-1996]
BIA ORDER

Exclusion ·

Deportation

{~.,......"":;"'....~~

Habeas Corpus
U.S. District Court

!.
!·
~:.

-~~

Petition for
Review
Circuit Court
of Appeals

Motion to Reopen or
Reconsider if denied
triggered new § 106
review

t
~

~·

Writ of Certiorari
U.S. Supreme

Court

Writ of
Certiorari
U.S.
Supreme
Court

X'

~
}.

.

~.:

.

' lfdenied,
noncitizen might
file motion to
reopen before the
BIA and/or habeas

,..
~-

~

>

Stay of
Deportation
Habeas
Corpus
District Court

If denied,
back to the
Circuit Court
of Appeals
i·
!:

Notes: Automatic stay of removal upon filing petition for review
for most cases.1996 Regulations limited timing and number of
motions to reopen/reconsider. With rare ·exception, departure
from the U.S. vacated federal court jurisdiction.
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CHART 2

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN GENERAL
CASES: INA § 242
(Not including claims of U.S. Citizenship)

Removal Order
Immigration Judge

0
Administrative Appeal
Board of Immigration
Appeals

~

..

Petition for Review
::

~

Court of Appeals

0

,,.

f_...,_. ...,...,.....,. ...,•.•.•v.•/',•,•.l',•,•,o.-,•.•.•.•J'/'.•.•,•,•,.,.,•,•,o,•,o,•.•.-.•,•,•,••••,•

'

Writ of Certiorari
United States
Supreme Court

Notes: One motion to reopen/reconsider may be filed within
a limited period. Denial of motions may be reviewed as final
orders. No automatic stay of removal, but federal court jurisdiction
continues in federal court. Habeas corpus review may still exist
when custody requirement is met.
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CHART 3

TREATMENT OF "CRIMINALS"
UNDER INA§ 242, § 238(b)
AND§ 238 (c)
§242

§ 238 (b)

§ 238 (c)

Regular Removal

Non-LPR
Aggravated Felon

Judicial Removal

Order of Removal

Notice of Intent to
Remove

Removal order
Issued in Federal
District Court
during sentencing

Immigration
Judge

Removal Officer

..

!:

:--.~··

Administrative
Appeal
Board of
Immigration
Appeals

~
f:

0

0
v

......

Final
Administrative
Order by
Removal Officer

l

Appeal of
Sentence and
Order of Removal
x

Court of Appeals ·

Note: No BIA
Review

Petition for

Petition for

Review

Review

Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals

I·.___ _ _ ___,

~
!""

v

~

Writ of Certiorari

t

United States
Supreme Court

~
i'

Note: There are no express provisions for judicial review in
either§ 242 or§ 238(b), however the court of appeals may
have jurisdiction to determine removability or membership in
the barred class.
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CHART 4 ·

INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW FOR CERTAIN "CRIMINAL" NON-CITIZENS
.......................................,...,,,................IYVY'I'>................/'.....,,.,.,••

~~·y.•,•,•,•
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Order of Removal by
Immigration Judge
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INADMISSIBLE ALIENS AND
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, INA § 235(b)(1)
Admission
Officer and Supervisory
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